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5 The 'formal' regulaüon of Kenya's Lake Victoria
fishery
5.1 Introduction
'Formal' regulations emanating from the state represent an external intervention in the exploitation of a
resource, which may either be designed to enbourage the exploitation of the resource base; or else, and
more commonly, set out to conserve the resource so that it will remain productive indefinitely. In the latter
case, such managerial intervention is designed to be coercive, using sanctions of fines and/or other
punishment to force exploiters into regulatory compliance. This chapter explores the application of such
rules and regulations within the context of Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery. It specifically examines the
problems inherent to these regulations and their implementation. The chapter goes on to demonstrate that
many of the . priori assumptions typical of contemporary management models, such as the ability of the
state to fund and enforce them, and that fishing communities lack heterogeneity (see Chapter 1), are invalid
when applied to a fishery such as this one. Finally, the chapter explores how fishermen have responded to
these regulations, what their perceptions of them are, and concludes with an assessment of the regulation's
success.
Following the repeal of the 127mm gill-net mesh-size limitation in 1961 and the collapse of the Fishermen's
Union in 1962, regulation of the lake passed to the Kenya Fisheries Department (KFD). In 1968, the
Kenyan Government passed the Fish Industries Act, and the KFD was charged with implementing and
enforcing this, although there is little to suggest that it did so successfully. It had been hoped that because
of the large size of the introduced tilapia, O. niloticus, fishermen would be encouraged to use larger sized
gill-nets, channelling pressure away from the exhausted endemic tilapia species (Balirwa 1992). This,
however, did not occur, and no further attempts to implement regulation occurred until 1989, with the
introduction of the 1989 Fisheries Act (Republic of Kenya 1989, 1991), which provide the Director of
Fisheries with sweeping powers to control fishing and fishing effort.
5.2 Contemporary forms of fisheries management in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery
In Chapter 3, the colonial forms of regulation on Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery were discussed. It was
argued that the failure of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Service (LVFS) appears to have arisen from problems
inherent to the regulations they imposed, and which arose through their incompatibility with the financial
and social status aspirations of Kenya's Lake Victoria fishing communities. These were further
compounded by the funding and staffing constraints faced by the LVFS. Subsequent regulatory regimes
fared little better, although for different reasons, as the fishery came to be increasingly defined by coping
strategies such as sequential exploitation and migration. Despite the serious problems that have confronted
the application and success of state-based formal regulations throughout the history of this fishery, Kenyan
authorities have consistently tried to bring the fishery under the control and direction of the state. These
efforts have been characterised by attempts at imposing contemporary forms of fisheries management, the
most important of which has been efforts to gain Maximum Sustainable Yields (MSYs) for the fishery
(Table 5.1). These estimates are not species-specific, and cover all of the 200+ species to be found within
the fishery, each with its own fecundity rates, mortality rates and growth rates. In any case, the actual
catches noted in Table 5.1 suggest that these MSYs are not adhered to, and in 1994, Kenya landed some
193,652 tormes of fish from Lake Victoria alone (Unpublished Department of Fisheries Data 1995).
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The MSY levels provided in Table 5.1 are estimates, and as a consequence, much of the managerial
discussion concerning the lake demands that accurate stock assessment be carried out.
Table 5.1: Estimated sustainable yields for the Kenyan sector of Lake Victoria and actual catches (actual
Catches from Greboval and Fiyd, 1993).
"Information on stock size, stock structure, and growth and mortality of a fish stock is essential for fisheries
management" (Ligtvoet et al., 1995: 120), and "[fjuture research on. Lake Victoria should emphasise on
[sic.] fisheries biology and environmental studies...to guide policy makers, investors and managers on
matters of fisheries management and conservation" (Okemwa 1995: 190; see also Okidi 1992; Ochieng'
Okach 1992; Reynolds and Greboval 1988; Dunn and Ssentongo 1992; Government of the Republic of
Kenya eta]. 1995). This literature, however, does not stipulate how such information is to be gained, who
will gather it, and who will fund its collection. Critically, no indication is provided as to how such
information might be utilised by fisheries managers, because it makes the explicit assumption that Je
present regulatory framework is adequate to police the fishery within MSY parameters. Furthermore, this
managerial literature does not consider in what ways MSY information might relate to the control of fishing
effort levels, for no Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) figures have been calculated. Although MSYs are
not explicitly referred to iii the 1989 Fisheries Act, the nature of the regulations it encompasses suggests
that they are implicit.
5.3 The 1989 Fisheries Act
This Act draws upon many of the same rules laid out by previous acts, and focuses on five primary areas:
Net-mesh restrictions, effort restrictions, gear prohibitions, spatial restrictions and temporal restrictions
(Repub!ic of Kenya 1989, 1991):
a) 4fl gifl nets are limited to a minimum mesh-size of 127mm. Boat seine nets used for the capture of
amena may he no sr-r han 10mm. Seine iiets, except those used for the capture of ornciia, may
nOt be 'ess than SOro:,: *i diagonally stretched. In addition, it is prohibited to land and/or sell any
flsh tic ì Lake Victoria : is less than 25cm standard length (SL) (the length from the top lip of the
fish se of its caudal fin).
(b) Afl fis ±: : obliged to have a fishing license and to be working from a fully registered boat.
Casual i, \'hQ, because of their frequent migration, are difficult to keep track of, must
normafly wo for a ovner whose licence 'covers' them, and which stipulates the number of
crew on board his/her L.a. BoLh licenses and boat registration must be renewed annually. The cost
of fishermens licences r:;.nd on the size of the boat owned and boat registration charges depend on
whether or not the vesser mechanised. Registration numbers must be clearly displayed upon the
bow of the baci. FSI ir:rS must also have licences, of which there are two classes, one which
permits trade v:hin distr.ct boundaries, and one for trading beyond these. These must be renewed
annually, In u Thi , firb traders must have annually renewable medical certificates issued by the
Ministry of H aJi.
Year MSY (m.t). Actual catch (imt) Source
1966 28,000-40,000 n.a Rhodes 1966 (in Achieng 1992).
1972 25,000 15,989 Welcornme (1972)
1975 25,000 16,581 Butcher& Colaris 1975 (in Achieng 1992).
1976 20,000 18,680 Kongere 1976 (in Achieng 1992).
1979 30,000 30,592 Republic of Kenya 1979; Kongere 1979.
C\ OI J() 46,000 60,958 Coche & Balarin 1982.
1983 10,000-26,000 77,327 Zonnevelcl 1983.
1988 150,000 125,100 Republic of Kenya 1988(b).
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(e) Accordiîig to The Act, trawling is a prohibited fishing method in Lake Victoria within five nautica!
miles from any point along the entire shore-line and within the Winam Gulf. However, in November
1993 the Kenya Government announced that trawling in all of Kenya's waters was banned (The
Standard 3.11.93: 3) although this measure has not yet been gazetted in parliamentary legislation.
The geographical restrictions on fishing in Lake Victoria refer to the mouths of rivers and fish
breeding areas, No person may fish within a 3km radius of river mouths during a period designated
by the Director of .isheries. During the course of this study, no such designation was gazetted in
Kenya Parlieniertt legislation. Nor may any person "disturb any spawn or spawning fish in a breeding
area" (Republic of Kenya, 1991: 70).
Closed seasons are left to the discretion of the Director of Fisheries, who must publish his/her
intentions in the Kenya Parliamentary Gazette. During the course of this study, no such intentions
were publicised.
The Act coveis all inland waters of Kenya (including rivers) as well as the Indian Ocean fisheries.
Depending on conditions peculiar to each of these fisheries, The Act stipulates different mesh-size
restrictions for different species. Thus, for example, gill-nets of 102mm mesh-size may be used in Lakes
Naivasha, Baringo, Challa and Jipe, and in the dams of the Turkwell and Tana Rivers, but not in Lake
Victoria; similarly, fishermen exploiting Lake Victoria's waters may not land fish of 20cm SL or below,
while those exploiting other inland waters of Kenya may not land fish of 16cm SL or below.
Failure to comply with the above regulations renders the offender liable to large fines and/or imprisonment
terms of not less than a year. The implementation of these proposals is left to 'authorised officers' who are
defined as "a fisheries officer, a police officer above the rank of inspector, an officer of the Kenya Navy or
other armed force or a person appointed by the Minister, by notice in the Gazette, to be an authorised
officer for the purposes of this Act" (Republic of Kenya 1969: 22). According to one source,' Assistant
Fisheries Officers are the lowest ranking officers able to make an arrest on the lake. Fisheries scouts, whose
role it is to collect basic fish catch data from landing beaches, have nc authority to enforce The Act.
5.4 The 1989 Fisheries Act: implementation and fishermen's responses
None of the fisherman encountered during this study were aware of the 1989 Fisheries Act. They did know
that there was a Fisheries Department, because most beaches have a fisheries 'scout' in residence.
Fishermen were aware that there are certain laws governing mesh-sizes, that illegal nets can be seized, that
certain sizes of fish should not be caught, and some claimed that closed seasons were enforced by their
Divisional Fisheries Departments. However, the relationship between fishermen and KFD officials is poor.
The basis for this precarious relationship is double-sided. On the one hand, animosity has arisen out of the
behaviour of Fisheries scouts. Although Fisheries scouts have no authority to implement the regulations of
The Act, fishermen are not aware of this. Utilising this ignorance, Fisheries scouts openly proclaim their
right to seize nets, and check for fishing licences and boat registration in attempts to extort bribes. On the
other hand, fishermen resent the KFD in what they perceive to be its short-comings. In other words, they
criticise the KFD on the basis of what it does not do, regardless of whether or not the 1989 Fisheries Act
endorses this action. One example of this is the failure of the KFD to address the problem of theft on the
take, as will be discussed below.
207 fishermen were asked whether or not they felt that the KFD was beneficial to them and the lake, and
just 38 (18.4 per cent) agreed that it was.2 Some of their re' s reflect the level of animosity that exists:
1 Two anonymous Fisheries Officers, Interview, Kisumu District Fisheries Department Headquarters, 30/3/95.
2Author's data.
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"The Fisheries scouts do help the lake by preventing people from catching small fish, but they must be
confused because they allow the very nets that catch the small fish to be 'repossessed' by their owners"
(Interview no.64, Kichinjio, 4/8/94).
"The Fisheries scouts say that there is a closed season, and they patrol the area to check that no one is
fishing...but all they are doing is collecting money" (Interview no.117, Nyagina, 21/10/94).
"The Fisheries Department does very little for the lake. They do not help to recover stolen nets. When
my pockets are empty, they come and demand money from me...they tell me that my nets are illegal, and
yet they licence them and the factory keeps on producing them" (Interview no.175, Kiumba, 23/12/94).
"The Fisheries Department does nothing for the lake. I reported the theft of my nets and they did
nothing. In 1993 three people were murdered on the lake, and they did nothing. They complain to me
about under-sized fish, but who is the thief if they allow the kokorro [beach seine] to be used? They
don't help to conserve the fish in any way" (Interview no.188, Mareiiga, 26/1/95).
There is no such thing as a 'net licence'. Fishermen confused this with the private mark system. Under The
Act, fishermen may voluntarily seek a registration number for their nets which may be used to identify these
nets in the event that they are stolen and then recovered. Fishermen are required to pay a small fee for this
registration, and registration occurs regardless of whether or not the net is legal or illegal. However,
because scouts in some places (particularly on Rusinga Island) insist that fishermen pay for the private
mark, fishermen have come to believe that it represents a net licence, and hence the confusion when their
nets are then seized.
The second area of concern often mentioned is theft. The Act does not give the KFD explicit powers to
tackle theft, although it is widely assumed that the KFD is responsible for the maintenance of security on
the lake. Limited by resources and funding, however, the capacity for Fisheries officials to carry out this
work is restricted. For example, the District Fisheries Headquarters in Kisuinu lias access to only one patrol
boat with an outboard engine, which, at the time of this study, was out of order. The Nyanza Province
Fisheries Department has two patrol boats, both of which were out of order. Fuel for the outboard engines is
supplied via a complex system of fuel vouchers that have to be balanced against budget requirements. For
this reason Fisheries scouts rarely have the fuel to patrol, and will ask fishermen to pay for the fuel instead.
Nets are manufactured by the Kenya Fishnet Factory in Kisumu, which lias a monopoly on all fish net
production in Kenya. lt therefore manufactures nets for all of the country's fisheries. It is legal to produce
these nets and legal to sell these nets, but illegal to use these nets in waters where they are not permitted.
Gill-nets of less than 127mm. aie readily available in beach-side shops and in all fishing tackle shops in
Kisumu. That the law has permitted these nets to be manufactured but did not permit their use in Lake
Victoria angered many fishermen.
Finally, the issue of bribery is a recurrent theme. Although no closed season was in force during the course
of this study, Fisheries scouts may have claimed that there was in order to extract bribes. KFD officials,
who are in charge of the scou,, are aware of the exteiit of bribery that occurs on the beaches, but complain
that they rarely get into the 'fif to monitor the activities of their subordinates, and are, instead, assigned
to office duties. In Kisumu Di.trict, for example, there are 60 Fisheries scouts spread over 32 landing
beaches; there aie, however, ony seven Fisheries Officers of Assistant Fisheries Officer rank and above in
charge of the same area (Government of the Republic of Kenya et al. 1995). As a result, the ability of
Fisheries Officers to scrutinise the activity of Fisheries scouts is limited, and the prosecution of offending
fishermen rare. During the course of this study, only one fisherman was encountered who had been
arraigned in court, charged with fishing without a licence. His case was dismissed. All the same, of 139
fishermen, 51 per cent said that they had either been harassed by scouts or liad their nets seized.
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In all eases, nets had been returned on the payment of a bribe. The costs of bribery to fishermen are
cdiderble; atid may be considered a legitimate cosi in their economy (Gehebi995).
As a consequence, fishermen may alter the way in which they fish arid develop evasidntacticrinan attempt
to avoid the attentions of the scouts.' Some fishermen try to ensure that their illegal nets are always in the
vlìt here tbe remain unobserved to the Fisheries scouts who rarely have the vessels nor thnecery
fitxamihe them. When these nets need to come out for wash big, they arei wahedi.n sech4ded inits
away from the landing beaches. However, scouts can also threaten to prosecute fishemnenfcrthekiztof
fish they catch. No fishermen interviewed in this study claimed to throw under-sized fish back into the lake.
As such undei sized fish are separated trom legally sized fish and sold off to tradei s who await tbe
frMeimen at discrete locations on the journey back to the landing beaches. At DungaBeach.; a seelude.L
pc of pap>ius swamp senes this function At Misori Beach, apengo' (juenile Nile peich) fisheunen
soklttieir fish at another beach where the resident scout was known to be lenient. Omtva.fishermenwere
the most vuinciable group to bribery costs Although these fishermen hsh at night when scouts aie QffdIt)
thirnets are placed out in the sun to dry the following day, which is where they are then seized and mjrie
ti en etorted via.the threat of confiscation. In these ways the 1989 Fisheries Act may inadvertently forQe,
fihernen to fish in certain ways which were unanticipated.
Thxtent to which the KFD is able to enforce the law is further hampered by its sympatheticaarene&of:
thudifficult conditions in which fishermen have to operate. Furthermore, many of the scouts appointedutø
beaches. are From the Nyanza region itself and may be related to fishermen. It isclainied that thisresult in
the nepotistic pardon' of many vagrant fishermen:
iThe Fisheries Department is aware of the difficulties of getting work elsewhere, and needsto ahloy for
sçne opportunities tobe open for these people. It was hard for a Fisheries Officer to prosecuqffe:!dipg
fiernien ..we are aware that by doing SC) ¡s as good as denying the fisherman's farnhv an
badvery fepi.osecntions last year and low seizures...I think it is better to educate the fisherwç oihe
regulations it is hard to arrest a man because he does not know that his net has ali illegal mes
sthy:he shouki not catch under-size fish. It is better to educate fishermen as to the wrong-doitig than it;i$:
ç prosecute them. On the Tana River dams, education has been very efeçtiye i1)ensuringJhaLtFe
:f1hery is aillegal. lt is the responsibility of the Fisheries Officer on the ground to educate fishernenu n
t regulations, but whether or not this is actually done here, I don't know I am in the offie and notin.
field. utsuch prosecutions and seizures are now on the increase. Tliere.re fewer. scours frqnttle
region now, so nepotistic pardons are going to decline. Last October, nany of these ofJcers were.
transferred."3
Some fisheiincn did feel that the woik of the KFD benefited them and some had the following to say about
t»KFD' s activities:
Ie Fisheries Officers are here to guard the fish and to guide the fishermen...they do a good job.. Thì
¡oie is veiy important and the lake would be woise off without them (Interview no 58 Kichinjto
1/8/94').
the Fislieris Department will look for your gear if you have lost it, provided you give thernfoefpr
then engine They may also give you letters of introduction if you aic going to other beaches far away
They also issue licences and cheek on mesh-sizes I think they do a good job protecting the Like it is not
the scouts who bother me, but the rules" (interview no. 138, Utajo, 28/10/94).
3Provincial Director of Fisheries, Mr. S. S. Andika, Interview, Nvanza Province Fisheries Department lleadìtrtèr
30/3/95.
4Author's dala.
5Author's data.
'Authior's data.
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"The Fisheries Department provides letters of introduction to those going off to other beaehes....they
licence,...[andl...between April and August they burn the small mesh.sizes...they do an okay joh...they
may even help us when we have had nets stolen" (Interview no.224, Nambo, 8/2/95).
"The Fisheries Department normally licenses and cheeks on small mesh-sizes. If they find a mesh-size
that they are unhappy with...[they will]...coriflscate it and not return it. They do a very good job and
catch many people" (Interview no.232, Anyanga, 23/2/95).
The KFD may provide 'letters of introduction' on request (see Chapter 4). This service, which is
outlined in the 1989 Fisheries Act, is considered a good oiie by most flshermen, and prevents them froni
getting into trouble when they migrate to new fishing grounds. Fishermen do comply with certain
provisions of The Act. For example, most fishermen h. licences. Ql 184 'cked, 47.8 per cent had their
own licences, 34.2 per cent vere 'covered' by the boat u\\ncr's licence, vL!c 18 per cent did not have a
licence.4 Fishermen claimed that it was KFD policy to ensure that all boat owners had lisliing licences lo
cover the whole of their crew. In order for this regulation to work, the KFD must be able to decide how
many crew there are per boat, depending on the type of fishery in which the crew operates. However, this is
in itself was a mattei of some controversy. At Utajo Beach, most fishermen use beach seines, arid the KFD
stipulates that there are eight crew per beach seine boat. 1-lowevei, Utajo suffers from an acute labour
shortage, and l'c' boats have niore than three crew members, utilising the services of pcimaicìt 'haulers'
on the beach in exchange for 'bita' (payment in fish) and priority in sales. Nevertheless, boat owners arc
obliged to pay 6r ciht crew members, a cost they resent intensely.
The KFD collects an annual average of US$ 70,000 from the sale of fishing licenses and boat registration
(Government of the keptibl je of Kenya et ai. 1995). These funds rcl)rcScflt an important contribution to the
KFDs total budget. and lbr this reason are efficiently collected. Oncc a year. i:ishcrics Officers do app'r
¡n the 'field' touring all landing beaches to issue licences and boat registration. It is for this reason that most
fishermen arc licensed and that most boats are properly registered. Once a yea!, Fisheries Officers do
appear ¡n the 'field' touring all landing beaches to issue licences and boat registration. 0E. 86 fishermen
questioned, 184 claimed that the boats they owned or worked ori were propeily registered.5 lust two said
that their boats veie not registered. However, in another survey of 6,229 boats in 1991, 1,228 boats (I 9.7
pe' cent) were unregistered (l-Ioekstra et al. 1991). Once a boat has liad its registration number painted upon
its side, it is difficult to know whether or not the registration has been cnewccl as it should. However, it
would appear that most fishermen are charged and pay for boat registration.
ihe 1939 Fisheries Act does not appear to have curbed the widespread use ol' illegal nets. 0f I 80 net users
ntcrv,ew'ed, 130 (72.2 per cent) used at least one illegal net (gill-nets of under 127mm, beach seines 01'
under 50mm. audI boat seines of under 10mm).6 Most of those who possessed gill-nets of above 127mm
were Nile pcm'eh tishemmen (given that Nile perch tends to be a large fish) and large numbers ol beach
scincrs did have mesh sizes of and above the stipulated minimum. Not a single amena fisherman had legal
nets. There vcrc two main reasons for this: firstly, it was claimed that the 10mm mesh boat seine was too
expensive. and secondly, when amena ¡s caught in a 10mm net, it acts as a gill-net, entangling individual
fish behind the gills. Because each haul of oniena contains several thousand individual fish. Ehe job of
plucking these fish from the net was deemed too time-consuming and boring. The process of fishing amena
¡s extremely quick (as the name imnlies: 'ariap': 'hurry tip'), and the SlOW fishilg of ornella yields poor
catches. It is undcmstood that the stipulated miiiimnum mesh-size for boat seines is under review.
7Author's data.
8Asat Fishermen's Co-operative Society catch records, Interview no. 98, Asat Beach, 2 1/9/94.
9Provincial Director of Fisheries, Mr. S. S. Andikai, Iritrview, Nyanza Province Fisheries DepartmentHeadquarters,
3 0/3/95.
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This use of illegal nets has arisen partly because of the lack of satisfactory regulatory enforcement.
However, fishermen have more compelling reasons to use them. Because of the high levels of competition
that exist between fishermen, as well as declining per capita catches, the short term benefits to be gained
from using small mesh-sizes far outweigh the benefits of using larger ones (see Chapter 6). Fishermen do
face the possibility that they may be caught using illegaL nets by Fisheries scouts, and having an illegal net
necessarily means that the fisherman makes himself vulnerable to bribery costs. However, the benefits to be
derived from using illegal nets outweigh the costs associated with bribery. It notable that the cost of a bribe
rarely exceeds the cost of the net. Fisheries scouts are careflul to ensure that this remains the case, otherwise
fisheririen would simply replace confiscated gear.
There is further evidence of the distorted communications between the KFD and the fishermen. Of 98
respondents questioned, just 28 (28.6 per cent) knew the legal minimum mesh-size for gill-nets.7 Most of
those questioned believed it to be 100mm, while many seemed to think it was markedly above the stipulafd
minimum. However, fishermen were unanimously clear as to why there were mesh-size restrictions, and all
agreed that enforcement of such regulations would be of benefit to the fishery. As well as being
controversial, the issue of mesh-sizes is confused. Four Fisheries scouts interviewed at one beach claimed
that the legal minimum mesh-size for gill-nets was 100mm, a size apparently confirmed elsewhere: "[o]n
request, the [Fisheries] department informed us that the legal net sizes are: gill-nets: 10 cm and above,
dagaa nets [omena] - 1 cm, beach seine nets - 5 ein and above, but the scouts at Wichium beach could not
give us this information" (Riedmiller 1994: 332). However, no decrease in the legal mesh-size minimum
lias been gazetted, and respondents at the Kisumu District Fisheries I-Ieadquarters, and the Nyanza
Provincial Fisheries Headquarters confirmed the 127mm mesh-size restriction.
The extent to which the 1989 Fisheries Act lias served to control trawling is not clear. Most of the trawlers
in the Kenyan Sector of Lake Victoria are in fact government owned, and their trawling is ostensibly for
research purposes. Whatever fish they catch is, under the terms of The Act, allowed to be auctioned off to
fish traders after the trawl is completed. The amount of research being carried out appears to be
considerable. At Asat Beach, when visited in September 1994, fishermen claimed that there were five
trawlers stationed there, and two of these were observed during the survey. In a period starting on July 28th,
through to September 20th 1994, these trawlers caught a total of 5,820 kilograms of Nile perch, and 2,
.8
kilograms of so-called 'under-size' fish (Nile perch of under 1 kilogram).8 All but one of these trawlers
were owned by government institutions, and all sold their catches through the Asat Fishermen's Co-
bperative Society to established Nile perch buyers, while they sold 'under-size' to local fish processors for
sínokiñg. As one Fisheries official commented, "[i]t is not surprising that [the trawlers] sell off their fish.
What else would they do vuth the surpluses they catch? Aftei all, they can t experiment on all of the fish
they catch."9
However, in December 1994, four crew members of a trawler were charged with illegal irawling (The
Standard 17/12/94); and in May 1995, two trawlers fishing off Homa Bay were seized, and their crews
charged (The Daily Nation 11/5/95: 4). Fishermen claim that trawlers are too efficient, and drastically
reduce the amount of fish available. Catch declines around Asat were blamed on the trawlers, and fishermen
complained that their gear was sliced through and dragged away by the trawlers. Fishermen were leaving
Asat Beach because of this, and Asat was the only beach in this survey that had decreasing numbers of
fishemen. The controversy surrounding trawler activity has led to strong protests from fishermen.
0Author's data,
Interview no.261. Misori Peach. I 53/95
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One group of fishermen from Homa Bay District complained to their Provincial Commissioner of nightly
trawling by five trawHrs (The Standard 21/3/95: 4), while in January 1996 a demonstration of 'more than
300 fiS ï.T;1î' .......:.rr, otesting at the 'destruction of their fish traps and equipment by trawlers,' ¡n
Winam Qi:f (ïio .......o . 2Jh/96). Such conflict between small-scale fishermen aiid large, mechanisd
fisheries is common thrc o: the 'developing' world (Kurien 1988; Begossi 1995).
The restrictions which the I 989 Fisheries Act has placed on fishing in known fish breeding areas also
appear to have failed. 98 fishermen were asked whether or not they would be prepared to fish in a fish
biceding area. 70 (714 per cent) replied that they would not, and that this was because these contained 'the
fish of the Future' OF 'OUF children's fish.' IO The remainder said that they liad no qualms about doing so,
often claíming that they were 'driven by hunger', or that if there were big fish there they would fish them
"you do lot help fish, you kill fish"1 Whatever the feelings of fishermen, however, the identification of
fish breeding areas is problematic, and most fishermen stated that they did not know where stich breeding
grounds might be located
In ari attempt io gain an impression of what fishermen felt to be the short comings in regulatory
enforcement and the 1989 Fisheries Act, 128 vere asked what they would do if they were the Director of
Fisheries. Their responses are summarised in Table 5.1 below. Many of these responses reveal fishermen's
ignorance of Thc Act, Several of the issues that fishermen stated they w'anted to be tackled are already
addressed. Hn'.ve'c'o', in the absence of any enforcement of The Act, fishermen are often nuder
impression ti :.--- lwrc o5oations are not enforced rigorously enough or that they do not exist at all.
Thus, for .::c'.;0i:-.:.. '7.8 ,e cent of the sample wished net mesh-sizes to be restricted or that some
permanent mi« ::tlni meshisize be established and enforced. Others felt that there should be closed seasons
or the banning of cert.f. :. ypes, all of which are provided for under the terms of The Act. Just three
respondents (2.3 per O) . a that prescrit regulations and levels of enforcement were satisfactory.
If J was the Director of Fisheries, i would: N
Establish a permane. L oininìuni mesh size/restrict mesh-sizes: 74 57.8
Do something about, iheft and/or piracy: 66 51 .6
Piovide unconditional loans to fishermen: 39 30.5
Ban certain niethods/gear: 30 23.4
Advise fishers on suitable fishing methods, times of year to fish, restrictions etc. J 7 13.3
Ensure that all are licensed to fish 15 11.7
Provide conditional loans to fishermen 15 11 .7
Provide refrigeration facilities to beaches 14 10.9
Increase!siahil,se flsh prices 13 10.2
Closed season on some gear/fishing methods/mesh-sizes 12 9.4
Assist fishermen with marketing 12 9.4
Search ¡'or lost/stolen nets 10 7.8
Ban flsliin lU. 01' protect, nurseries 9 7
Improve co-onerative facilities and/or services 9 7
Encourage I'ishennen to fish deeper/further away from shore 9 7
Place restrictions oi the numbers of Fishermen 8 6.2 -
Seek co-operation between rpaoan states for control of lake 7 5.5
Rid the lake of the water hyacinth (see Chapter 6) 7 5.5
Encourage the fishermen to save against days 'hcn they catch nothing 7 55
12 Author's data.
Table 5.2: Fishermen's Resolves if they were to be appointed Director of Fisheries.12
N.B: Most respondents gave more than one response and percentages exceed 100.
In addition, fishermen do want action to be taken over such issues as theft and piracy on the lake, control of
the water hyacinth and assistance in the improvement of co-operatives and the provision of refrigeration
facilities, all of which are beyond the present mandate of the KFD. On the whole, however, fishermen seem
to regard regulatory mechanisms such as mesh-size control, gear prohibition, closed seasons and area
closures as legitimate means for controlling the fishery. The reason for fishermen's enthusiasm for these
regulatory mechanisms may lie in the fact that, on the one hand, they are unaware that alternative regulatory
mechanisms might be utilised in managing a fishery; and on the other hand, that they are ignorant of tne
regulations embodied in The Act, either because no one has explained these to them, or else because of
inefficient enforcement. Indeed, 13 per cent of fishermen felt that the KFD could play a bigger role in
providing advice to fishermen on such things as gear usage, the best times of year for fishing and indeed,
why certain rules and regulations exist. As one respondent put it,
"The Fisheries Department does not help the lake one little bit...we fishermen are normally seen as
stupid because we do not know what to do with our money. The Fisheries Department should teach us
how to invest our money best.. .we are uneducated, and we do not understand our rights, so when the
scouts come and harass us, then we just live in fear of the scouts, and yet we should work together"
(Interview no.178, Kiumba, 24/11/94).
5.5 Conclusion
The 1989 Fisheries Act utilises regulatory measures typical of many fisheries around the world. The major
failing within many of these kinds of contemporary fisheries management models is that they treat fisheries
as ubiquitous, irrespective of the kind of ecology within them, or the culture of the people who exploit
them. Despite this, the locationally specific differences between the globe's fisheries necessarily mean that
the results of such regulatoiy systems cannot be expected to be homogenous. This is certainly the case with
Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, where contemporary management models have been applied with little
consideration either for the past failure of similar models, or for the fishing populations who are supposed
to be regulated by them. The nature of the regulatory tools in force in the fishery suggest that they are
derived from Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) models.
However, in the absence of any stock or effort data, these regulations operate within a vacuum, with no
objectives to aim for and no parameters within which to work.
An additional failing with these models is that they assume that governments will have the technical
expertise, funding and monitoring capability with which to implement and enforce them. Earlier, it was
mentioned that the KFD earns some US$ 70,000 from the sales of fishing licenses and boat registration
(Government of the Republic of Kenya etil. 1995).
Provide some kind of rescue service for fishermen in trouble 6 4.7
Reduce the price of7banish fishing licences 6 4.7
Decrease/control gear prices 6 4.7
Abolish middle-men 6 4.7
Encourage employment alternatives by developing farming 6 4.7
Ban the manufacture of under-sized nets 6 4.7
Closed season on all gear types 5 39
Improve/maintain/create access roads to beaches 5 3.9
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Despite additional contributions from central government and, occasionally, international development
agencies, the total cost of wages for all of the 611 KFD personnel stationed on Lake Victoria comes to a
yearly average of some US$ 413,019 (Government of the Republic of Kenya et aI. 1995). As central
government finds itself increasingly unable to meet budgetary demands, KFD personnel only draw wages,
and have not the funding to provide services. Indeed, recurrent operating expenses within the KFD
represent just 9 per cent of the total KFD budget, while the remaining 91 per cent is used exclusively to pay
wages (Government of the Republic of Kenya et al. 1995). As a consequence, the assumption made in much
contemporary fisheries management planning that governments will automatically be able to pay for the
implementation and enforcement of formal, state-based, fishing regulations is untrue. Such high-cost
management models are inappropriate to the funding and monitoring capabilities of the Kenya Fisheries
Department (TOED). The 1989 Fisheries Act has not, therefore, been adequately enforced, has not been
explained to fishermen and the presence of certain variables - such as the wide-spread use of illegal fishing
gear - suggests that The Act has been an ineffective means of controlling exploitation within, and
production from, the fishery. Furthermore, the most visible evidence of the TOED on the beaches are
fisheries scouts, who, through their persistent harassment of fishermen for bribes, have served to foster poor
relations between the KFD and the fishing communities. While many of the attributes of' The Act are both
necessary and desirable, the difficulties of enforcement render it close to redundant. The I(enyan
Government admits that, on the whole, regulations are rarely enforced: "Visits to the beaches revealed total
disregard of regulations [sic.] (e.g. landing of undersize fisb) even in the presence of fisheries personnel"
(Government of the Republic of Kenya et al. 1995: 55). This failure to enforce regulations occurs despite
Kenya, with the smallest portion of the lake, having the highest number of KFD staff: 611, compared to 106
in Uganda and 178 in Tanzania (Government of the Republic of Kenya et aI. 1995). These problems are
those which are restricted largely to the design of the 1989 Fisheries Act itself and its poor application. The
failure of The Act, however, cannot be restricted to these problems alone. One of the greatest determinants
of its success is the extent to which fishermen perceive any benefits in obeying the regulations outlined
above. In Chapter 6, the study will examine some of the factors that influence obedience of The Act, as well
as serving to define exploitation patterns within the fishery.
'Author's data.
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6 'Informal' regulation in Kenya's Lake Victoria
fishery
[F]isberies are a human phenomenon...strictlyspealthig, there is no fishery without a human fishing effort
(J. R. McGoodwin 1990: 3).
6.1 Introduction
Like many common property fisheries that suffer from open-access conditions, Kenya's Lake Victoria
fishery in the 1990's has come to be characterised by high effort levels and intense competition between
fishers. These and other factors are problems to fishers insofar as they represent restrictions on access to
good catches. They may also determine the perceived benefits to be gained from adhering to formal
regulations and, indeed, determine the extent to which localised initiatives develop to create community-
based regulatory institutions. Under conditions of acute competition, fishing becomes defined in terms of
meeting livelihood needs through coping strategies designed to minimise competition and the chance of a
zero catch on a given day. 181 fishers were asked what they considered to be the main problems that they
faced on the lake, and these are summarised in Table 6.1 below:
Table 6.1: Major problems faced by fishers.1 N.B. percentages exceed 100 because most fishers listed several grievances.
Only problems mentioned by 10 per cent or more fishers are noted.
Fishers's concerns over the behaviour of Fisheries 'scouts', corruption, poor regulatory enforcement and
trawlers, and how these have come to influence fishing activities, have already been discussed in Chapter 5.
The rest of the problems noted in Table 6.1 are addressed in this chapter from eight broad perspectives, all
of which influence access to fish stocks to greater or lesser degrees:
Farming: this may, on the one hand, serve to diminish fishing effort, or, on the other hand, to increase
it, depending on whether or not fishers see it as viable or not.
Investment limitations and capacity: these do not serve to stem the flow of fishers into the fishery, but
do limit their access to fish.
Main problems N %
Catch declines 78 43
Theft of nets and/or theft of fish from nets 76 42
High cost or rising cost of fishing gear 58 32
Illegal fishing methods, under-size mesh-sizes and/or ochun fishing methods 46 25.4
Rain and/or strong winds as a limitation on fishing 38 21
Mbita Causeway 27 15
Fluctuating on unstable fish prices 24 13
Too many fishers and/or nets on lake 21 11.6
Fisheries 'scouts' because of corruption and/or harassment 18 10
Water hyacinth 16 8.8
Trawlers 15 8.2
Catches are too variable 15 8.2
Fish prices are too low 14 7.7
Diseases and illnesses that can be caught on the lake 11 6
Poor enforcement of (formal) fishing regulations 10 5.5
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Theft: this may affect what types of gear fishers invest in, how much gear they buy, the time they
spend on the lake and where they fish.
Catch declines: these limit access to fish and play an important iole in defining how fishers view the
future of the lake and their investment patterns.
Increases in fishing effort: these limit access to fish through the competition it generates, and
consequently, reduce the amount of fish per fishing unit.
The impact of marketing variables: these may not limit fishing cl'íorts. However, because the market
is unpredictable and subject to rapid change, fishers try to limit its impact by intensifying their
fish ing.
Community change: traditional Luo community structures appear to be breaking down, and this
contributed to the decline of community-based controls over resources.
Ecological factors: fishers have limited control over these, and may result in the collapse of the
fishery in the future.
All of these factors have a bearing on access to fish and will determine the nature of exploitation and
henceforth, production levels. These are also factors which will affect the degree to which fishers are
prepared to obey regulations. As will be shown below, most of these factors do ensure that fishers perceive
no benefits from adhering to state-based formal regulations, and, conversely, do perceive benefits from
disobeying them. This appears to have resulted in the the over-exploitation of fish stocks and declines in the
fishery's productivity. In the long-run, these trends will undermine the fishery's contribution to the regional
and national economy. These worrying trends are the direct result of the increasing inability of fishing
communities to fulfill various livelihood functions and needs. This chapter sets out to demonstrate how
important these factors are in influencing access to fish, fishing activity, production levels, and, ultimately,
how they serve to regulate the fishery. Figure 6.1 below shows the location of place names mentioned in the
text.
6.2 Farming
The lake-side farming zones are not ideal farming areas, suffering from unreliable rainfall and poor soils
(See Chapter 1, 1 .6).
"Although the region's cash crops are many (notably cotton, grounclnuts, tobacco, sugar cane and coffee
as one goes uphill from the lake), the Luo are far outfarmed in both cash and food crops by other
Kenyans like the adjoining Gusii and the central Kenyan Kikuyu - people whose highland climes and
richer volcanic soils give them the edge to begin with" (Shipton 1995: 166).
Nevertheless farming constitutes an important component of fishers's livelihoods. Of 238 respondents
questioned, 87 per cent had access tn iand (owned or borrowed).2 Of these, just 5.3 per cent of them did not
farm it. Most fishers will spend som time of the year on their farms, or, in the event that they have no
access to land, spend time *. mihies with their farms. As a consequence, farming wi'l influence
the. an1ount of time that fishers spend fishing over a year, and for 60 per cent of fishers interviewed, farming
did interrupt fishing.3 Most of these ìad land located far from where they were fishing, and, on aver°e
they spent 105.2 days of the year away from the lake. For the remaining 40 per cent of the sample, farnaing
did not interrupt fishing. As : would seem that during the farming seasons (late February-early May,
August-September) effort levei. the lake do drop (Geheb and Binns 1997). However, while farming may
draw labour away from the lake riodically, the problems associated with it may also encourage people to
seek incoirie-generating employment in the fish industry.
2ALIthor's data.
3n168; Author's data.
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Fig. 6.1: The Kenyaii Sector of Lake Victoria, showing place names mentioned in Chapter 6.
182 fishers were asked whether or not they considered themselves more farmers than fishers.4 51.6 per cent
of the sample said that they were fishers 45 per cent felt that they were farmers and 3.4 per cent felt that
they were either both or neither. Of this sample, 140 of the respondents qualified their answers. Table 6.2(a)
provides the reasons given by those fishers who considered themselves to be more fishers than farmers,
while Table 6.2(b) provides the reasons given by those who considered themselves more farmers than
fishers.5
Table 6.2(a) Reasons stated as to why respondents considered themselves to be more fishers than farniers.
Table 6.2 b Reasons stated as to why res u ondents considered themselves to be more farmers than fishers.
The particular circumstances faced by any individual, therefore, may determine whether or not farming is
an incentive that draws him/her away from the lake, or a disincentive to encourage him/her Into the fishing
industry, depending on a variety of factors regarding the security and the incomç making pctential of either
resource base. The amount of time a person spends fishing may also be an indication of whether he is a
'full-time' or a 'part-time' fishers. Other researchers have noted that for many lake-side stíb-clans, there is
an annual move from the land to the lake when the farming season has ended after harvest between late July
to early September:
"From March until August or September, the people of Katweng'a are preoccupied with gardening,
weeding, and harvesting of millet and some maize. By October, the harvests are done, and like many
other communities in Yimbo, Uyoma, and Asembo, the people turn their attention to the laKe,
spending the next four or five months on the lake shore or on the lake" (Cohen and Odhiambo 1989:
99).
Ochuba and Mainga (1992: 129) note that "[t]here is an annual movement of fishers between the shore,
open lake and agricultural farm." it is these population groups that we may consider to be part-time'
fishers, spending only a small part of the year away from their farms. These farmers will only fish as they
await their crops to grow, or farming activity is limited, such as immediately after the harvest.
In the pre-colonial fishery, this iovement between lake and land was probably defined by broad nutritional
Security concerns within which ming was a priority. The movement represented a means by which risks
associated with either farming, herding or fishing could be spread, lest the productivity of any one resource
should decline. This was especially true of communities along the lake shores, where rainfall tends to be
more unreliable and soik more infertile than areas inland from the lake shore. Although the reasons behind
this mobility in the 1990's remain the same, the necessity for the movement has become accentuated.
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Reasons why more fisher than farmer N
Because fishing provides a daily income, unlike farming 14 22.9
Fishing is 'my tradition' or 'in my blood' 14 22.9
Plot size too small to be productive or because they have no land 10 16.4
The lake provides a better income than farming 9 14.7
Harvests too poor to merit farming 5 8.2
Rainfall too poor to merit farm in 5 8.2
Because I have never farmed before 4 6.6
Farming does not provide a cash income 3 4.9
Farming is too hard work 3 4.9
Because the lake, unlike the land, will alwa s srovide 3 4.9
The lake is more 'secure' than the land 2 3.3
Farming in-puts are too expensive 2 3.3
Reasons why more farmer than fisher N
lake too insecure (declining catches, theft, variable incomes) 29 50.9
Farming earns more than fishing 8 14
I only fish while I await harvest 7 12.3
The lake holds no future 5 8.8
The land gives us grain, and therefore we save money by not having to buy it 5 8.8
I only fish to cover daily living expenses 2 3.1
6n166; 21.7% = 36.
7Author's data.
8Stri hernionthica.
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It is no longer clear that if, for example, farming should fail fishers, then the fishery will sustain them
through the drought. Instead, both fanning and fishing are necessary if broader nutritional security
objectives are to be accomplished. As the need for cash remains high, and Luos have increasingly fewer
subsistence resources on which they can rely, the relative importance of fishing while they await harvest
has become much greater (Geheb and B inns 1997).
Assuming that a part-time fisher is one who spends at least half of the year away from the lake, then 21.7
per cent of the sample may be classified as part-time fishers.6 No fisher who had land adjacent to the lake
harvested more than once a year. Most harvests are stored in granaries, and it was rare for a granary to fulfil
the nutritional needs of a whole famïly from one harvest to the next. As a consequence, this annual
movement between lake and land represents a coping mechanism designed to mitigate the impact of
declining yields and farming difficulties.
168 fishers were asked what they considered to be the main problems in farming (Table 6.3), which would
affect their choice for fishing over farming or vice versa. Needless to say, the problems stated are often the
product of localised conditions, and those which occurred in some areas, were not relevant to others. Thus,
for example, fishers from the Karichwonyo Clan in South Nyanza faced three primary problems that fishers
who farmed elsewhere encountered to a far lesser extent. Firstly, disease had wiped out much of the cattle
population of the area. This meant that most Karichwonyans ploughed by hand. Because ploughing by hand
is a hard arid exhausting activity, many Karichwonyans did not have the physical energy to plough all of
their land.
Table 6.3: Main Farming Problems Listed by Respondents.7 N.B. Porcentages exceed 100 because most respondents
listed several problems. Only problems mentioned by five or more people are listed here.
Secondly, cow dung restricts the growth of the purple witch weed.5 In the absence of cattle herds in
Karichwonyo, the weed had prospered. Finally, Karichwonyans have also been subjected to the designs of a
Problem N -
Poor and/or unreliable rainfall 112 66.7
Insect pests (rmites, ball weevils, stock borers, army worms) 43 25.6
Insufficient capital to pay for labour and ploughing inputs 40 23.8
Animal Pests (hippos, weaver birds, cut throats, squirrels, monkeys) 30 17.9
Plots too small to be really productive 21 12.5
Insufficient capital for other inputs (pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, seeds, fertilisers,
farming equipment)
20 11.9
Soil too infertile to bepoductive 15 8.9
Difficulties irrigating land/not having a pump 15 8.9
Crop diseases (esp. 'smut') 12 7.1
Domestic livestock wandering on to firms and eating andlor trampling crops 12 7.1
Sometimes too much rain, resultin, in water-lo.:in: and/or floodin 11 6.5
Timing problems (arising from inability to secure sufficient capital and/or labour in time
for rains)
11 6.5
Poor market for maize and/or millet because everyone grows these 7 4.2
Soil gets too hot, killing shoots and/or making it too hard to plough
Not enough technical advice/assistance 6 3.6
Soil erosion 5 3
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Norwegian aid company based at Homa Lime, which liad introduced a quick-yielding millet variety,
'Serendo'. The organisation was also responsible for the marketing of the product, and while they were still
based at Homa Lime, Karichwonyan farmers were pleased with the outcome of the project. When the
organisation departed, however, Karichwonyan farmers were left with no marketing out-let for their millet
given that the local population did not like it, and the original, and more popular, indigenous seed variety
was said to have been lost.
Farming problems have also arisen as a consequence of land fragmentation. For most Luo land-owners,
land is inherited from their fathers or given to them by their families when they marry. Of 163 fishers
questioned, just 18(11 per cent) had bought any land. 120 (73.6 per cent) had inherited their land, and 54
(33.1 per cent) had been given land by their families.9 The land an heir will receive is almost always in a
number of plots. Fathers will divide land between their sons in such a way that each son receives a piece of
the best land, a piece of the poor land and so on. Of 157 respondents questioned, 56.7 per cent (89) had two
or more plots of land»0 Of these, each person had an average of 3.2 plots of varying sizes. As a
consequence, the land available to be inherited declines through generations, while the number of plots
often increases. This land fragmentation places considerable limitations on harvest potentials, since the
smaller the piece of land owned, the less the potential harvest. Since fishers do not own much land in any
case, an average of 2.25 hectares apiece," land fragmentation poses considerable problems to fishers.
While this may not affect net agricultural production from the Nyanza region, it does affect per capita
production levels. In this way, cultural traditions serve to influence the production potential of land, and the
amount of land an individual stands to inherit is dependent on how much land his father owns, how many
brothers lie has, and what kind of relationship he shares with his father, given that a favoured son often
receives more land than his brothers. This also means that while most farming is carried out by won. .i,
most of the land in the Nyanza region is owned by men. While women may be allocated land by their
husbands fo,. personal use, this land will then pass on to their sons. Land is available for purchase in most
places around the lake. However, this land tends to be the least fertile, and will only be sold in the event
that its owner urgently needs cash for whatever reason. As such, poor access to land or owning infertile
plots may lead farmers to turn to fishing for an additional income, so as to try and accumulate enough
capital to purchase the additional agricultural produce which lie and his family needs.
The unreliability of rainfall poses an additional problem for fishers. As mentioned earlier, the land
immediately adjacent to the lake normally suffers from unreliable and/or poor rainfall (Herring 1979), and
it is here that most fishers have their land. 164 fishers were sked ¡f they felt that rainfall reliability in their
farming area was good, fair or poor. 20.7 per cent (34) felt that it was good, 4.3 per cent (7) felt that it was
fair, while the majority, 75.6 per cent (124), felt it was poor.'2 lt has also been suggested that land in the
ai'ea adjacent to the lake tends to be infertile (Kenya Task Force 1988). However, most fishers did not feel
that this was the case. 79.7 per cent (122) felt that the land ¡n their area vas fertile, 5.9 per cent (23)
considered it to be of moderate fertility, while 5.9 per cent (23) felt it to be of poor fertility.'3 Thus,
inadequate and/or unreliable rainfall may be another factor that encourages people to turn from farming '-'d
to seek incomes from the bake.
Labour and input constraints may encourage people to seek incomes from the lake. Most labour used on
farms is family-based: of 203 fishers quested, 57.6 per cent (1 7) used family labour exclusively; 38.9
per cent (79) used a cumbinan of family labou and paid casuai labour, 2.5 per cent (5) used help from
their church cogregations in ; for a meal or a small payment to the church donations box, while I per
9Figurcs do not add up to 163 - many fishers received land from several sources; author's data.
0Author's data.
'n=205; Autlor's data.
12Auihor's data,
3Author's data.
cent (2) used additional help from groups of friends. 14 Labour demands are highest during weedingwhich99
occurs just after the rains have started, normally in April. Inability to find sufficient labour at this time may
have severe repercussions on harvests. In previous years, Luo farmers could rely on the 'rika'15 labour
sharing system to ensure that enough labour was at hand on the farm at the right time of the year. The rika
system involved groups of neighbours helping one another on farms in rotation (Shipton 1995: 175). The
rika system is increasingly rare, however, and farmers must now pay for whatever additional labour
requirements they need.
Farmers must also consider labour requirements during ploughing. This normally occurs late in the year or
at some time between January and February. The rika system could also be used during ploughing, with
neighbours sharing oxen and ploughs between them. However, ploughing now costs money, and many
fishers cannot afford to have all of their land ploughed. Of 58 fishers questioned, 55.2 per cent (32) said
that they did not plough all their land because of this constraint.16 As such, farming costs represent
constraints on farming, and may compel people to seek cash-incomes in the lake in order to pay for these.
Labour and ploughing represent the most expensive farming costs that fishers face. In the year prior to
interviewing (1993/1994) those fishers who had paid for these expenses each spent an average of Kshs.
2,6O7.8/.l7 Expenditure on other inputs, such as pesticides, fertilisers and so on, are negligible because
most do not feel that the returns on these are good enough. Money for these farming costs comes from two
primary sources: the lake and the sale of livestock - which may also have been bought with lake earnings. It
is rare to find fishers who are prepared to invest money earned from their farms in the lake. Land represents
an integral part of Luo society and custom, and is the most important component of sub-clan identity. The
concept of 'home' is always associated with land. A fishers may never have lived in a place, although he
still considers it his home because he expects to inherit land located there. The dead are buried on home
land, and it therefore represents a component of Luo history and genealogy. The prospect of using land as a
collateral in the securing of loans and/or credit seems absurd to many Luos (Shipton 1995; Wilson 1968).
Traditionally, Luos prioritise farm produce as a source of nutrition, the most important of which is 'kuon'
(maize or millet meal). This prioritisation will even occur if fish prices are lower than kuon prices on the
market. Therefore, if the price ofkuon rises on the market, or milling fees increase, Luos prefer not to buy
any fish to accompany their meals lest they risk going without kuon. Indeed, at such times fish prices drop.
As a result, ensuring that farms continue to produce, albeit in ever decreasing amounts, can be a compelling
reason for Luos to fish so as to cover farm input costs and to make up for any agricultural deficits that they
encounter.
Fishers grow a variety of crops, the most common of which are those which are drought-resistant, such as
maize, millet, cotton, cow peas and beans, and those which can tolerate water-logged conditions, such as
arrowroot, rice, kale and sugar cane. Most of the drought-resistant crops are grown for subsistence purposes
(with the exception of cotton). Many of those crops that tolerate water-logged conditions are perennial, and
in the majority of cases it is these crops which are offered for sale. Thus, farming also represents an
important income-making option, and in recent years, the farming of horticultural crops has become
popular. This has two advantages. Firstly, most horticultural crops are perennial, and farmers can earn from
sales throughout the year. Secondly, the types of crops grown have a high demand, particularly kale and
tomatoes. Because maize and millet are grown by virtually everyone, the latter do not have good markets,
unlike horticultural crops.
Fishing communities, with land by the lake, are particularly well placed to grow horticultural crops which
require irrigation throughout the year.
14Author's data.
15Also called the 'saga' system.
t6Author's data.
17n=74; Author's data.
18AutLor's data.
19Perceutages exceed 100 ba-caus ïespcndents sold more than cue crop; author's data.
20Authjr's data.
21 Author's data.
22Figures do nc add ua o d4 be ;::e .rrv fshers observed investments occurring in several areas.
23Author" data,
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Most irrigation is carried out by hand, which is hard work, and may discourage fishers from investing in
this area. Nevertheless, from a sample of 206 fishers, 62 per cent of them or their families sold sorne of the
crops that they grew.'8 Most sold tomatoes (34.4 per cent) arid kale (32.8 per cent). Other important cash
crops are cotton (grown and sold by 25.8 per cent of respondents), maize (sold by 17.2 per cent of
respondents), ground nuts (sold by 17.2 per cent of respondents) and sugar cane (sold by 13.3 per cent of
respondents).'9 Of the 93 fishers who sold crops, net sales earned them an average of Kshs. 11,868.5/- each
over the year prior to the interview (1993/1994), although with wide variation.20
Fishers will often divide the labour in their families, so that their wives and sometimes their children are
solely responsible for the farming. The small lake-side plots where horticultural crops are grown ('orundu')
are almost exclusively the domain of women who use the money these generate on household needs such as
school fees and extra foodstuffs, while their husbands fish to earn additional incomes which may then be
invested on the farms. However, orundu farming can be problematic. Irrigating the plots by hand, as has
already been mentioned, is hard work. In addition, orundu farmers face the threat of hippopotami, which are
particularly fond of crops such as kale and potatoes (Geheb and Binas 1997). All the same, the orundu play
an important role for farmers who, increasingly, can no longer rely on just one income, such as fishing, to
cover domestic costs. As plot sizes have decreased and populations increas'i, fishers face compelling needs
to either increase their incomes or to find additional income sources, which may inspire them to seek
employment in the fishery and/or to invest in cash-crops (such as cotton), possibly to the neglect of food
crops.
The problems associated with farming may make employment in the fishery attractive to many farmers,
while conversely, problems associated with the lake may compel fishers to invest in their farms or
elsewhere. Thus, it was hypothesised that fishers might consider problems in the lake to be so severe that,
as a precaution against the collapse of the fishery, they were investing their earnings beyond the lake. 184
fishers were asked whether or not they had observed if their colleagues were spending more time and/or
money outside the lake. 127 (69 per cent) agreed that this was the case; 55 (29.9 per cent) said that this was
untrue, while the remainder were unsure.21 83 (69 per cent) of those who agreed that this was the case said
that fishers were spending increasingly more time and/or money on their own farms or on the purchase of
land for agricultural purposes; 49 (27.1 per cent) said that investment was occurring in livestock, in the
building of cheap rental housing and small businesses.22 68 of those who felt that such a trend was
occurring stated when they believed it had commenced, and 63.2 per cent said that the trend had started at
some time between 1989 and 1992.23 There may be two reasons for the choice of this period. On the one
hand, the sii ifting of investment away from the lake may be a response to declining Catch Rates per Unit of
Effort (CPUEs). Indeed, the end of the 1980's may well signi' the end of the Nile perch 'boom'. On the
other hand, it may aiso reflect improved potentials beyond the lake, particularly in farming. The early
1990's were characterised by severe drought in Nyanza, but following nood rains in 1992, fishers may have
felt that i va WL le to ceucn r' f a nirc i °93 and 1994 in ail probrbilmty it was a combination of
both ±rctcrs,
Many of the robIatns listed in 'fahle 6.2 above can he overcome by the provision of farm inputs such as
insecticides, Ierbicides, irrigtiou, fencing and improved availability of ploughing facilities, At present,
however, thec:c arobíems re: .sent disincentives to farming. 1f these problems persist and eacaf ate, farmers
"uay be in
,
j ch ige o jan te ie fishery in eaEch of income-generatm acloltles, despite any
catch denfines JiatraLìt occ
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It is botL y an desirable to tlie friiiig od its dn'elopment as a means of regulating fishing
effort. Tic- díity in Ihe mo'ernent of fihcs bewecn lake and land and vice versa, dependent on
condition i' source base. Thus, if farming fails to yield sufficiently, people may turn to the fishery,
while ifL. is no productive enough, people may turn to farming. This dynanñc mobility is a response
to declinidg CPU in the lake as weil as increasing farming problems, and reprens flexible coping
mechaniT1 to minimise the increasing problems associat I :th resource bases. The above
discussic:: aws how it is that a community's reliance on 01: resource pools may affect their
relationship wi 1:.:.e resource pooi under study.
6,3 Inve:;: capacity and limitations
Investment IJ* i and capacity may serve to limit access to fish. The cheapest way of entering the
fishery is as a c fisher, who will not even have to buy a fishing license because these are normally
provided by th iat owners for whom they work. This method of entry into the fishery is extremely
common, ard for many boat owners, the cash needed for buying their first boat was raised in this fashion.
However, casF receipts to casual fishers are not large, being percentages of the catch. Normally, the boat
and gear owners stipulate that they expect to receive the largest part of the catch value, some 40-50 per
cent. The remainder of the catch is divided between the 'budget' - costs for food, repair twine, boat repairs
and so on - and the crew. Thus, the larger the crew, the lower the percentage of the catch value each
receives.
It is, therefore, helpful that a fisher can invest in th fishery incrementally, as his financial situation allows
him to do so. Thus, ma1y flshc-rs will buy individual pinns or their boats ov:r several monihs or years,
building up a stock vail sh irie a tksy have all ftn they need to build a boat, and enough money to pay
for its construction. Similarly, bean:: seine fishers may buy rolls of 'manila' twine little by little, until they
have enough to rH:e a net. For ow :aa casuals wishing to have their own boat and gear, an entry point may
be vie buyir... a '. Many ome:': boat owners ue ih 'agok' (literally, 'the back') system of paying their
crews. The bce:. c 'ner normally has four lamps on hnat, while an additional two lamps are owned by
casuals e ic7ed on the boat. These two lamps r sent the agok, at the back of the boat, and all fish
caught from these t a are kept separate fror te catch oaugh around the four other lamps. At the
end of the flshing trip, t1 aok will pay certain, fixed amounts to the boat owner to cover net and boat
usage, and then keep the res. of the catch value, earning more than those casuals without lamps. In this way,
a casual with a lamp may accumulate savings more rapidly than those who have not made a similar
investment.
Fishers may also enter the ishcry by purchasing some cheap ty.Je of fishing gear. The most common fcrm
of gear in this case is a flshing rod and line, and a fishers nocd only spend some Kshs. 178/- to enter the
fishery in this fashion (sec below). This fishing technique does not require a boat, and most angling is done
from the shore or from rocks close to the shore. This form of flshing has the advantage that the angler has
few overheads, and the most common recurrent cost in this fishery is the purchase of new rods, lines, hooks
and bait, all of which are cheap. An angler can further minimise his over-heads by finding his own bait and
cutting his own 'odwidu' to make his rod. In this way, an angler may catch enough fish over a short period
of time to merit further investment in the fishery should he wish. Once these small investments have been
made, the fisher is then in a stronger position to make larger-investments.
In Chapter 4, the cost and life span of boats were discussed. Generally, recurrent maintenance costs on
boats are fairly low, restricted to the occasional applicatioa of tar, the stuffing of cracks or holes with bits
of cotton, or the replacement of a rotted plank. Owning a ........can, therefore, be inexpensive. However, the
fisher may wish to invest further, for example, in additional gear, and can try to raise the cash needed for
this by renting the boat out. Being able to rent a boat is, in itself, a means to improving ones access to fish.
24Author's data.
25lnterview no.5, Dtmnga, I 9!3!94.
26lnterview no.69, Kichinjio, I 0!8194.
27Author's data.
28Author's data.
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The payment of rent is incremental, and normally paid as a percentage of the catch. Of 62 renters
interviewed, 40.3 per cent paid their rent in this fashion (around 10 per cent of the daily catch).24 In most of
these cases, the boat owner would also accompany the boat onto the lake. In this way, most boat owners
rent out a seat on the boat, rather than the boat itself, and sowill stand to earn an additional income from
the rent without affecting his own access to fish.
However, some boat owners, such as those with a large number of boats, or those who have had all their
gear stolen, may rent out boats without accompanying them in order to ensure that the boats pay for
themselves. Dues on boats rented out in this way are normally paid for in regular, monthly amounts. Of the
sample referred to earlier, 33.9 per cent paid their rent in this fashion, paying an average of Klis. 762!- a
month. The final method of paying boat rent was by giving the boat owner a full day's catch once a w'-k
and 25.8 per cent of respondents paid in this fashion. Again, boat renters who paid in this way were not
normally accompanied by the boat owner. The importance of most of these payment systems is that they
allow the fisher to pay in instalments. Additionally, since many rent payments aie percentages of the catch,
a fisher need not worry about ensuring that he has enough money to pay the rent on a given day. An
additional merit of renting a boat is that it does not tie fishers to the fishery, and in the event that catches
declined, they can leave the fishery without having made any substantial investment in it. Those fishers who
paid their rent by the month did have to ensure that they had enough money at the end of the month, and
this necessitated that they save in some way.
Like many small-scale fishing communities around the world (cf. McGoodwin 1990), the level of
institutional saving amongst Kenya's Lake Victoria fishers is low, and generally restricted to a few, wealthy
boat owners. There are several possible reasons for this. Fishers generally budget on a daily basis, where
budgets are defined by the daily catch. The most commonly cited reason amongst respondents for not
saving was that "we will always catch more fish tomorrow". Fishers, additionally, have two possible
sources of institutional credit: banks and co-operative societies. However, fishers have limited access to
these because they tend to be located in urban centres which are often fai from the landing beaches. In
addition, such institutions revolve around high levels of bureaucracy and in environments with wlih
fishers are not familiar, and utilising conventions which, to many Luo, seem alien. Banks are often seen as
places inhabited by the wealthy educated, and not places where fishers are welcome. An additional
problem, which banking institutions share with co-operative societies, is that the conditions on which credit
and loans are advanced generally do not reflect the high-risk environment in which fishers operate, which
means that few fishers are able to advance any kii'l collateral.
Co-operative societies, on the other hand, are wide-spread and fairly accessible to fishers. However, fishers
are deeply suspicious of co-operatives, and complain that they are biased, awarding loans only to the
kinsfolk and friends of committee members. "The co-operative could work a bit better if it were better
managed...it suffers from nepotism...and the fishers that are not in the same clan as the co-operative
officials are unlikely to get a loan regardless of their merit."25 One former co-operative chairman explained
that he awarded loans to fishers on the basis of "...their hard work and how close they are to me."26 Of 194
fishers interviewed, only 35 per cent were fully paid-up members of a fishing co-operative.27 Of 62 fishers
interviewed, 30.6 per cent had received a loan or a 'bonus' from their co-operative society.28 With these
low rates of payments to members, fishers often failed to see why they had to make regular contributions,
and invariably stopped doing so.
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Nonetheless, fishers do require credit. Although the daily budget derived from fishing allows them to
survive in a 'hand to mouth' fashion, there will invariably be times when fishers must be able to draw on
credit if some large expenditure must be made, such as the purchase of nets and/or a boat. In some ca'cs,
fishers are able to obtain goods on credit from store-owners with whom they have a good relationship or to
whom they are related (Jansen 1973). More commonly credit systems in Luo fishing communities are a
product of a series of patron-client relationships as well as inter-linked deals, which have evolved within the
socio-cultural context of the fishing community. Thus, as examined in Chapter 4, fishers often have special
arrangements with fish traders from whom they may get loans for certain necessary purchases. Indeed, fish
traders normally prefer to have their suppliers indebted to them so that they may exercise greater control
over fish supplies, and actively encourage this form of debt-bondage. In this sense, the trader plays a patron
role, and the fisher a client role (see Amarasinghe 1989).
Credit systems are equally defined by the role of capital within community structures. Luo fishing
communities are generally characterised by high levels of inter-linkage between members. Indeed, these
kinds of relationships serve to distinguish one sub-clan from another, and most sub-clans members are, in
some way or another, related to each other. If one community member should, for example, make a windfall
catch, then all other members generally react to this by seeking credit, demanding the repayment of past
loans and favours, or by announcing an urgent need for cash. Because of the relationship that the fisher
shares with his community, he is not generally able to forgo these demands, lest he is seen to be
parsimonious or that he does not respect the honour of his association with the sub-clan. The repercussions
of failing to meet these demands undermines the role of the fisher within his own community and can even
erode the basis fi-orn which he draws sub-clan identity. In their efforts to ensure that these demands are met,
fishers may be rendered close to poverty, or, as will be discussed below, driven to migration. As a
consequence, fishers may go to some length to try and conceal their earnings, or else to spend their money
as quickly as possible, before it all disappears into the community. This may be part of the reason why
fishers rely so heavily on the daily budget system, ensuring that they have no money left at the end of the
day which may be vulnerable to community demands. Additionally, fishers also seek to protect cash from
themselves "...since cash is so versatile and divisible. They fear it will burn a hole in their pocket" (Shipton
1995: 181), and for these reasons, fishers consider it prudent to get rid of ready cash as quickly as possible,
be it on liquid investments such as livestock, in fixed investments such as gear or farming inputs, or indeed,
on prostitutes and alcohol.
However, the function of these demands and relationships is double-edged, for the fisher can similarly call
upon other community members for credit, loans or financial contributions as he needs them, and ensuring
that demands on his own financial success is, in many ways, au investment in the future and represents a
coping mechanism designed to ensure that while the fisher may rarely have access to ready cash, he ds
have access to his previous investment in the community on which he can draw at any time. This credit
system is radically different from that offered by institutional credit sources. With the latter credit sources,
applications have to be made well in advance of requirements, paper work must be completed and adequate
collateral found. In a working environment which often necessitates quick decisions, it is important that
cash be quickly obtainable. This credit system does not normally yield large amounts of money, and most
expenditure is limited to fairly small sums, something which institutional credit sources rarely supply.
However, institutional sources can provide larger loans, but fishers nevertheless prefer to prepare
themselves for large expenditure through incremental investments. This system of saving is far more
flexible and dynamic than any institutional form of credit, and allows the fisher to respond rapidly to
changing conditions. It is, in this sense, a coping mechanism on which the fisher can rely.
Generally, it would appear that the higher the amount a fisher invests in any particular gear, the better his
access to fish. In other words, the more efficient a fishing gear is, the higher its cost. 'Access', as far as
fishers are concerned, implies the level of guarantee that he has in securing a catch on any given day. For
example, initial investment requirements into the angling fishery tend to be low, and anglers rely heavily on
'luck'.
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They are limited by the number of rods they can carry, as well as being restricted to fishing from the shore
or rocks close to shore. Tables 6.3(a) through 6.3(g) give the minimum investment requirements for eacF' of
the main fisheries: angling, boat seining, long-lining, beach seining, gill-netting (both tilapia and Nile
perch) and mosquito beach seining.29 These are based on the average costs provided by fishers for each of
the necessary components.
Table 6.4(a) Initial expenditure requirement for entry into the anzlin_g fishery, N.B, Assumes that bait is bought,
which it may not be.
Table 6.4(b) Initial expenditure requirement for ent into the gill-net (tilapia/diverse) fishery.;.N.B. Sinkers
assumed to be of stone,
Table 6.4(c) Initial expenditure requirement for entry into thegill-net (Nile perch, long stretch) fishery. N.B.
Sinkers assumed to be cl' stone.
29Costs all calculated from Author's data.
Gear Requirement for Angling Cost (Kshs.)
Rod (Oduridu) 11.751-
I Hook (size 13) 2.50/-
i Line (7.5 metres) 23.25/-
Bait (earth worms I night fishing) 41.25/-
Fishing licence: 100/- (for those with no boat) 100/-
Total 178.75/-
Gear Re. nirement for giIl-nettin in the Tua ia/Diverse Fisheries Cost Kshs.
12,338/-
i net (2-.! , 100 mm, 90 metres bn: 383.6/-
Floats: (i 4/-, one attached .er metre) 3 60/-
Ro'e Sisal, attached to tos and base of net, i 1/- er metre 180/-
i Roll 2-.1 twine to mount net 85/-
Boat re istration (non-mechanised vessel 100/-
Fishin: licence with boat> 5 metres 200/-
Total 13,646.6/-
Gear Requirement for gill-netting in the Nile perch Fishery Cost (Kshs.)
1 boat (non-mechanised, Çjpresstiinber, 7 metres long) 12,338/-
i net ('1-ply, 127 mm, 90 metres) 65 7/-
i sail (sacking) 1,590/-
Floats: (@4/-, one attached per metre) 360/-
Rope (Sisal, attached to top and base of net, @ 1/- per metre) 180/-
i Roll 2-ply twine to mount net 85/-
Boat registration (non-mechanised vessel) 100/-
Fishing licence (with boat> 5 metres) 200/-
Total 15,510/-
Gear requirement for beach seining Cost
i boat (non-mechanised, no sail, Cypnsstiinher, 7 metres long) 12,338/-
I net (except for ropes, fully mounted, 198.3 metres) 17,726/-
2paddles (wood, @ 50/-) loo!-
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Table 6.4(d) Initial expenditure requirement for entry into the beach seine fishery. N.B, Crew hire assumed to be
paid as percentage of catch.
Table 6.4(e) Initial expenditure requirement for entiy into the purse seine fishery. N.B. Crew hire assumed to be
paid as percentage of catch.
Table 6.4(f) Initial expenditure requirement for entry into the mosquito beach seine fishery. NB. Crew hire
assumed to be paid as percentage of catch.
2 hauling ropes (sisal, 281.2 metres each, 1/- per metre) 562.4/-
2 rolls repair twine (18-ply @ 27/-, 42-ply @36.7/-) 63.7/-
Boat 1-egistration (non-mechanised vessel) 100/-
Fishing licence (with boat> 5 metres, 8 crew @ 200/-) 1,600/-
Total 33,190.1/-
Gear Requirement for Boat seining Cost (Kshs.)
1 boat (non-mechanised, no sail, G,press timber, 7 metres 1on) 12,338/-
i net (3 mm, 231.8 metres, @ 34.5/- per metre)
I lam. ('Anchor' Brand ressure lam.)
i lamp float ('kengere') 66/-
1 lamp mantel 15.5/-
Paraffin for I lamp 20/-
2 paddles (wood, @ 50/-) 100/-
Floats: (@4/-, one attached per metre) 360/-
Rope (sisal, attached to top and base of net, 1/- per metre) 180/-
1 roll cotton thread to mount net with 12/-
Boat registration (non-mechanised vessel) 100/-
Fishing licence (with boat> 5 metres, 4 crew 200/-) 800/-.
Total 23,330.6/-
Gear requirement for mosquito beach seining Cost (Kshs.)
i bout (non-mechanised, no sail, C'jprcsstimber, 7 metres long) 12,338/-
i net (except for ropes, fully mounted, 194 metres) 22,500/-
2 paddles (wood, @ 50/-) 100/
2 haulìng ropes (sisal, 60 metres each, @ 1/- per metre) 120/-
i roll cotton thread to mount net with 12/-
Boat Registration (non-mechariised vessel) 100/-
Fishing licence (willi boat> 5 metres, 8 crew 200/-) 1,600/-
Total 36,770/-
Gear requirement for lon-1inin_ Cost (Kshs.)
i boat (non-mechanised, Gjsress timber, 7 metres long) 12,338/-
I sail (sackin:) 1,590/-
Hooks (50 er line, a 320/- 'er 100, Size 8 hooks) 160/-
1 Roll (400 rams - to include snoods) 21- ly line 300/-
Floats ( 4/-, 25 re.uired) 100/-
Bait 50 'ndbi' ' 5/-) 250/-
13 oat Re2istration (non-mechanised vessel) 100/-
Fishin licence (with boat> 5 metres) 200/-
Total 15,038/-
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Table 6.4(g) Initial expenditure requirement for entry into the long-line fishery. N.B Bait assumed bought and that
fisher has no mosquito beach seine with which to catch own bait.
The mosquito beach seine, beach seine and purse seine fisheries are the most expensive to enter, but they
are also the most efficient gear types, and returns on initial investment can be extremely rapid. Fishers were
asked what the value of their best and worst catches over the pervious year had been. Invariably, for m''iy
fishers the worst possible was a zero catch. However, no mosquito beach seiners ever claimed to have
experienced a zero catch. Because of the small mesh-size of this gear, and the manner in which the net
scrapes along the lake bed as it is hauled in, very little escapes this net. Furthermore, mosquito beach
seiners tend to be highly mobile, and do not fish from one beach or spot alone, and rarely target a single fish
species. In these ways, mosquito beach seiners always catch something.
Beach seine fishers can experience zero catches, although infrequently. These nets tend only to catch Nile
perch, which excludes them from other fisheries. Furthermore, these tend to be used from one spot only,
normally a single beach. This is primarily because these nets must be used over beds which are free from
rocks in which their larger mesh-sizes can get caught (unlike mosquito beach seines which have such small
mesh-sizes they tend not to get 'snagged' in anything). This sedentary fishing method means that beach
seine fishers cannot take advantage of a wide range of fish species to guarantee catches. They are,
nevertheless, extremely efficient gear types, which is reflected in their cost.
Purse seines concentrate on omena alone, and the abundance of this fish does, to some extent, ensure that
purse seiners will always catch something during the mudho. This kind of fishing is carried out from a boat,
and the ome.aa fisher is able to cover a wide geographical range during an evening, further ensuring iat
they will always catch something. The success of gill-nets or long-lines, on the other hand, relies a great
deal on 'luck' - the hope that some fish will inadvertently swim into the net, or take the bait on the line.
There are few ways in which fishers involved in the set gear fisheries can intervene in the catching process
to improve the efficiency of their gear, and therefore have a higher chance of experiencing zero catches.
Boats enable fishers to expand their geographical field of operations, and hence access to a boat improves a
fisher's access to fish. Additionally, a boat also enables him to migrate in the event that catches at the home
beach decline, Investment in a boat or additional boats can greatly improve a fisher's catching power. 20
Nile perch fishers based at Osieko Beach, with access to a single boat apiece, each caught an average of
3,605 kilograms of fish in 1994. Those with access to 2 boats (8), however, each caught an average of
13,474 kilograms of fish in the same year.30 At Dunga Beach, 27 Nile perch fishers with access to one boat
each caught an average of 1,753.9 kilograms of perch in 1994. Those with two boats (5) each caught an
average of 3,53 L2 kilograms.3' If these figures are to be relied upon, a fisher stands to improve his chances
of catching fish by a factor of between two and four with each successive boat he buys. As a consequence
of the improvements in access to fish that arise with boat ownership, fishers may choose not to invest in
more efficient gear, and instead invest in additional boats.
The manner in which boats can improve a fisher's access to fish is also reflected in fishers's incomes. 158
fishers were asked to provide estimates of their total earnings for the year prior to the interview
(1993/1994). On average, each earned Kshs. 39,083/.32 103 of these respondents were boat owners, who
earned an average of Kshs. 47,482/- over the year prior to the interview, while the 55 casual fishers
interviewed had an average stated wage of Kshs. 23,166/- over the same period. While these estimates are
probably not accurate, they do reveal that boat owners expect to earn almost twice as much per year as
casuals do.
30From data provided by the Osieko Fishers's Co-operative Society.
31From data provided by the Dunga Fishers's Co-operative Society.
32Author's data.
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Investment choices and patterns may also be regulated in other ways. Jansen (1973) has suggested that
fishers will only expand their individual fishing efforts to the extent that they can control them. Once a boat
owner attains a certain number of boats and/or nets, he begins to lose control over the activities of his crew
members, making himself more vulnerable to the theft of fish and/or nets. Boat owners, therefore, appear to
have investment 'ceilings,' which are dependent on their ability to over-see production. If this ceiling is
reached, the fisher may see fit to invest elsewhere, such as in farming or in a small business, spreading his
risks and ensuring that he is not overly reliant on a single source of income.
Investment patterns may also be influenced by fishers's perceptions on tl1e future of the fishery. Of 128
fishers interviewed, 54.5 per cent (90) felt that its future was 'bleak,' primarily because they felt that the
value of their catches would decline vis a vis escalating gear prices. For this reason, many of these fishers
believed that, in the future, the fishery would 'be a place for the rich,' and confined only to those wealthy
fishers who could absorb increasing gear prices. These fears imply that fishers are facing increasingly
problematic in-put costs, which, they say, are compounded by declining per capita catches. This in turn
suggests that the fishery may be approaching Maximum Economic Yields (MEYs). 35.7 per cent (59) of the
sample felt that the future was 'uncertain', while the remainder thought it 'satisfactory.'33 This latter group
of fishers, like their colonial predecessors, argued that the 'lake is so big, the fish will never be finished'.
These pessimistic views on the future economic viability of the fishery invariably influences the areas in
which fishers are prepared to invest. 171 fishers were asked where they would invest their money should
they receive a windfall - in excess of Kshs. I 00,000/-. 31 per cent (53) said that they would invest it in the
lake, where most felt that quick returns could be made on the investment. 45.6 per cent (78) said that they
would invest it in the purchase of land or on their farms; 14 per cent (24) said that they would invest it in a
business of some kind; 7 per cent (12) said that they would invest it in the building of cheap rental houses,
while 2.3 per cent (4) said that they would invest it in 'other' areas not repeated elsewhere. In total, 69 per
cent (118) of this sample said that they would not invest it in the lake, mainly because they felt that catches
were declining and/or because of the threat of theft.
As discussed above, the more efficient a gear, generally, the more expensive it is. In addition, most efficient
gear types are not set and are therefore less vulnerable to theft. This suggests that there are two groups of
fishers, divided between those who have the wealth to invest in expensive gear, and those who are too poor
to have access to these gear types, and are forced to invest in less efficient, cheaper and set gear. The ability
of fishers to invest in more expensive gear enables them to minimise the possibility of a zero catch, despite
net catch declines throughout Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery. These more expensive gear types are not as
common as set gear, and those who can afford them are able to improve their competitive advantage over
less wealthy fishers. In this way, the ability of fishers to improve their access to fish through the purchase of
more efficient gear types is dependent on wealth. In turn, the ability to gain access to such wealth appears to
be the product of fishers's access to credit, previous investment in the fishery, and whether or not the fisher
has access to other income sources, such as small businesses.
6.4 Theft
Fishers may limit the number of nets and/or boats under their control in order to reduce their vulnerability
to theft. Of 101 fishers questioned, 75.2 per cent had had some item or part of their gear stolen, while the
rest had not been affected.35 150 fishers were asked if they thought theft of gear on the lake was problem.
62 per cent felt that it was, while 32 per cent felt that is was not, and 6 per cent felt that it had been bad, but
that security was now improving.
33Author's data
34Author' s data.
35Author's data.
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Theft is a major problem for fishers based along the north-eastern part of the lake close to the Ugandan
border. Lured there by the promise of large catches from deeper Iiganclaii waters, fishers must also contend
with high levels of cross-border theft. Ugaridan fishers are said to cross into Kenyan waters at night and
return to the safety of their own waters with stolen nets which may then be sold or used by the thieves
themselves. lt is also claimed that pirates often operate iii these waters, holding up fishers on the lake and
stealing all their fish, nets and, if available, their out-board engines as well. The threat of theft also affects
the time that fishers spend ¡n the lalce. Many fishers who tise gill-nets will remain on the lake overnight so
as to keel) guard on them. Fishers may also tiy to camouflage the white floats on their nets and long-lines
by replacing them with bits of wood debris and small, floating bits of water hyacinth. This, however, can
prove a problem to the gear owner, who may be unable to find his own gear again. The threat of theft can
also determine the areas in which fishers will invest. Theft mainly affects the gill-net and long-line
fisheries, where fishing gear ¡s left unattended in the lake. 1f time threat of theft is considered great enough, a
fisher may well invest in a gear types that is always attended to and never left in the water, such as purse
seines, beach seines and all of the ochwì methods.
It is not clear why theft appears to have increased. Fishers claimed several reasons, amongst which were
declines in morality, increasing poverty and ethnic tensions between Luhya, Luo and Ugaudan fishers.
What amorality' constitutes is ambiguous, but respondents equate it with the breakdown of traditional Leo
systems of security, the right to communally judge offenders, coluniunity justice systems and so on. To
some extent, community decisions ou this level do still OCCUr. Ou several beaches visited, public tribunals'
were observed, where fishers accused of various infringements were condemned either to a public whipping
or banishment from the beach. However, it is not clear if these forms ofjustice act as disincentives to theft.
Increases in poverty nay also be a contributory factor. Although second hand-nets cannot normally be sold
foi large amounts of money, in circumstances where the need for cash is high any amount of money gained
froiii the sale of stolen nets may he satisfactory.
Theft, and the perceived threat of theft, therefore, may determine in which gear a fisher invests and how
much gear he is prepared to buy. A fisher may limit the number of nets he has because the vulnerability to
theft increases with the amount of gear owned. By being forced to restrict the amount of gear owned, theft
caim serve to regulate a fisher's access to fish. Theft may also affect exploitation patterns. 1f theft is known
to be particularly bad in an area, fishers may avoid fishing thcr. Theft also affects the amount of tim. a
fisher spends on the lake, if he feels he should guard hs nets. In this way, theft serves as an informal
regulation. Increases ¡n theft appear to be the result of a number of factors, including increasing poverty and
the break-down of community self-regulation and governance. The culmination of these declines in wealth
and community structure may be reflected in increasing ethnic tensions, particularly between Kenyan
fishing communities and their Ugandan counterparts.
6.5 Falling catches
Total fish catches irm the lcenyan waters o Lake \[ictoria appear to have risen steadily ever silice records
started (see Chapter 4). However, the collection of these statistics is ilawed. On the one hauch these statistics
do oot reveal the source of the fish landed. There is a strong possibility that Kenyan catch tonnages are
being sustained by fish smtiggied in from Tanzania and Uganda. Many flshers from these countries will
land their fish ou Kenyan beaches because of the higher prices offered (cf. Reynolds et ci. 1992). Ori the
other hand, the collection statistics give no indication of the SiZe of fish landed, which is important because
tile greater the number of juvenile or immature fish lauded, the more likely that conclitiomis of biological
over-fishing arc being approached. Thus, the O;reSSiOI: that catches fioa; enya waters are increasing n.y
be untrue, a fact that fishers confirm.
Table 6.5: Reasons given by fishers as to why catches have declined.37 N.B. percentages exceed 100 because many
respondents stated several reascns.
The water hyacinth is not native to Lake Victoria. This attractive floating weed was introduced from South
America to Rwanda in the 1940's by Belgian colonisers as an ornamental plant for garden ponds, and from
there it made its way to Lake Victoria via the Kagera River (Kaufman 1992). Currently, large areas of the
lake shore-line are covered by the plant, impeding access to beaches and getting tangled in nets. It is
particularly troublesome to beach seiners, whose nets, once filled with the weed, are often too heavy to haul
in. Fishers claim that there are no fish in the water below the hyacinth, possibly because it reduces the
amount of light that can penetrate the water, as well as deoxygenating it.
36Author's data.
37Author's data.
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Of 178 fishers ¡nterviewed, 90 per cent (160) felt that catches had declined;36 9.5 per cent (17) said that
catch levels remained unchanged, while the remainder felt that catches had increased. Of this sample, 161
respondents qualified their answers which are summarised in Table 6.5 below.
Currents ('nger') play an important role in fishing, and may serve to attract fish or to repel them. Fishers
claim that in the past, water entered the Winam Gulf through the Mbita Passage between Rusinga Island
and the mainland, passed around the Winam Gulf in an anticlockwise rotation, and exited through the
Rusinga Channel (Fig. 6.1). However, in 1983 the Mbita Causeway, linking Rusinga Island to the mainland,
was completed, and water no longer enters the Gulf through this entrance. Although the distance from the
mainland to the island is no more than 500 metres, fishers claim that the water volume that passed through
it was great and the current extremely strong, such that many people who tried to cross the channel died
when their boats capsized. The clusters of evil spirits ('nyawawa') living on either shore are said to be
testimony to this. This current, it is said, brought 'good' water to the Gulf, pushing the 'bad' water out in
front of it through the Rusinga Channel. Because the water is now 'bad' in the Gulf, fish are no longer
willing to enter it. Indeed, there are indications that water in the lake is anoxic and that there is a permanent
oxycline below which no oxygen in solution exists (Kaufman and Ochumba, 1993). Whether or not the
Mbita Causeway actually contributes to this condition is not clear. A survey carried out by the Kenya
Academy of Sciences in 1988 dismissed it as a cause for declining fish catches and mass fish kills
(Wandera, 1992). Fishers, however, are adamant that the Mbita Causeway has affected their catches.
Reasons suggested for declining catches N %
Because of illegal and/or ochun fishing methods and gear 60 37.3
Because there are too many fishers and/or nets 41 25.5
Because fish have been caught before they have a chance to breed 36 22.4
The Mbita Causeway 29 18
Single responses (not repeated elsewhere) 13 8.1
Rain brings food to the fish in its run-off. Now there is less rain 9 5.6
Because the Nile perch has eaten al! the other fish 8 5
Because of fishing in and/or the destruction of fish nurseries 8 5
No net decline, but because so many fishers, less fish 'er fisher 7 4.4
Because of the water hyacinth and/or other noxious 'Need/grass 7 4.4
Respondent does not know 7 4.4
Because the fish have all moved into the open lake 5 3.1
Fish no longer have breeding places because all the streams are blocked/silted up 4 2.5
Because the lake is getting shallower 3 1.9
Because there are no longer any closed seasons 3 1.9
Because of algal blooms 2 1.2
Table 6.6: Reasons stated b fishers as to why fat and roe have disa ieared from the Nile .erch.40 N.B.
percentages exceed 100 because many stated several reasons.
The largest proportion of fishers who provided reasons for the disappearance of fat and/or roe from the Nile
perch felt that it was because of over-fishing. The notion that the authorities are trying to poison the Nile
perch was encountered at several beaches, although no other evidence relating to this was uncovered.
However, Riediriiller (1994) suggests that the fishing authorities may be pursuing an unofficial polie>' )f
encouraging Nile perch fishers to use under-sized nets for exactly this purpose. Evidence of catch declines
may also be derived from changes to the amount of the time that fishers spend on the lake. Of 150 fishers
interviewed, 104 (69 3 per cent) said that they spent longer on the lake now than they did when they first
started fishing.
38Author's data.
39Author's data.
40Author's data.
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In addition to fishers's claims that catches are declining, they also claim that fish sizes are getting smaller.
Fishers have a distinct view of what constitutes a 'large' fish of any species. For example, they identify
three age-size cohorts in ornena, and claim that each of the cohorts swim in shoals comprising only the one
size. As mentioned in Chapter 4, tilapia species are sold according to size, the largest being the 'nyamami
or 'ngiaba'. Similar names and size-recognition are associated with the Nile perch. Fishers are also aware
that it is only the large fish that have bred, that the medium sizes may not have done so, and that the
smallest have certainly not. Thus, of 137 fishers interviewed, 97 per cent said that large fish were now rare,
1.5 per cent said that they saw no difference, while 1.5 per cent said that the sizes in the omena fishery had
hot changed, but had in the others.38
Fishers also claimed that fat and roe on the Nile perch had disappeared. Needless to say, the larger the fish,
the more likely it is to have bred. Fishers also say that it is only large Nile perch who have fat deposits, so
much so that its skin is said to 'wobble' from the fat beneath it. Many traders claim that they can no longer
buy Nile perch oil on the beaches in which to fry fish in, and that it now comes only from the filleting
factorks in Nairobi or Kisumu. Of 105 respondents interviewed, 92 per cent claimed that the amounts of fat
and/or roe they observed on the Nile perch landed had either decreased, was rare or haJ completely
disappeared. 3 per ceiit said that they still found these, while 5 per cent said that they still saw the fat, but
rarely the roe.39 64 respondents provided reasons as to why they thought the fat and roe had disappeared,
and their responses are summarised in Table 6.6 below.
Reasons provided for why roe/fat have disappeared from the Nile perch. N
Do not kiiow why 24 37.5
lt ¡s caught before it has time to produce fat or roe 17 26.6
Only big perch have these, and they have all been fished from the lake 17 26.6
The perch is constantly harassed and agitated by nets and fishers, so it does not
produce these things
10 1 5X
Fat and roe appear only ou large perch, and these are taken by the trucks from the
filleting companies, o these are no longer seen
8 12.5
lt no longer gets the 'correct food' 6 9.4
lt has beenoisoned by the authorities, so as to rid the lake of it 6 9.4
Single responses (not repeated elsewhere) 3 4.7
Because of pollution 2 3.1
The Mbita Causeway prevents it getting enough food 2 3.1
l'i
41 32 (21.3 per cent) said that they spent less time on the lake now than when they first started fishing,
while 14 (9.3 per cent) said that the time they spent on the lake had not changed. The reasons given for why
these changes had occurred are provided in Table 6.7 below.
Regardless of whether or not the amount of time spent fishing had increased or decreased, fishers generally
claimed that the reasons for the changes were directly related to declining access to fish, either because of
net stock declines, or else because of competition increases. For many of those fishers who had experienced
declines in the amount of time they spent fishing, it was because of the shrinking benefits to be gained from
increasing or sustaining previous fishing times. In other words, time decreases had occurred because it was
no longer cost effective to spend longer periods of time on the lake. Foi' beach seiners, times had decreased
because the amount of beach space available to them to haul from had decreased as a result of heavy effort
increases in this fisheiy.
Table 6.7: Reasons stated by fishers as to why the amount of time they spend on the lake has changed.42
N.B. percentages exceed loo because many stated severaL reasons.
One final indicator of declining catches is the widespread use of 'medicines' applied Lo nets and/or boats
which are thought to improve a fisher's chances of realising good catches. These medicines are bought,
often at considerable expense, from traditional healers and doctors, 'jab/Jo' and/or 'ajuoga', and are said to
contain magical properties that guarantee good catches. Fishers were questioned as to whether or not they
felt that the amount of such medicine use had increased in recent years, but no conclusive data was gained.
However, given that such medicine is deemed important in guaranteeing the capture of fish, it may be
inferred that per capita catches are low enough to justi' its use.
Fishers, then, do perceive significant catch declines. These declines are not reflected in official catch
records except for tilapia catches. Since 1991, tilapia catches have declined from 4,691.1 tonnes in 1991 to
1,562.8 tonnes in 1994 (Unpublished Fisheries Department statistics 1995). The reasons for this are not
clear, although one source suggests that its breeding cycle has been 'interfered with', and that it has also
been affected by pollution and siltation in rain water run-off.43 Another possibility is that given anoxic
conditions within the lake, tilapia stocks have been driven towards the shore where they are more
vulnerable to fishers's nets, and have been over-fished as a consequence (Lowe-McConnell pers. comm.).
Tilapia declines are also reflected in the growing market foi' exported tilapia in Kisumu.
41Author's data.
42Author's data.
43Mr. P. N. Gikonyo, Assistant Director of Fisheries, quoted in The Standard 8/4/95 and 25/4/95.
Reasons provided for why amounts of tin-ic spent fishing have changed N
Catches in in-shore areas have declined, so we must now fish further out 32 24.4
There is less fish now, so we have to work harder and longer to get it 28 21.4
There is less fish now, so we have to spend longer looking for it 26 19.8
There is less fish now, so there is less work and less time on lake 13 9.9
There is less fish now, so more sear is needed, and this takes time to handle 10 7.6
There is less fish now, so it does not pay to spend any longer looking for it 9 6.9
Single responses (not repeated elsewhere) 7 5.3
Because there is so much theft, we have to stay with the gear at all times 4 3.1
Because competition has increased, we have to stay out longer if we are to get our
share of the fish
4 3.1
Because of competition, we cannot fish for longer (beach seiners) 4 3.1
There is less bait (HapJochromis and we have to spend longer looking for this (long-
liners only)
2 1 .5
I IL
At Kichinjio beach there are a number of store houses in which a group of fish traders store dried tilapia
exported from Lake Turkrna. Every week, one or two trucks, fully loaded with some 10 tonnes of tilapia
from the north of Kenya, arrive to sell them to these women who then sell them on at local markets and
towns within the Nyanza region.
The reasons for these catch declines are by no means clear. Fishers may he right that declines per fishing
unit have occurred because there are less fish in total. On the other hand, fish stocks may remain unchanged
and stable, but catches per fishing unit have declined because of net effort increases. On the whole, declines
in fish per fishing unir would appear to be a combiiiation of both effort increases and declines in the net fish
stock.
Declining catches per tishing unit necessarily have implications foi fishers's access to fish. They also have
wider repercussions. wishers may be turning their investments a\ay from the lake because of declines and
the perceived increase of financial 'insecurity' on the lake. Catch declines per capita alongside increasing
effort levels do serve to increase competition between fishers, which is partly reflected in the increased
amount of time some fishers spend on the lake. Per capita catch ceclines, furthermore, compel fishers to
invest in more efficient fishing gear such as beach seines, mosquito beach seines and other ochun methods,
which improve the guarantee that fishers will always catch somethi on any given day, and also serve to
improve a fisher's competitive advantage over other fishers. Catch declines rna)' further affect fishers's
investment priorities, as many fishers now try to spread their risks by investing in several fisheries, so that
if catches in one falter, then hopefully catches in the others will enable them to survive. Fishers may also
invest in those fisheries that appear to be doing better than faltering ones. Thus, for example, there appear
be great increases in investment in the oincn fishery, which does not seem to have experienced catch
declines (Othina and Odem 1995).
Catch declines are a product of a number of factors which are themselves embedded in wider socio-
economic trends. As fishers are faced with declines in the resources they have traditionally been able to rely
upon, the need for cash lias increased to make up for any production shortfalls. Because fishing represents
on of the easiest means to a cash income, its relative importance as a cash income generator lias increased
viga vis other sectors of the household economy, such as farming and herding. This represents a compelling
reason for many to seek employment within the fishery, and is one of the most important causes behind
effort increases. There are, however, other reasons why effort incases have occurred, and these are
discussed below.
6.6 Increases in fishing effort
Although estimates of the effort size in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery have been made (see Chapters4 and
5), no census of fishers lias ever been undertaken. Fishers, however, do claim that there have been
considerable increases. 164 fishers were asked if they felt that the numbers of fishers on the lake had
increased since they started fishing,44 and 95.7 per cent (157) agreed that they had; 3.7 per cent (6) said that
numbers had declined and 0.6 per cent (1) felt that numbers remained unchanged. 131 of these fishers stated
why they thought these changes had occurred (Table 6.8).
44Author's data.
Table 6.8: Reasons given by fishers as to why increases in effort have Occurred.45 NB. Percentages exceed 100
because many respondents gave several reasons.
majority of fishers blame effort increases on the lack of alternative ernpioyrreoi eisa 'ire e.
..:ther reasons, they also cite population increases, the need for cash incomes wtot.
ine of faimig. Effort increases have two important consequences for fislierr,
is ices fish per fishing unit, a problem compounded if there are r.
ccurring at the same time. On the other hand, competition between fishers over :1co:.H., fis
n itiooc ripe foi' conflict between fishers and between fishing if foe. As
:o'ot c;'nities outside the fishery decline, and as the need for iea:j rrn :::r:ses,
ro secr ei'oui in the most easily accessible sector of the economy, evo
..
o r mes, thora viho seek such employment do so on a strictly temporary herr.....
Trble joh ni.. ies. This forni of transient fishing has implications for
f :fieves .. he will be leaving the fishety in any case, he is less likely
t where investment requirements are low. However, i
Cil to improve, then the fishery only experiences effc cl
O :o::fv 1Af (I 'ff' ;oiccicl discitssecl in Chapter 1, predicts that as
rom o onml 'ríhaoa inc costs of fishing arc not recouped thro
:10; C1:1 effooc decreases Ioweve, ii a fishery based on numr:.::
r - 'ci::: r =j. I Cfís fo: cile ger: t1re roe not necessarily die cairn r: : 7 e: t for
o :°OT roo 'ro; '; rom. offro aai Th:s, no angier jire a much iffer MEC' Irte:. r C
mm. of :y'rg 'o a 1tar ifa; are in beach seining. Si:. Ca:f e, fishers may invest i:
iroogf Ihey are not very efficient (Ligtioet et ai. i95). This
o r 'Co in the event that the costs of of . c.::e
os 7' l'o:' C'o: . If::, a fisher with a beach seine who feels
ño ::eL. a:4 ño:.: ..: .. rofter type of gear for use in a different fisher; where cacM
hiot'ed. Alternatively, a fisher may invest C: numeicols groe: reror. di
.,hen markets and catches are deemed to be good c:.r:: ci costs
t, and then switch to another gear if catches and market conditions cfcan be adequately ni
45Author's data.
loor:: roo /11M 1: effort ñc:oc.ro: N
.m.CtOrSC :oa 'o rofi: io ha buen 'fsewhese 103 78.6
finorroc ere ro m.don has inceased 15 11.4
fiorro'oa :aooi' m'ro ecc run: dieroforo they need incomes 14 10.7
i: ido oñ/ f:corro-:':ai:iog o:I:on fo: oeopie here 14 10.7
mr.orr efe fiori ca.:. no bogo: cucco:L :eoole 14 10.7
Coro' or ;orofi ccii o: ro"g: frore loso one income now 8
Corrose of iriiro1e-jeis cf mdcci ¿:o:-ouLs/pa1enLs cannot afford school fees 8 d.f
:1ro: faje seau ..jfr: is iO be de::ved ficen the lake 7 fC
Beer: ra îrofñ i: r :o.:o. .no rie 7 fC
mermes (rot 'a:arnd ñsn"iCaie 6 '-:7
:00 rie irr Te 000C :miìf:r:dons and cannot -find work elsewhere 5 3.f
ecaoon onoota nave envasa w 1Cc fishery, so there are jobs here 5 3 f
Nurobo: :o:e decreased because of declining catches 4 3.05
Caeciese tf :r lake is the easiest place to find work 4 3.05
Bemuse work in the towns pays so badly 3 2.3
46n=233; Author's data.
n23I; Author's data.
48J. 1. Ochieng Okach, Head of Fisheries Section, Lake Basin Development Authority, Kisumu, Interview no.102,
22/9/94.
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This allows a fisher to cope with both catch and market variations as it suits him, and delays the impact of
any MEY on effort levels. This dynamism, furthermore, ensures that the fishery can maintain its value, and
in this way continually serves to attract new entrants.
Employment opportunities beyond Lake Victoria are poor. According to fishers, many university graduates,
unable to find employment elsewhere, have joined the fishery, a trend which has been confirmed elsewhere
(The Standard 7/1/95). Additionally, many of those who join the fishery are school 'drop-outs' (Ogutu
1992). During the 1970's and early 1980's education was seen by many as a means to a paid job.
Increasingly, however, education no longer provides the promise of salaried employment. To many fishers,
investing in their children's education when there is no gUarantee of a job afterwards seems an unnecessary
expenditure when their children can be employed in more useful income-earning activities such as fishing.
On average, fishers had 3.4 children each, and only a quarter offishers interviewed had no children at all.46
The costs of schooling can be a considerable domestic expense, and fishers will gladly forgo this ifthey can
find alternative income-earning activities for their children. At Anyanga beach, truant school pupils were
routinely rounded up, and forced to go to school, bound together and marched off like prisoners. At N'Cciu,
beach leaders and senior fishers did not permit children to fish unless they had completed their schooling to
a standard 8 level. Beach officials at N'Gou felt that the costs of primary school education were not so high
that parents could not afford them. At this level of education, parents pay some nominal fees, and must also
buy pens, exercise books, uniforms and shoes for their children, and are also obliged to pay for a series of
school 'activity' fees. These total approximately Kshs. 3,200/- per child per year. After primary school,
children are expected to proceed onto secondary school where fees are much higher, some Kshs. 12,OOO/
per child per year, and officials at N'Gou beach did not expect parents to afford such fees. Fishers had an
average education of 6.42 years out of a total possible 12 years,47 and in virtually every case, fishers
claimed to have left school because of problems with paying fees. For those who do feel that their children
ought to complete their education, fees are often staggered, depending on the money coming into the
family. As such, a child will often spend long periods of time assisting his/her family to find school fees
either from relatives and friends, or from fishing. Schooling is then intermittent, and takes a long time to
complete. It was not uncommon to encounter primary school pupils in their twenties.
Encouraging children to stay in school would appear to represent an effective mechanism of controlling
fishing effort levels. However, fishers must be persuaded that it is worthwhile to send their childre". to
school, a difficult task if fishers do not feel that employment opportunities will improve with education.
"The fishing sector is a dumping ground for those youths that are unable to find salaried jobs."48 The
combination of low school attendance with poor alternative income-paying job opportunities results in
increases in the total effort level, and with it, competition. There is evidence of this congestion on the lake.
At Utajo, for example, the number of fishers on the beach was so high that there was physically not enough
space for fishers to haul in their beach seines at the same time The beach leaders had therefore designed a
rota system for fishing. At any one time during the day, four seines were being pulled at once, each
encircling the other. As the last seine approached the shore, the next crew of fishers in the 'queue'
commenced with setting their net. At Misori Beach, all tilapia fishers fished in an area no further than 10
metres off the shore, and no longer than 500 metres along the beach. In an effort to minimise the
competition between fishers for space, the beach authorities insisted that fishers all had t&leave theY beach
at the same time, and no fishers were allowed on the lake after a certain time of the day, so that competition
was considered 'equal' and all fishers had the same chance of setting their nets in favoured spots. In order
to enforce this rule, fishers were obliged to hand their paddles in to the beach co-operative after they had re-
set their nets. At 7 o'clock every morning the crews would line up outside the co-operative store, make a
rush for their paddles, and then stampede towards the lake where their colleagues awaited them in boats.
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Another symptom of competition has been the rise of 'kanyaga' fees, charged by beaches to migrant fishers
not normally resident on the beach, and which enables them to fish from the beach for the duration of a
year.
While some beaches have attempted to limit the amount of competition between their fishers, conflict can
nevertheless occur. 138 respondents were asked if they had ever encountered trouble on the lake from other
fishers. Most - 84 per cent - had not, and said that when going to other beaches a letter of introduction, the
explanation of intention, the payment of kanyaga fees and/or having contacts on the beaches usually averted
any kind of problems. However, incidents have occurred where fights have broken out between competing
fishers, sometimes resulting in death.49
Of the 16 per cent of fishers who had encountered trouble, most used one of the ochun methods of fishing.
Non-users of these gear types feel that they are unfair because of their superior efficiency to other, more
conventional types of gear. Users of ochun methods, therefore, receive much verbal abuse from people
fishing along the shores, and in some cases have stones hurled at them.50 However, tensions do not only
occur between ochun method users and non-users. At Asat, fishers claim that deep-water spots yield the
best catches. However, such spots are rare around Asat, and fishers often argue amongst themselves for the
right to fish these.51 Fishers from Asat often cross the Winam Gulf to fish in waters off Got Huma, near
Homa Lime (Fig. 6.1), where they receive verbal abuse from local fishers who object to them fishing in Got
Huma waters.
These latter examples are fairly subdued forms of complaint. However, violence between fishers is quite
common in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, and some examples of this are as follows: In March and April
1993, the beach leader at Tako beach objected to fishers from Nyakach fishing off 'his' section of the
shore-line, and 'hired' Fisheries 'scouts' to accost them and to have them thrashed. In the ensuing violence,
five fishers drowned.52 In May 1995, omena fishers from Nyagina beach on Rusinga Island were accu'd
by long-line fishers from Luanda Kotieno beach of disturbing their lines and stealing their fish. The Luanda
Kotieno fishers accosted and seized a Nyagina fishing boat and crew, and locked up the crew. They
threatened to call in the police, saying that they had caught them red-handed with fish stolen from the long-
lines. However, following discussions between the respective beach-leaders, it was agreed that the median
line between the two beaches along which the steamer passed was to be a boundary over which fishers from
neither beach could cross.53 In 1987 two Misori fishers were attacked by Osindo fishers claiming that they
were fishing too close to Osindo shores. Both fishers drowned.54
There are only a limited number of places along the shores of the lake from where beach seining can be
carried out. This is mainly because the water off the shore has to be cleared of rocks before seining can
occur, an often arduous and expensive task. Congestion at beach seining spots can, therefore, become
extreme. At Utajo beach in 1978 and 1979, congestion was extreme. Several members of the beach
community decided upon a rota system of fishing (described above), and enforced this. However, many
fishers felt the system was unfair, and two factions were formed between those who agreed with the system
and those who did not. The factions fought, and several deaths resulted. The Kenya Fisheries Department
(KFD) sent a delegation to the beach to try and calm the fishers down and it was decided to divide the two
factions along two beaches, one which would practise the rota system and the other which would not.
49Author's data.
50lnterview no.163, Kiumba, 17/11/94; Interview no.165, Kiumba, 18/11/94; Interview no.169, Kiumba, 19/11/94.
51lnterview no.281, Asat, 19/3/95.
52lnterview no.38, Tako, 23/4/94.
53lnterview no.s 121 and 122, Nyagina, 22/10/94.
54lnterview no.259, 15/3/95.
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They further added that anyone who was unhappy with this should establish their own beaches, As a result,
five new beachs were opened and all are 'private'.55
Finally, the Nyando River divides two major Luo clans, the Kaiio and the Nyakach, and the mouth of the
river is a productive iuip, ground. In 1987, Kano fishers complained that nets set by Nyakachian fishers
in the mouth inirJd uith the success of the osadhetraps they had set there. Fights ensued, and one Kano
fisher was killed. Flaito lichers are said not to trouble Nyakachian fishers any longer.56 Conflict arising over
competition for fish stocks, fishing grounds and over different types of gear can and does occur. As already
discussed in Chapter 5, conflict also arises between small-scale fishers and trawler crews.
Competition between fishers has further repercussions for the fishery. As competition increases and fish
stocks decline, then a fisher's guarantee of catches is undermined, and few can afford to return home at the
end of the day without a catch (Geheb 1995). Responding to this, fishers may start fishing in ways they
have never done before as they attempt to recover some of the guarantee which provided them with fish
previously. These risk-aversion techniques may manifest themselves in benevolent ways, such as fishers
trying to keep favoured fishing spots secret, a tactic observed along the Sondu-Miriu River (Ochumba and
Mainga 1992), or by diversifying their production base by investing in a variety of fishing gear and
exploiting several different fish species. Alternatively, risk-aversion techniques may manifest themselves in
detrimental ways, such as using under-size nets to exploit hitherto under- or unexploited fish stocks and s,:e
ranges. These latter responses are indicative of the competitive relationships that fishers share, and it is
increasingly the case in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery that the benefits to be derived from using legal gear
are far outweighed by the benefits to be gained from using illegal gear. Fishers generally anticipate that the
cost of their fishing gear, along with profits, will be met before the end of the gear's life-span. The use of
legal fishing gear does not guaraiitee this outcome.
Because these conditions prevail within Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, there are good reasons to expect
that the use of these illegal gear will increase. This is particularly the case given that fishers have few
alternative job opportunities to which they can turn, and access to farming and herding resources appears to
be on the decline. In such a context, fishers will continue to join the fishery, regardless of declining Catch
rates per Unit of Effort (CPUE5) and despite associated dissipation of incomes. In this way, the lack of
alternative employment serves to regulate fishing effort levels by augmenting them, and fishers will react to
this increasing competition in one of several ways: by increasing the amount of hours they spend on the
lake (intensification); by diversifying their means of production by either targeting several fisheries rather
than just one, or by targeting fish stocks and size ranges which are hitherto un- or under-exploited; or,
finally, by using the most efficient fishing gear available to them. In the event that efforts to g n
competitive advantages fail, fshers may well resort to violence against one another to protect their access to
these diminishing stocks. By identifying these trends within fishing communities, indications are also
provided as to the state of the fish stock. Where competition is low and the availability of large fish high,
fishers will be less likely to use violence as a means of controlling their access to fish stocks, and more
likely to use larger mesh-sizes because it is cost effective to do so. Competition, as well as the cost
effectiveness of using illegal mesh sizes, is further regulated by marketing variables.
6.7 The impact of marketing variables on Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery
The key factors which affect fish prices are as follows:
(a) Scasona1ity seasons affect the supply of fish. The lowest catches are realised during the dry season(December to February), while the best are during the rainy seasons (March-June, August-
September). The rainy seasons, then, are also low-price seasns given the generally higher
availability of fish.
55lnterview no.155, Utajo, 13/II/94.
56lnterview no.306, N'Gou, 25/3/95, and Interview no.314, N'Gou, 27/3/95.
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The number oftraders- at Iarge.beaches, such as Usenge and Marciga, there are large numbers of
traders and fishers may be able t exploit the competition between them to their own advantage.
Because there are so many more traders than fishers, the price off 'n may be driven up as fish traders
compete for supplies.
Social factors at smaller beaches, many of those who buy the fish from fishers are either in-Iaw r
the wives of the fishers themselves. Because of the relationship between fishers and their buyers at
these beaches, social etiquette may prevent fishers from demanding higher prices. At N'Gou,
Anyanga, Misori, Tako, Utajo, Nyagina and Kiumba, most, ifnot all the fish traders that fishers sold
their fish to were relatives or wives.
( d) Market monopo1ies fishers from Mfangano and Rusinga sell most of their Nile perch to trucks from
the filleting companies awaiting at Mbita. The agents ofthe companies collude to offer the fishers a
single price. The difference between this price and that offered by the filleting company is kept by
the agent as payment. However, because the agents have a monopoly on the market, they are able to
force fishers to accept virtually any price. These prices, fishers claimed, rarely reflected the supply of
fish. As one observer commented, "[t]he entire lake is in the hands of wealthy entrepreneurs...the fish
in the lake is sold cvc: fore it is landed57 Interestingly, Rusingan fishers rarely tried to exploit
other markets elsewhere. Mic'ri beach, which Is not far from Rusinga, is also frequented by trucks,
hut fishers rarely sailed there to sell their fish. T ver, throughout the Kenyan sector of Lake
Victoria, beaches commonly prohibit outsiders from seIii their fish in an effort to protect their
markets.
Proximity to inarkets in their negotiations with fishers, fish tradei. en argue that prices should he
dropped because of his/her transport costs or because they know that ui narket is bad. Nornia..y,
fishers are unable to refute either claim, and sell their fish at the lower pice. However, at those
beaches where the mai11 markets are close by, such as Dunga, Kichinjio and Tako, close to Kisumu,
and Koginga, close to Homa Bay, fish traders cannot claim to be affected by transport costs (they
walk to market), and fishers generally know what fish prices are at the markets because these are so
close by. In addition, fish prices at the beach may be very different from those at the market. Thus,
for example, catches at a beach may be poor, and the price of fish driven up as a consequence.
However, on arrival at the market, traders may then find that it has been saturated with fish coming in
from other parts of the lake, and hence make losses. Fish prices can only be judged on the day, and
traders will ràrely know what the going rate for fish is before they arrive at the market.
Other factors these include issues apparently unrelated to the fishery, but which nevertheless affect
prices. As has already been mentioned, if the price of grain rises, then fish prices drop. Similarly,
when school fees arc due, fish prices will also drop. While market variations away from tile beaches
are born by the fish traders, any declines in prices at the markets necessarily affects household
incomes in fishing communites, given that many traders are married to fishers. However, other
factors may affect the price of fish on the beaches. For example, during April and May 1994, when
bodies of Rwandan civil war victims floated down the Kagera River and into the lake. Concerns
the Nile perch ate these bodies resulted in price declines on tile foreign markets, and Nile perch
prices on the beaches at this time dropped from an average of SOrne Kslis. 35/- a kilo for the year, to
Kshs. 3-4/- a kilo.
Fish prices can vary considerably over the year. Thus, for example, the average lake-wide price for Nile
pei'ch over the study period was Kshs. 22.50/- per kilo.58 Fishers were also asked to state the highest and
lowest prices reached by perch in the year prior to the interview.
57J. 1. Ochieng Okach, Head of Fisheries Section, Lake Basin Development Authority, Kisumu, Interview no.102,
22/9/94.
58Author's data.
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Fheaverage highest prices stated came to Kshs. 34.l0/- per kilo, while the lowest average prices stated
were Kshs 10 10/ a kilo, a 71 pei cent diffetenee Prices foi large 'troughs of ornena sold foi an average
of Kshs» 266.5/- over the study period; the highest prices were I(shs. 301.21- a large 'trough', whilst the
lowest were on average Kshs. 105.70/- a large 'trough', a 65 per cent difference.60
The most important variable affecting these price fluctuations is the fish supply. However, unlike other
producers, fishers are not able to influence prices by trying to limit or increase supplies because they are
unable to control how much fish they catch. In this way, fishers are 'price takers' and not 'price makers',
because a significant component of their production is dependent on luck (Oduor Otieno et aI. 1978). As
discussed above, exploitation patterns in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery are based on trying to minimise the
chances of a zero catch on a given day. In other parts of the world, fishers may rely on institutional
mechanisms to influence prices. They may have access to refrigeration facilities, and are able to withhold
fish supplies until such a tune that prices improve In addition, because of the institutions of which they are
a part, mainly co-operatives, they may secure loans and/or advances to tide them over this waiting period
Fishers in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery do not have lecourse to either facility As we have seen earlier co
peratives are treated with suspicion and few fishers beneit from their services. In addition, there are no
refrigeration facilities available to fishers on the lake As a consequence, fishers have few alternative
income sources to which they can turn in the event of a zero catch, providing a powerful motivation for
perpetually intensive fishing patterns.
Fishers will try to protect themselves against these market fluctuations by intensifying their fishing no
matter What the state of the markets. Thus, when prices are low, fishers will catch as much as possible in the
hope that the sheer bulk of fish sold may mitigate the impact of the low prices When prices are high, on the
other hand, fishers will maximise their fishing intensi(y so as to maximise profits These tactics are, iii large
measure, a response to fishers's mnabihty to Lontrol prices as well as the risks ai ising due to the 'luck
factor' However, it is by no means clear that mf fishers could control pricec they would alter their fishing
tactics Ihey could, for e'ainple, try to catch less fish to diive prices up Howevei fisheis often claivid
that if they were to try and reduce the amount of fish they caught, then someone else would catch them a
classic symptom of open-access, coirmiori property fisheries
In this way, price variations provide fishers with incentives to use illegal nets. An additional motivation to
using small mesh-sizes is thaL fish can be sold no matter 'nhat their size As discussed in Chapter 4, most
fish from Lake Victoria is sold by size rather than weight. On the markets, the larger the fish, therefore, the
higher its price Although this may mean that fishers aie provided with motives for catching large fish most
consumers are unable to afford these, pcovzdmg fisher s with ample incentives to tar get small fish In any
case, the smaflci fish size ranges ae more plentiful than larger size ranges, so keeping the price foi small
fish low For example, the mdiket for juvenile Nile peich ('apango or tede') is good These fish have
several attractions to both processors and consumers Their small size means that they have a low fat
content which makes them easier to process, while con sumer s dai ru that the sniallei the perch the 'sweeter
its taste ¡n addition they aie also cheaper than perch of over a kilo being sold in 'troughs' and so having a
ncgotiable price Tilapia rs a nrghiy valued fish in Loo society, and widely seen as a delicacy This means
that tilapra can be sold virtually no matter what its size, but demand for small tilapia are highest because
these have low prices Lung fish and cat fish are diso iegaided as delicacies and so command consistently
good markets, no matter how big they are. Finally, consumers and processors are indifferent to the sizc f
ornena - all umana is sold at the same price, regardless of size, arid fishers have few incentives to catch
large orn ana.
Fishers will seek to maximise their 'fishing intensity no matter what the state of the market.
59n='55; Author's data.
60n22; Author's data.
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The reasons for this are a combination of several factors, including fluctuating prices, the ever present
threat of a zero catch and high demands for small fish sizes. In this way, the nature of the market can affect
exploitation patterns and, in this way, regulate the fishery.
6.8 The changing nature of lake-side fishing communities:
The nature of communities in the pre-colonial fishery has already been examined. As we have seen, the
colonial era brought about considerable changes to community structures. These changes were further
exacerbated by continuing change in the post-independence era, which influenced exploitation pattrns
considerably. As Nyanza's population has increased and access to resources has decreased, the demand for
cash has risen, so as to make up for whatever resource deficiencies that households encounter. Community
structures can be used by members as a means of achieving nutritional or income security. However, insofar
as community structures represent social obligations to fishers, they may also represent constraints on their
ability to achieve income and nutritional security. In this section, we examine this dual function of
community relations from the perspectives of divisions of labour and migration, and how these have arisen
as a result of decreased per capita resource availability.
Divisions of labour contrary to some reports (Harris et al. 1995), many of those fishers who hire crew or
work as casuals are related to the crew members. Nepotism, to most Luos, is a social obligation, and in the
event that a community member manages, for example, to buy a boat, s/he is expected is to provide kinsfolk
with employment on the boat if s/he is to be seen to be caring for their welfare (cf. Dykstra and Dykstra
1987). Of 155 fishers interviewed, 118 (76 per cent) either employed relatives or worked amongst
relatives.61 In this way Luo men and women are able to rely on their better-off kinsfolk to secure jobs for
them, and the community structures within whicli Luos live may therefore be a means to gaining nutritional
and income security.
However, this employment pattern may also give rise to divisions of labour. Employing kinsmen may fulfil
some community obligations, but at the same time, it exposes the boat owner to the problems associated
with his role within the community. In Section 6.3 above, social demands on an individual's wealth were
discussed. Generally, those Luos who are able to accumulate some wealth may go to considerable lengths to
ensure that their wealth is in sorne way hidden or not too obvious, so that it may be retained and further
accumulated. The wealthier a person, the greater his responsibility within a community and,
correspondingly, the greater the numbers of demands on his wealth he faces. If he fails to meet these
demands, a wealthy man stands to face the repercussions of a jealous community who will try to
redistribute his wealth without him noticing. Thus, for example, Jansen (1973) observes that the more
successful a boat owner is deemed to he, the higher his chances of having fish stolen from him. Boat owrrs
may also make themselves vulnerable to 'magic' and 'medicine' from jealous kinsfolk who object to their
wealth. Thus, Luos must try and balance their means of production against communal obligations ìf they are
to continue to accumulate wealth. One way of doing this is to carefully structure crews so as to fulfil
communal obligations while, at the same time, minimising the chances of having fish or gear stolen.
At the head of every crew is the 'matha? ('skipper' or 'coxswain') whose role it is to summon together
casuals, and decide when and where to fish. For this job, mathars are normally paid a little more than other
crew members. This mole is extremely important, and inathars are generally the most powerful members of a
boat' s crew. For this reason, respondents claim, it is better to have a mathar who is unrelated to the boat
owner. Such a matharwill hot demand of the boat owner the kinds of favours and attentions which kinsfolk
do. A mathar who is a kinsman, on the other hand, can, by merit of his power within the crew, make
considerable demands on a boat owner, and undermine the ability of the boat owner to control fishing,
labour relations and even the thefi of fish and gear.
6mAuthor's data.
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For this reason, boat owners will normally appoint outsiders as mathars. In addition, boat owners will try to
ensure that they have a special relationship with the mathar, delegating him with much responsibility and
power, inviting him home and culturing him as a close, personal friend. In this way, the boat owner tries to
win the mat/ia/s allegiance, and attempts to ensure that no opportunity is opened for the mathar to set up
close relationships with the rest of the crew, amongst which are the boat owner's kinsmen. In other words, a
boat owner will try to create conditions in which a mat/ia/s interests coincide with his own. An additional
advantage of employing a mathar from beyond the community is that whatever complaints or blame that the
(related) crew might have tend to be levelled against the mathar, and not against the boat owner who has,
after all, fulfilled his community obligations by employing them.
A boat owner may try to further weaken the power of the crew by dividing various responsibilities between
them in an attempt to avoid any kind of unified action against him. Thus, for example, he will designate
one person to set the net sinkers (the 'jachiko' or 'ayombi'), another to haul in the net sinkers (the
'japudhkidi'), another to hold the net down with his feet in the water (the 'wiopa.ra') and so on. Each
member of the crew is paid a little extra for each of these tasks, which serves to cement his relationship
with the boat owner, but which also acts to set him against the other crew members. A wise boat owner will
occasionally favour one crew member over others so as to reinforce the divisions, before he changes his
attentions to another crew member. These competitive relations between crew members ensure that they all
work hard, as each seeks to attract the favour and rewards of the boat owner.
These divisions of labour set crew and community members apart from one another as each competes in
their own way for the attentions of the wealthy boat owner. These competitive relationships have a divisive
impact on community structure, so that fishers's aspirations are not directed towards the well-being of the
community as a whole, but towards their own, individual interests. This serves to disable any unified,
community claim over the lake and its resources. In addition, it also distances the community from the
resource base because the political control over the means of production is concentrated in the hands of a
few, wealthy boat owners. In cases where the boat owner is absent, then control over the means of
production is removed from the lake-side completely. The success of a fishing unit is increasingly based on
the competitive relationships within it, and the ability of the boat owner to maintain and reproduce these.
The boat owner, in this way, is able to minimise community claims on his wealth, while at the same time
appearing to be a benefactor to the community by his fulfilment of nepotistic obligations.
High rates of competition also exist between traders, and these may have an impact on commuJy
structures, and help to define divisions of labour. As discussed in Chapter 4, traders often make
arrangements with fishers in order to guarantee supplies. As the numbers of traders increases, however,
relationships between them are not always confined to competing for fish supplies. Instead, competition
may become entrenched in the struggle to gain supply arrangements from fishers. It is these kinds of
arrangements which increasingly determine the success of trading operations, and a failure to secure them
may lead to many traders gaining inadequate supplies of fish or none at all. This means that the divisions of
labour between traders is based along the lines of those who are able to forge such supply arrangements
with fishers and those who cannot. This division is also, to some extent, characteristic of the economic
divisions between traders, because it is normally only those traders with access to established wealth who
are best placed to offer fishers the most enticing arrangements, such as 'soft' loans, gifts of nets and other
gear. Wealthy traders deal in the largest bulk of fish, ensuring an uneven distribution of fish supplies, with a
small number of wealthy traders controlling the largest section of the market.
Divisions of labour also exist between small-scale and large-scale fish traders. Ogutu (1992) suggests that
fish traders are alienated from certain segments of the market by the filleting companies because the latter
are able to offer far higher prices than traders. Indeed, unless Nile perch is 'rejected', traders and procese. rs
do not have access to Nile perch of over a kilo. In this case, the division of labour occurs between those
who have access to capital with which to buy large supplies of fish and refrigerated vehicles to transport
these supplies to market, and those without access to substantial capital reserves.
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Lack of access to such capita! reserves can be extremely damaging to small-scale traders, particularly in
areas where fish supplies are poor. At Asat Beach, there are two private individuals with their own
refrigerated trucks who visit the beach daily. The competition between the two of them has raised fish
prices on the beach, and fishers are satisfied with this. But because these trucks also deal in tilapia, fish
traders on the beach can only deal in various types of under-size fish and ornena, supplies of which are
erratic and poor. Given that women are almost solely responsible for the upbringing and education of
children, this alienation may have had serious effects at the domestic level. Despite the fact that many of
Asat's traders are married to fishers, the improved prices that fishers received were no guarantee that these
benefits would pass into the domestic economy because many fishers do not make any contributio1, to
household expenditures.
As the number of traders increase, and fish catches declina, the necessity to establish some kind of
arrangement with a boat crew for secure supplies becomes more and more important, heightening
competitive relationships between traders. Similarly, as the number of fishers increases, competition
between them increases as each vies for the attention of the boat owner, or for declining per capita fish
catches. This undermines the ability of the individual community to minimise the competitive relationships
within it, and to increase the various demands made on the few, wealthier members of the community,
restricting the latter's ability to accumulate capital. In this context, community relations of production
become defined by individual efforts aimed at gaining and reproducing the competitive relations of
production that provide short-term nutritional and income security. Because the success of regulations in
the pre-colonial fishery were based largely on the absence of intra-coinmunity competition, and the
relations of production were geared towards the reproduction of the community itself, then these
competitive relationships within fishing communities in the 1990's contribute to the decline of traditional
forms of fisheries regulation, as each individual member strives to reproduce their competitive advantage
and the means to nutritional and income security.
The impact of these competitive relationships may be observed at several levels within Luo fishing
communities. As mentioned in Section 6.2 above, the labour-sharing farming system of 'rika' has largely
disappeared from these communities, as farming becomes defined in terms of competitive relationships, and
increasingly, farmers have to pay for labour in-puts with cash. Another example of this breakdown is the
gradual disappearance of 'bira'. Blm is free fish, and in the pre-colonial fisheiy, anyone could ask for blm
from a fisher, who could be repaid for the fish in some other way later. This ensured that everyone within
the community had access to fish regardless of their occupation. A similar term exists for free agricultural
produce, suina'. However, bira is no longer a reliable mechanism of distributing fish. While most fishers
agreed that they did give blm, this was only conditionally, such as to close friends, the disabled or the
elderly. Many feared to give out bira, because the recipient, jealous of the fisher's success, could have a
spell placed on the fish which would render the fisher's nets useless. At Tako Beach, fishers wandering
home from work in the evenings took a circuitous route, trying to avoid the homes of in-laws or relatives
who might demand bita. These fishers said that bita demands could get so great that they had to return
home with no fish at all. While bira is supposedly voluntary, those who fail to give bñ-a are frowned upon
by the rest of the community, and demands for it are difficult to avoid. At Tako, like at many other beaches,
bita represents an example of a community obligation that can undermine a fisher's nutritional and inc,u1e
security. As catches have declined, granting birato all who ask necessarily limits the amount of fish a fisher
can sell, as well as that which he can take home for personal consumption.
The role of traditional social and cultural obligations remains strong in the fishing communities of the
1990's. However, the nature of these obligations and their role has changed since the pre-colonial period.
Before the establishment of the cash economy, these community obligations served to redistribute fish
within the community, and because such favours would be returned in some way later, they represented an
informal type of intra-community barter. In the 1990's these obligations have come to represent a means to
individual survival, invoked and retained for exactly this purpose.
62lnterview no.305. N'Gou, 25/3/95.
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Because oítheir continued potency within the community environment, it is difficult to avoid them, so that
while they may still ensure the redistribution of fish to some extent, they may also undermine the ability of
the fisher to keep some of his fish for personal consumption or sale.
In the pre-colonial fishery, political power within a community was often synonymous with an individual's
wealth. The charitable demeanour of a wealthy man consolidated and lcgitimised his rights to political
power within the community, established his modesty and kindness, and assured that lie was regarded as a
fair and good leader of his people. In this way, acts of charity and good vill vere comprehcns.
components o political life, and a means to demonstrating one's ability to lead competently. Crucially,
such charity was expected of leaders. In the 19')'s, these expectations continue, and can be seen in the
extent to which nepotism is anticipated from those who gain employment or access to cash. Because a
man's charity is such an integral component of his political status within a community, few wealthy
individuals can forgo the requirement that they provide employment, loans and help to kinsfolk. In this way,
the ability of a wealthy individual to retain accumulated wealth, and, indeed, to protect his means of
production, can be undermined by his need to fulfil his obligations towards the community. The role of
these community structures, therefore, is double-edged, for while they assure some measure of income and
nutritional security for those who exercise them, they undermine the ability to accumulate capital and
derive nutritional security for those who are subjected to them.
The state of these community structures and the competitive relationships that characterise them, have
important implications for fisheries management. On the one hand, they provide an indication of the
strength of community-based controls over the resource base. As per capita access to resources decline, and
subsistence livelihoods based on farming and/or fishing become and increasingly difficult means to
achieving nutritional security, cash assumes greater importance as a means to survival, and competitive
relationships become defined in terms of access to money. Where this s the case, traditional forms f
regulation are difficult to maintain, and in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, this would appear to be so. On
the other hand, the state of community relationships and structures will often determine how new, state-
based regulations are received. As is the case with community-based regulations, state-based regulations
may fail in an environment defined by inter- and intra-community competition for cash. In other words, if
state-based regulations represent restrictions on ari itidividual's access to cash, they are almost certain to
fail. This lias important implications for the communication of regulations.
As we have seen above, competitive relationships within fishing communities can and do define the way in
which fishing is carried out, as fishers consistently try to maximise catches, invest in many and/or various
types of gear, keep information about good catches aiid fishing spots secret, and ensure the reproduction of
divisions of labour within communities in order to gain and/or iiiaintain competitive advantages. Thus,
changes in community structures are a result of decreasing access to resources, as well as increasing
ntimbers of fishers and traders. Another response to these changing competitive relationships lias been
migration.
Migratloir. As we have seen, fishers face constaiit demands from kinsfolk for fish or any wealth they n
have accumulated. Fishers argue that because of this, the accumulation of wealth and its investment in the
means of production cannot be done successfully amongst their home communities. For this reason they
must migrate to places where they are unknown: "Jealousy makes people leave their home beaches. It is
frowned LIPOÎI to make it rich at your home beach, and people very rarely do so. You have to leave the beach
to make money, or else you will loose all your wealth to your relatives".62 This was not the case in the pre-
colonial fishery, where resources and access to theni were fairly evenly distributed throughout the
community, and where community members could rely on their families and kinsfolk in the event of bad
luck. Furthermore, fishers in the pre-colonial fishery could rely on several sources for livelihood security.
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However, as access to resources has declined, and demands for cash baveincreased, fishers may then be
obliged to rngrate, either in search of better fishing grounds or else to avoid the constant community
demands p1d on them.
Since most crew members are paid percentages of the catch value, migration becomes a means of securing
the best possible income. If catches should drop at one beach, casuals are apt to move on quickly to find
greener pastures. Similarly, boat owners will often sail their boats elsewhere if catches at the home beaches
should decline. The need for this kind of mobility reflects, on the one hand, the increasing relative
importance of fishing as a means to an income, as other resources, such as agriculture, decline; while on the
other hand, it represents a transfer of capital resources away from beach communities to other, distant,
communities. Migration, then, also represents a security mechanism that can be relied upon in the event that
catches at the heine beach decline. Catch fluctuations, however, may be seasonal rather than permanent,
and the migration that arises from such fluctuations a product of the drive to maximise earnings.
Most fishers have, at some time in their lives, been casuals. However, they are normally temporary
migrants, seeking out work at various beaches for several months and then returning home for a while
before they set off again. These temporary migrants eventually return home to settle, normally with a
sufficient amount of capital to not only invest in a secure and continuous income source, but also to cover
the various demands made on them by kinsfolk and, possibly, to pay the dowry for a wife.
However, there arc, also permanent migrants. At Utajo Beach, it was claimed that over 20 families had
recently migrated to Uganda because fish stocks at Utajo had declined so far.63 Nyagina beach on Rusina
Island is almost entirely inhabited by permanent migrants from Karichwonyo to the ecst of Kendu Bay.
While temporary migration is symptomatic of fluctuating catches and a desire to avoid community
responsibilities, permanent migration is symptomatic of declining overall catches per fishing unit in specific
areas. If this is a lake-wide trend in Kenya, and should it increase, community structures may cease to exist
as capital, knowledge and labour are transferred elsewhere.
Migratory trends also affect the spatial configurations of the fishery. As considered in Chapter 4, the
apparent increases in Kenyan catch totals may not be the result of increased productivity from the Kenyan
sector, but rather, that they are sustained by fish smuggled in from Ugandan and Tanzanian waters. These
waters promise much greater catches than Kenyan waters, and so fishers will try to congregate in those
areas along the shore that have the best access to them. Thus, most of the largest of Kenya's landing
beaches, such as Marciiga, Wichlum, Uhanya and Usenge, are located in the western part of the Gulf, in
Siaya and Busia districts, and the western-most parts of South Nyanza District (Nyatike and Mbita
Divisions). The concentration of boats in these areas is high, particularly if compared to boat concentrati..is
in the eastern parts of the Winam Gulf, in Kisumu District and eastern parts of South Nyanza District
(Rangwe and Kendu Divisions). In 1991, just 21 per cent (1,305) of the boats in the Kenya sector were
based in these eastern areas (Hoekstra etal. 1991).
Registration numbers indicate the district in which a boat has been registered. In 1991, 676 boats were
based in divisions and districts outside those where they had been registered; of these, 66.4 per cent (449)
originated from Kisumu District (Hoekstra et aI. 1991). Only 4.6 per cent (31) of these migrant boats were
operating in the eastern parts of the Gulf, while all the other migrant boats were operating in the western
part (Hoekstra et al. 1991). Fishing communities in eastern parts of the Winam Gulf, therefore, appear to
have experienced high levels of out-migration to western waters with easy access to the open lake, and the
better catches which are said to be found there.
This migration represents a breakdown in social structures contained in Luo communities and society.
63lnterview no.135, Utajo, 27/10/94.
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In the pre-colonial fishery, these social structures and relationships represented a means to community
survival and reproduction. However, in an environment defined by increasingly competitive relations of
production, the relationship between community members and these structures has changed. On the one
hand, some of these structures have been retained by community members because they improve their
chances for survival in the competitive environment. On the other haùd, however, these community
obligations represent restrictions on the fisher to provide for his own needs, and it is for this i'eason that the
fisher may be compelled to migrate.
Migration, therefore, ¡s a way in which a fisher may mitigate variable catches and/or overall catch declines
in certain areas. It also represents a mechanism by which a fisher can generate and accumulate wealth for
himself. However, migration is also a source of community breakdown, for it represents the transfer of
knowledge, wealth and labour away from home areas and into others (cf. Harris et al. 1995). The radical
changes that have occurred to Luo community structures have direct implications on access to fish which
have come to be partially defined in terms of an individual's relationship with his/her community and its
structures. Access to fish in recent years has been further compounded by massive ecological change.
6.9 Ecological change and constraints
The fertility of tropical waters depends on the rate at which nutrients can be brought into solution, The
influent rivers of Lake Victoria provide few nutrients to the lake in relation to its size. Because of this, it is
thought that most of Lake Victoria's nutrients are locked up in lake-bottom deposits (Beauchamp 1954;
Hickling 1961). By itself, this vegetative matter decays slowly. However, animal flesh decays considerably
faster, and therefore the fertility of the lake is dependent on the rate at which these nutrients can be eaten by
fish (Beauchamp 1954). Prior to the introduction of the Nile perch, there were over 300 species of fish in
the lake. Most of these were cichlid species - tilapia and Haplochrorni'nes - which are known for their
extraordinary ability to evolve rapidly to suit extremely localised and diverse envii'onments, a characteristic
termed 'evolutionary plasticity' (Goldschmidt et al. 1993; Fryer and lles 1972). This ability has made the
cichlid species of Lake Victoria an extremely successful fish. Prior to the Nile perch invasion, for example,
Haplocliromis species accounted for some 80 per cent of the fish biomass of the lake (Witte et al. 1992), an
abundance which led Graham (1929) to believe that this species flock could support a trawler fishery of up
to 200 boats. lt also meant that Lake Victoria at one time boasted one of the most diverse fish environments
on earth (Coulter et al. 1986). With such diversity, the cichlids of Lake Victoria managed to exploit
virtually every food source available, including most detritus, zoo- and phyto-plankton (Goldschmidt et al.
1993).
The introduction of the Nile perch, which favoured fia plocl2ronhis as its prey, had a decisive impact on
Hapiochromis stocks, affecting both their abundance and diversity. It is believed that the contribution of
this species flock to the fish biomass of the lake has decreased fi'oni SO per ceni: to less than I per cent since
the introduction of the Nile perch (Witte et al. 1992; Barel et al. 1991), and that sonic 65 per cent of the
Haploobromis species were driven to extinction in the process (Goldschmidt et al. 1993), an event which
'...may vell represent the argesÉ extinction event amongst vertebrates this century" (Goldschmidt et al.
1993: 1993). The decline in the Haplocliromis species flock has been felt by fishers, particu!ar!y long-line
fishers who fish it for bait. This event has had fart'eaciiing and important consequences which not only
affect Ehe fishery at present, h't. may eventuaHy contribute to its collapse.
There is little doubt that fihpk .rO1lliS played an imoortant role in return big detritus and plankton back into
solution (Kaufhian 1992; Kau. nd Ochumba 1993; Goldschmidt eta. 1993). With sonia 80 per cent of
Haplochromis species feeding o'f detritus, and equally capable of feeding off one another, they represented
a tight, internal recycling system, moving nutrients and biomass both vertically and horizontally through the
water column, and even out of the hake via predation by humans and terrestrial animals and humans
(Kaufman 1992).
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However, th rovai of HpJochrarnis may hava contributed to the increasing frequency of algal blooms
(Goldschmidt et!. 1993; Ochumba and Kibaara 1989; Kaufman and Ochumba 1993), which may in turn be
responsible ï mass fish kills (Ochumba and Kibanra l99; Wandera 1992).
Fishers were familiar with mass fish kills, but rarely blamed them on algal blooms. Instead, they blamed
them on watcr spouts ('nyakoi') which frequent the lake from March through to May. It was said that fish
kills always occurred after these had passed, and those Nile perch that were found dead in its wake had
distended swim-bladders, a characteristic associated with sudden pressure changes in the water (Parker
1971). Fishers also blamed fish kills on the three Migingo islands lying in the tri-point between Tanzania,
Kenya and Uganda (Fig. 6.1). These islands are of volcanic origin, and are said to 'rumble' from time to
time, at which point fish kills occur. These may be symptomatic of tectonic movements beneath the surface
of the lake causing sudden and rapid pressure changes in the water and killing fish. Again, of the Nile perch
killed in these events, many have distended swim-bladders. Such tectonic movements have been blamed for
maass fish kills in Lake Albert (Parker 1971).
Finally, fishers blame fish kills on what they call hot water,' a feature that often killed bait rapidly. 'Hot
water' was said to occur mainly on the lake bed, where fishers will sometimes set their long-lines and nets
depending on fishing conditions. These may be currents of anoxic water which reportedly affects 50 per
cent of the lake's bottom for prolonged periods of time (Kaufman and Ochumba 1993). This 'oxycline',
below which no life can exist, may be symptomatic of the lake's eutrophication (Hecky 1993). The origin of
this eutrophication is not clear, but could be ti result of increased phosphate and nitrate deposition in the
lake through a series of' land-based events staIg in the 1920's, with the clearing of land and vegetation
through burning, and later through erosion by both water and wind (Hecky 1993). Needless t say, planktor
may have responded well to this increased nutrient load, but without the Haplochrorni's species flock there
to counter-balance the increased abimdanec of phytoplanktons, these blooms additionally contribute to
eutrophic conditions. Indeed, it has hoen suggested that the presence of the Haplochroinis species flock may
have been able to mitigate the eff;cts of eutrophication in the past (Kaufman 1992).
If the anoxic conditions along the bed of the lake should, in some way, be allowed to mix with the aerobic
waters above, the consequences could be catastrophic: "...a large.scaie fishery collapse from a major mixing
event is a real possibility" (Kaufman 1992: 855), However, in the meantime, the introduction of the Nile
perch has served to alter the nature of the fishery considerably. Current changes in Nile porch and tilapia
landings appear to have been the direct result of intensive fishing, although onwna landings do not seem to
have been affected. The introduction of the Nile perch has served to change the fishery from a multi-species
fishery to one which relies overwhelmingly on just three species: the Nile perch, oinena and tilapia, and in
this sense has contributed to the regulation of fishing activity. The presence of anoxic conditions and the
apparent eutrophication of the lake will almost certainly serve to regulate the fishery in the future.
These changes represent a grievous threat to the fishery. In the meantime, the changes have also altered the
nature of the fishery. Once the Nile perch had decimated the Haplochrornis species flock, it turned to eating
other species - ornena, the fresh water shrimp Garidi'na nii'otica and its own young (Achieng 1990; Ligtvoet
and Mkumbo 1990). At the same time, and possibly in response to reduced predation by Haplochromis
species, as well as increased detritus availability, C'aridfna populations appeal' to have increased
(Goldschmidt et ai. 1993). This was often commented on by olnena traders, who said that the shrimp
appeared in greatest numbers during the rains when it was caught along with the omena. The cost of a
'trough' of omena is the same regardless of the amount of shrimp mixed in with it. However, traders cannot
sell the shrimp along with the dried omena product, and i:nx separate it. The shrimp is then sold to animal
feed buyers for prices well below the original cost of the omcaa. Traders resented this intensely.
Omena itself has also increased 'following the crash of the Hapiochromis species flock. The onwna is a
zooplanktivore and, following the disappearance of zooplanktivorous Haplochromis competitors, the omena
may have prospered in new-found nutritional abundance (Goldschmidt et ai. 1993).
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Catches of omena have increased substantially since the 1970's (Chapter 4), and fishers have responded to
this increased availability. In 1987, some 25.7 per cent of the gear types in the fishery were purse seines,
compared with 55.8 per cent gill-nets, 8.8 per cent beach seines and 9.7 per cent long-lines; by 1994 purse
seines accounted for 60.1 per cent of the gear composition, while gill-nets accounted for 20.6 per cent,
beach seines to 15.7 per cent and long-lines to just 3.6 per cent (Othina and Odem 1995). However, access
to C'arithna and amena for the Nile perch may be limited by the presence of the oxycline. Kaufman and
Ochumba (1993) observed that both these species can survive beneath the oxycline for short periods of
time. The Nile perch, however, does not tolerate anoxic conditions well, and cannot follow the amena there.
The Nile perch appears not to have affected tilapia stocks. In other lakes where the Nile perch is common, it
is thought to co-exist with the Nile tilapia (Kolding 1992; Balinva 1992). However, anglers near Dunga
regularly use juvenile tilapia as bait for the Nile perch.
A final concern to the ecological well-being of Lake Victoria is pollution. The temperature range in the
Great African Lakes is between 22-30°C. As temperatures increase, the capacity of water to retain oxygen
decreases and its consumption increases (Coulter et al. 1986). As a consequence, the absolute amount of
oxygen per unit volume of water is less in African lakes than it is in temperate-zone lakes, which make the
Great African Lakes extremely vulnerable to pollution (Coulter et al. 1986). Furthermore, because these
lakes (Lake Victoria included) loose some 90 per cent of their water to evaporation, retention times for any
pollution in Ehem are very long (Coulter et al. 1986). Thus, as industrial and agricultural development
within the Lake Victoria basin continue to increase, pollution may also play a contributory, and regulatory,
factor in the future fishery (cf. Achieng 1992; Bugenyl and Balirwa 1989; Coulter etal. 1986; Mitema and
Gitau 1990; Wandera 1993; Kirugara and Nevejan 1996).
6.10 ConcLusion
Fishers interviewed during this survey identified a series of problems which they consider to be the worst
they face in the fisheiy. Most of these problems relate to access to fish, and therefore represent mechanisms
which serve to regulate how and where fishers fish, as well as to determine per capita catch rates. This
chapter has identified seven main reasons why these changes have occurred: the relationship between
fishing and farming, investment limitations and capacity, theft, per capita catch declines, increases in
fishing effort, the influence of marketing variables, changes in community structures and relationships, and,
finally, ecological factors. Many of these changes are the result of a combination of several trends,
including increased demands for cash as a means to livelihood fulfilment; population increases; declining
urban job markets; the rising international market for Nile perch; large-scale investment in the fishery by
commercial filleting factories and, finally, the decline of traditional forms of regulation within the fishery,
The net impact of these trends has been to increase the fishing effort, to reduce per capita catches, and,
ultimately, to force fishers to follow certain exploitation patterns which may not, in the long run, be
sustainable. Many of the trends that affect these exploitation patterns and production levels originate far
from the lake. Effort levels, for example, are largely determined by trends in urban j oh-markets, while
changes to the fish market may be determined by international demands for Nile perch. The fact that so
many of these trends are exogenous to the lake and its communities suggests that control over the fishery is
being transferred away from the lake shores, undermining the ability of lake-shore communities to regulate
access to the resources on which they rely.
It is important to note that th .genous trends that serve to determine exploitation within the fishery tC
not thr product of any formal, rtate-based regulation. indeed, these trends compound the ability of fisheries
administrators to effectively rnarage the fishery. Furthermore, because many of these trends undermine the
ability of fishing communities ¶0 meet certain livelihood needs and requirements, they ensure that few
fishers can afford to obey formal fishing regulations.
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Within this kind of environment, formal regulations may even hinder the ability of fishers to cater for their
own livelihood needs. Conversely, the informal regulations that dominate exploitation patters in Kenya's
Lake Victoria fishery may also, in the short-term, seriously threaten the ability of fishing communities to
meet livelihood requirements. As has been discussed in this Chapter, many of these informal regulations
have resulted in a much increased fishing effort which has compounded levels of competition within the
fishery. They have also served to increase pressure on fish stocks, ensured that there is wide-spread use.of
illegal fishing gear; increased nutritional insecurity; and, finally, altered community structures. In this way,
then, Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery has come to assume many of the characteristics associated with
common-property, open access fisheries around the world (see Chapter 1).
This has meant that fishing within Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery has come to be defined by a series of
coping and risk aversion strategies which are designed to mitigate the localised impact of the various
exogenous factors that dominate the fishery. Under these types of conditions, fishers have no recourse to
consider the long-term sustainability of the fishery. It is these coping strategies that have been largely
ignored in the management of the fishery, and which must be understood if formal regulations are to work.
Failing to do so necessarily means that the way in which regulations are communicated to fishing
communities become distorted. Through the overwhelming biological and ecological biases inherent in
most contemporary fisheries management models, the trends that affect the human populations that rely on
fisheries, are side-lined and even ignored as management seeks to define 'efficient' production strategies
and 'optimal' catch rates. As Gordon (1954: 133) comments, "[sjince...regulatory policies are made by man,
surely it is necessary that they be evaluated in terms of human, not piscatoria!, objectives".
The failure of formal, state-based regulations in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery are not only restricted to the
inability of the Kenya Fisheries Department to enforce them (Chapter 5), but also due to the pressures that
fishing communities face. It is necessary, therefore, to examine management alternatives which will not
only improve the regulation and monitoring of the fishery, but which caii also alleviate the resource access
constraints which fishing communities have to cope with. Chapter 7 sets out to try and provide sqh
options.
7 Options, directions and alter atives for the future
regulation of Kenya' s Lake Victoria fishery.
7.! Introduction
In recent years, the riparian states sharing Lake Victoria have agreed to form ari economic union, under
which border controls will be removed. In anticipation of this, moves have been made to harmonise the
regulations in force on Lake Victoria by the establishment a 'Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation' (LYFO)
to cover all the three nations that share the lake (Government of the Republic of Kenya er al. 1995). The
role of the LYFO will be to determine and enforce regulations; to collect fisheries related data; collect
funds for its own administration costs; and to co-ordinate and monitor the operations of co-operatives. lt is
expected that the types of regulations that the LVFO is set to impose are contemporary regulatory
mechanisms, such as net mesh restrictions, closed seasons and so on. No facility has been included in the
project proposal to evaluate the effectiveness and usefulness of these regulations. The project is expected to
cost some US$ 8.5 million over a five year period, funded by the World Bank and the European Union
(Government of the Republic of Kenya et al. 1995). Where funding will come from to sustain the LVFO
after this period ¡s not clear, The funding difficulties faced by centralised, state regulatory institutions,
however, are only one of the many problems that the LVFO will have to face. Of ecival concern is how the
LVFO's regulations will fare in a fisheries environment where exploitation patterns are defined by
detrimental coping mechanisms, which are the product of exogenous socio-po liticat and economic trends,
over which the LVFO will have little or no control. For these reasons, it is imperative that alternative
management strategies should be considered, that not only alleviate funding, staffing and monitoring
constraints, but which may also provide some measure of nutritional and income security for the fishing
communities involved.
This chapter sets out to consider possible alternative forms of management that may be considered for use
in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery. It starts by examining the possibilities of establishing community-based
boundary institutions, of which it explores Territorial User Rights in Fisheries (TURFs) and the creation of
residency and limited access institutions. The Chapter considers the possibility that the implementation
such alternatives may already coincide and build upon already existing community-based institutions
regulate access to the fishery, and proposes an institutional framework into which such alternatives may be
placed. Fiiìally, the Chapter examines the possible role of the Kenya Fisheries Department (KFD) within
this framework.
7.2 Options for TURF implementation:
in Chapter 1 it was suggested that Ehe allocation of territorial user-rights to fishing communities may
represent a means of establishing both the allocation of the resource base between community participants,
but also as a means of conferring exclusivity of water resources upon users. In was suggested that these
could be gained in several ways: by explicitly allocating aquatic resources to small-scale fisheries; by
dividing these resources between small-scale fisheries; by regulating entry into the fishery andlor by
encouraging exit from the fishery through the creation of alternative employment opportunities (Panayotou
1982). Furthermore, in order to avoid any kind of divergence between the rule institution and the allocation
of such rights it is important that the manner in which this transfer of user-rights, and the way in which they
are designed, compliment already existing social and cultural structures and perspectives. Of additional
importance to the implementation of such rights is ari understanding of whether or not such rights existed in
the past, and the extent to which they prevail currently. In Kenya's pre-colonial fishery, TURFs were one of
the most important components of fisheries regulation at this time.
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However, as discussed in Chapter 3, these were primarily allocated on the basis of the fishing gear during
this period. Thus, individually owned TURFs extended out to the maximum water depth in which a kira
could be set.
TURFs, it should be noted, typically take the form of allocated boundary defined territories between flshing
communities and fishing grounds. The explicit allocation of such TURFs in the current fishery would have
to be based on four crucial factors: firstly, the extent to which fishers still identify with their sub-clans,
which could be used as principal unit by which these TURFS are allocated; secondly, the extent to which
these sub-clans still identify with water territories; thirdly, the potential for political problems and conflict
that may arise between fishing subclans as a result of the implementation; and finally, the difficulties and
costs that may be associated with the delineation of these TURFs.
There are several indicators of the current strength of sub-clan association. As shown in Chapters 4 and 6,
for example, most fishers come from fishing sub-clans. In addition, although most young fishers will leave
their sub-clans to gain experience and accumulate wealth elsewhere, they invariably return home after some
time, hence demonstrating the strength of their community association. Many traditional socio-political
relationships between sub-clans still remain. For example, during the pre-colonial period, community
members were not allowed to many within the clan itself, and spouses were drawn from other, unrelated
clans. Clans often demonstrated political unity by establishing marnage rights between themsel
Members of Luo fishing communities still respect these laws. Most will marry outsiders from those clans
with whom marriage rights were established many generations ago. This serves to consolidate community
identity by drawing out historical differences and associations between sub-clans. In addition, various
customs and rituals continue to be maintained by various sub-clans, which set them apart from others. As
such, sub-clan association remains strong, and in the event that TURFs are allocated, could be further
strengthened.
An additional factor that appears to reinforce sub-clan affiliation is access to resources. As discussed in
Chapter 6, sub-clans in Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery appear to invoke water rights when their access to
fish stocks decline. At one level, sub-clans may react to these declines by verbally abusing outsiders fishing
in 'their' waters. At another level, however, the demand for controls over water tenitories may become so
great that violence ensues between water territory downers' and outsiders. These efforts at excluding
outsiders from water territories ace unified actions involving the whole of a sub-clan's fishers, and suggests
that when access to fish stocks becomes severely restricted, then the benefits to be gained from setting up
temporary institutions of exclusion become perceptible. In this way, declining access to water resources not
only provoke a rise in community consolidation and identity, but may also prompt fishing sub-clans to
invoke traditional rights over water territory. This suggests that there is a basis from which TURFs caP be
implemented and that there is an institutional basis on which they might test, and that fishing sub-clans
have a clear idea of where their' waters are and the limit to which they extend. However, the imposition of
TURFs may accentuate differences between sub-clans to stich an extent that as fish stocks and per capita
catches continue to decline, further violence may well erupt. Equally, while sub-clans claim to he able to
identify which water belongs to them, delineating these territories could be extremely problematic, as each
sub-ejan tries to persuade independent delineatocs that their TURFs are larger than the acTually are. If
TURFs are to be regarded as a plausible option for the management of Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, more
research must be done to examine the extent to which sub-clans perceive rights to water territories, as weil
as to try and foresee the possh olitical conflict that might arise. As a result of these types of problems, a
more viable management aiternive may be to encourage fishing communities to establish institutions to
control access to their fisheries as opposed to explicitly delineating fishing territories.
7.3 Options for restricted access implementation
Under this scenario, institutions are established whereby communities have the right to decide who can fish
from their shores.
lu this sense, then, sub-clans do not hold per se rights over the water, but do hold the right to exciu
outsiders from their shores. In Chapters 3 and 6, the association between tile Luo and their land was
discussed. These associations currently have a political expression, in that sub-clan lands are generally
embodied in sub-locations, and cian territory is expressed in terms of either locations or divisions within
districts. This territorial delineation, indeed, plays an important role in defining sub-clan identity, and may
form the basis on which restricted access rights can be established. Here, the sub-clan shore can be
identified by that portion of a sub-location's boundary which is defined by the lake shore. The sub-clans
that occupy this territory would then hold the rights to determining who can fish froui their shores, although
they would not be able to prevent outsiders from entering into 'their' vaters by boat. Throughout this study,
increasing effort levels have been cited as one of the greatest problems facing Kenya's Lake Victoria
fishery. The sum effect of such quasi-property rights would be to control effort levels by denying members
from non-fishing sub-claus, as well as other ethnic groups, the right to use the lake as a source of income.
Although this means that income options for these latter population groups are restricted, the long_term
benefits to be gained from such a strategy would mitigate the short-term difficulties that such population
groups might experience (see Chapter 1). Most fishers are from fishing sub-clans in any case, and the
movement of people from non-fishing activities into the fishery still appears limited. Because of this, the
impact of such restrictions ou communities who have not traditionally had access to the lake will probably
be minimal.
The implementation of such access rights and controls would probably be acceptable to fishing
communities for a number of teasons: firstly, such access rights existed within the pie-colonial fishery, and
fishing communities are for this reason already familiar with them. Secondly. certaiti current trends suggest
that the notion ofaccess rights is prevalent amongst fishing communities. Thus, for example, non-resident
migrant fishers arriving on beaches are obliged to introduce themselves to the beach leader, identify what
gear and crew they have brought with them, and then to pay 'kanyaga' ('trespass') fees to beach authorities.
Some beaches already restrict who is allowed to fish and trade from them. At Misori Beach in Siaya
District, for example, those fish traders who are not married to a resident fisher, or who are not related to a
member of the beach community, are not allowed on to the beach. On the Utajo Peninsula on Rusillga
Island, a number of private beaches exist. As was the case in Kenya's pre-colonial Lake Victoria fishery,
these beaches are owned by those on whose hand they are located. These land owners can determine
can fish from their shores, what kinds of gear are permitted, and when fishing can occur. Virtually all
beaches along the shore of the Kenyan sector of Lake Victoria are owned by private individuals, although
access to them varies. As a consequence, designating powers to these individuals and/or communities
should not be a problem given that this institutional context already exists.
Along with access controls, fishing sub-clans can be allocated the right to decide what gear they permit to
be used from their beaches. There is wide-spread dissatisfaction amongst fishers for what they see as
'destructive' gear, and many cite under-sized mesh sizes, beach seines and the ac/mn ('forcing') fishing
methods descrbed in Chapter 4 as being responsible for the 'destruction' of the lake. There is evidence to
suggest that fishing communities are prepared to try and control the types of fishing gear used off their
beaches. At Kaloka, beach leaders have complained to the KFD about the lack of controls on fishing gear.
The KD responded that they should create their own methods of controlling the problem. The fishing
community leaders decided amongst themselves that the local sub-clan would bou illegal íïshing gear, and
gained support from tile sub-clan elders and the area sub-chief. The location chief, however, intervened,
saying that the [ocal sub-clan c not take the law into their own hands, and that their plan would have to
go through the 'proper channels. This example demonstrates the willingness of some fishing sub_claur to
control the kinds of fishing gear ised off their shores. The above example also demonstrates the ability of
centrahised controls to hamper community-based initiatives to improve livelihood conditions, and the desire
to control access to their rcsource..
1lnterview no.78, Kaloka Beach, 14/9/94.
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The 'private' beaches along Utajo Peninsula also exhibit similar restrictions on gear, and throughout the
fishery, many beaches will actively seek to prevent users of ochun fishing methods from fishing from their
shores.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, the costs of regulatory enforcement can be high. However, if fishing
communities are allocated with powers to both control access as well as to regulate gear usage, then the
costs ofregulation are minimised as they are transferred from the state to the beach communities who do, in
any case, appear to perceive benefits over and above the present status quo dominated by a lack of
regulation and the prevalence of illegal gear types. The evidence presented above, furthermore, appears to
indicate that fishers also perceive sufficient benefits from monitoring their waters, and hence providin in
institutional basis for the regulation of the fishery. In addition, with lake-side communities holding such
powers of regulation, not only will the monitoring of the fishery be more effective, but that the Costs
associated with such monitoring are also minirnised (Johannes 1978; Panayotou 1982). The transfer of
regulatory powers in this way may also remove the considerable divergence in perceived benefits between
those associated with state regulations and those associated with communally enforced regulations. It was
suggested above that as per capita access to fish stocks still appears to be on the decline and is increasingly
acute, then the relative benefits to be gained from enforcing the tules associated with locally generated
institutions increases. This may have to do with the problems outlined in Chapter 6, where it was suggested
that as exploitation within the fishery is increasingly defined by risk aversion strategies and coping
mechanisms designed to mitigate the impact of highly uncertain trends both within and without the fishery,
then the consequences of divergence between state perceived benefits and community perceived benefits
become increasingly clear. Under such conditions it is likely that communities will seize the initiative to
create locally defined regulatory institutions, in order to mitigate the problems associated with uncertaint',
and the sub-optimal outcomes associated with risk aversion and coping strategies. For example, if
communities can control access to the fishery, then the impact ofjob market declines in urban areas may be
minimised because communities will be able to prevent renewed entry into the fishery. Simildy,
communities may influence investment patterns by prohibiting the use of certain gear types, or placing
ceilings on the number of nets and/or boats that their members invest in. Controlling access could also
minimise the problems associated with high levels of competition between fishers, or even make
competition profitable, as non-community members are charged for fishing from shores which are not theii
own. Needless to say, if Kenya's Lake Victoria fishing communities are to utilise access rights as a means
to curbing uncertainty, then uncertainties associated with institutional and rule creation must also be
removed by ensuring that a community's rights over the resource base are legally defined within national
statutes and provisions made for their protection.
7.4 Possibilities for community-based institutional design
The institutional context for the changes proposed above may be centred entirely on the sub-clans
themselves, and these could be based on pre-existing co-operative society structures. However, as shown in
Chapter 6, few fishers are members of co-operatives, and even fewer have ever received any benefits from
them. The success of co-operatives appears to be based on three factors: the size of the catchmeiit area from
which the co-operative draws its membership; the level of ethnicity involved in its running; and finally, its
level of 'openness' with regard to its members. 'Openness' implies that the co-operatives hold no seciets
from their members, and information regarding transactions, bank statements, receipts and so on are readily
displayed and available for scrutiny by members. In the following discussion, the success of two fisher's co-
operative societies, Dunga and Bunyala, are compared in order to demonstrate that those co-operatives
which have a small and bocalised membership catchmerit area, are 'open', and have a high degree of ethnic
dominance within them appear to be more successful than those co-operatives who do not share these
characteri sties.
Dunga Fishermen's Co-operative Society was established in 1970, and currently has around 130 members,
of whom approximately 80 are active within it (Intermediate Technology Group 1996).
132
Virtually all of the co-operative members are boat owners, and most of them come from the local Koiwa
Sub-Clan of the Kisumo Clan, and are resident either on or near the landing beach. Its responsibiltes
include: providing its members with savings accounts; the collection of commission fees on all fish landed;
the provision of health insurance to its members; and the determining of how fish marketing and sales are
carried out on the beach and negotiating marketing deals with large-scale fish filleting plants, of which
currently it has one with the Afro-Meat Co. The co-operative is extremely popular with its members, and
Dunga had one of the highest rates of co-operative membership out of all the beaches visited during this
survey. Most members had at some time received bonuses and/or loans for the purchase of additional gear
and/or boats. The committee that runs the co-operative is composed almost entirely of wealthy members
and elders of the local sub-clan. All society transactions, expenditure, fish sales, and cash deposits are
openly displayed on the co-operative office walls, and all members are able to monitor its activities. Jn this
way, the arrangement of the co-operative closely follows traditional power structures peculiar to the Kolwa
Sub-clan. In addition, members are unlikely to be mislead or 'cheated' by the co-operative because they
have the opportunity to examine all of its records. Finally, it is locally specific to Dunga Beach from where
most of its members are drawn. Importantly, Kotwa Sub-clan is almost entirely dependent on fish for its
income and nutrition, given that the sub-clan's land ìs almost completely covered with boulders, rocks, and
swamp and cannot be farmed. Respondents from Dunga had the lowest rates of agricultural involvement of
any beach visited during this study, and their success and relative wealth within the arca is in large measure
a reflection of the success of the co-operative. An additional feature of this co-operative is the manne in
which it selects its members. Unofficially, people who are not from the Kotwa sub-clan stand little chance
of being accepted as co-operative members, a feature that outsiders criticised it for. Nevertheless, even
casual fishers with no form of collateral, were allowed to join it, provided tlìey were members of the Kolwa
Sub-clan.
Fishers from the Manyala Clan in Busia are represented by the Bunyala Fishermen's Co-operative Society
based at Marenga. This co-operative is supposed to cover alt of the beaches in the district. This means that
those members who are iìot based at Marenga are unable to scrutinise the activities ofthe co-operative, and,
conversely, the co-operative cannot collect membership dues from all of its 730 members (Republic of
Kenya 1994a). It is widely regarded as being corrupt and dishonest, and the chairman of the co-operative
committee was neither a fisher nor a Manyalan. The co-operative provided no services which the fishing
community felt were beneficial, and dissatisfaction for the co-operative was so great that even those fishers
based at Marenga ceased to pay their membership commissions. However, the co-operative had managed to
continue its operations by cornering the Nile perch market on the beach. A great deal of Ugandan Nile
perch is landed at Marenga, and the co-operative ensured that trucks from the filleting companies only
bought Nile perch from its sales representatives. This forced fishers to sell their perch to the co-operative,
which then charged the filleting companies a twenty per cent commission fee on every kilo of perch that it
handled. In this way, the co-operative earned an annual income of some Kshs. 2.5 mit lion. However, the
chairman had received court summons to explain the disappearance of some Kslìs. 3 million in co-operative
funds, and at the time the beach was visited in January 1995, a new committee was due to take office.2 This
example serves to illustrate the kinds of tensions that may arise if multi-ethnic controls are imposed on a
beach and if the co-operative does not openly inform members of its activities and financial accounts. An
additional complaint from fishers at Marenga was that there are too many Ugandan fishers landing there,
which they felt hampered their ability to impose controls on the beach. They argued that the Ugandan
fishers came to Maienga to take advantage of its good markets, and yet they made it difficult for Manyalan
fishers to fish in Ugandan waters. As the beach leader put it, ". .. it is difficult to get co-operation on this
beach because there is such a variety of people here."3 Similar ethnic tensions exist on Rusinga Island,
where the Rusinga Fishermen's Co-operative Society is extremely unpopular with fishers because it is
located at Mbita, far from most of the island's beaches.
2lnterview no.187, Marenga Beach, 25/1/95.
3lnterview no.192, Marenga Beach, 27/1/95.
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It is run by a multi-ethnic committee of non-fishers from both Wanyama and Waware Sub-Clans, and it was
widely judged by fishers to be operating in its own interests rather than those of the fishing communities.
The above examples suggest that if co-operatives are localised and specific to local fishing sub-clans, are
copen' and ethnically dominated, not only can they serve as a node around which localised institutions can
be created. They also present us with the problem of cale with L i4istitution building: In the case of the
Runyala Co-operative, little institution building occurred due to the physical distance separating most
potential members from the co-operative society. In addition, ethnic diversity can serve to increase the risks
associated with heterogeneity by making it difficult to create leadership structures around which institutions
can form. Finally, by seeking to draw funds and membership dues from to large a catchnient area, as well as
suffering from problems of corruption, Bunyala Co-operative society undermined the possibilitie, f
creating any perceived benefits to inspire members to invest in it. In this sense, Bunyala Co-operative
created the very divergence which led to its failure. Conversely, Dunga Co-operative drew its membership
from a fairly small catchment area, provided services to its members so creating the inspiration to invest
within ¡t, and, through it ethnic dominance, limited the potential effects of heterogeneity. In this way, co-
operative societies can serve as the basis around which local regulatory institutions can be formed,
particularly if they try to incorporate locally specific structures and authority within their administration.
Funds for these co-operatives could be raised through the imposition of 'knyaga' fees based on local fish
availability, commission fees collectod from umrs (both fislirs and traders), taxes or commission
imposed ori fish buyers, and fi-orn fines imposed ou those who disobey regulations and beach rules.
Additionally, these community co-operatives should also provide saving facilities. In this way, fishers can
either receive loans and/or draw on savings in the event that local catches should decline or are variable. As
was discussed in Chapter 6, when catches are poor and/or variable, fishers may often respond by increasing
their fishing intensity to try and mitigate these declines, or else migrate. These represent coping
mechanisms designed 'for exactly these possibilities. However, if fishers have access to funds on which they
can rely in the event that fishing is poor, an alternative basis for security would be created. If this were the
case, fishers might be less inclined to migrate or fish intensely. Under these conditions fishers may not only
be willing to remove their nets from the water, but also to save in the long run, rather than basing their
expenditure on immediate and short4erm needs. These are valuable considerations, given that fishers
otherwise maintain constant fishing pressure and intensity, regardless of the state of the fish stock or the
fish markets.
7.5 Future roles for the Fisheries Department
All of the above issues are of crucial importance to fisheries managers because of the potential they have
for limiting access to Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery. However, this is not to suggest that the KFD would
not have a role to play. In this section, the extent to which the KFD can play an adaptive management' in
the administration of the fishery is examined. An important component in this regard is the way in which
the KFD can help in (a) providing information and monitoring capabilities; (b) in assisting fishing
communities with delegation and regulatory sanctions.
While fishers retain considerable amounts of knowledge about fish and fish migrations, the KFD can
certainly retain an advisory role, providing information not readily available to fishers, such as
recommending mesh-sizes, or information on the size of fish when they start to breed. Furthermore, through
a monitoring capacity, the KFD may also be better placed than fishing communities to explain ecological
and limnological changes within the fishery. All of these service could help to alleviate
- to some extent -
the appropriation problems outlined in Chapter 1, enabling 'fishers to gain access to important ecological
and limnological information which can at least minimise the uncertainties often associated with this type
of common property resource, and hence enable fishing communities to respond the changes as they occur.
This ability to respond to changes is a necessary component in the construction of 'robust' institutions. The
KFD could also play an important role in the alleviation of uncertainty in the fish markets.
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As discussed in Chapter 6, fishers very rarely know the condition of fish markets, and respond by trying to
fish as intensively as possible, regardless of market conditions. If the KFD were able to monitor the price of
fish in markets far from the beaches, and pass on this information, fishers would be better placed to
anticipate and prepare for price fluctuations. Similar services are provided for small-scale farmers, and are
broadcast over the radio, an option the KFD could consider.
The role of the KFD could also include law enforcement. During this study, several examples of
community-based justice' events were observed, where people who, in the eyes of the community, had
broken some local law, and were publicly tried and punished. This implies that fishing communities not
only maintain a sense of justice, but also notions of punishment for offenders. However, if such community
systems of justice fail, then the KFD could intervene at the behest of the communities involved. Of all the
crimes that occur on the lake, fishers regard piracy and the theft of fishing gear and boats to be the most
severe, and it is in these areas that the KFD could play a useful role, by introducing patrols on the lake to
help fishers protect their gear from theft, as well helping fishing communities to monitor the types of gear
being used off their shores.
There are two other area in which the KFD might also play a useful role. Firstly, it could play an important
role in defining the costs of fishing, and, hence, contribute to limiting effort levels. As discussed in Chapter
4, the KFD is efficient in ensuring that all fishers have licences, and that their boats are registered.
However, while these regulatory mechanisms have the potential to ensure that effort levels are control.d,
there is no evidence to suggest that they have been used in this way. Furthermore, the KFD has largely
failed to control the widespread use of illegal mesh-sizes. If the KFD were to revoke licensing and
registration regulations, and replace them with net licences, then some type of control over both effort and
the use of illegal gear could be gained. Those nets above the stipulated mesh size may be charged low
licensing fees, while those below it may be charged high ones, altering the Maximum Economic Yield
(MEY) advantages to be gained from using smaller mesh sizes. In other words, by establishing net licensing
rules, and allocating costs that proportionally increase with decreases in mesh size, then the smaller the
mesh size used, the higher the cost. Communities could assist the KFD in this regard. The legal framework
in which the fishery is set could stipulate that all community organisations must disclose the number of nets
operating from their beaches, as well as their mesh-sizes. In order to provide fishing communities incentives
for reporting such information, co-operatives should receive at least sorne of the revenue gained from
licence sales. Furthermore, if fishing communities were to yield such information to the KFD an indication
of effort sizes could be gained if this was based on the numbers of nets and the known life spans of the
various mesh plys involved (see Table 4.4, Chapter 4). Since the KFD is so efficient at ensuring that all
registration and fishing license fees are paid, there seems little reason why they should not be equally
efficient at issuing net licenses. In addition, this plan would ensure that there would be no such thing as an
'illegal' net, so removing the basis from which Fisheries 'scouts' can extort bribes.
Finally, the KFD could play a vital role as an 'umbrella' organisation, informing fishing communities about
what other fishing communities are doing, and attempting to co-ordinate activities between them. Within
this capacity, it could also co-ordinate the integrated monitoring of other resource pools such as agriculture.
As was argued in Chapter 1, and demonstrated in Chapter 6, farming conditions can play an important role
in defining both effort increases and the rate to which these occur within the fishery. If they are available, it
is vital that resource managers exploit alternative sources of employment and nutrition as a way of
alleviating problems associated with high effort levels:
"... [I]n the presence of terminal resource limitations and surplus labour in fishing communities,
creation of supplementary or alternative employment (or gradual reallocation in the absence of such
prospects) is a sine quo non condition for upgrading fisheries and uplifting depressed fishing
communities" (Panayotou, 1982: 38).
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This study found that there was limited awareness amongst Nyanza's fisheries administrators of trends in
agriculture and alternative employment markets was limited. Similarly, agricultural administrators from the
Nyanza region knew very little about trends within the fishery. The KFD, in conjunction with the various
agricultural institutions of the region, could play a crucial role in redressing this imbalance, and
contributing towards an integrated regional development plan.
7.6 Conclusion
The above proposals are intended to serve as possible options for consideration in the design of future
management policies. Degiibol (1992: 220) has argued that in Lake Victoria, "[i]t is difficult to avoid being
pessimistic about the possibilities for finding practical means of regulation that are acceptable by the fishery
or even could work on a participatory basis [sic.]". This is by no means the case. It is one of the deficiencies
of alternative fisheries management theory that community reactions to declining access to resources are
hot examined. In the case of Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, as per capita access to fish stocks lias declined,
communities appear to have gone through some measure of consolidation, seeking to exert their influence
aiid control over the resource bases on which they rely, through the establishment of certain institutions. If
this is a general feature of small-scale fisheries throughout the world, it represents a means by which
alternative management options can be founded.
This study has indicated that formal regulations have only ever worked iii Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery if
they are community-based. The success of botti the Lake Victoria Fisheries Service and the KFD in
implementing their owii varieties of formal regulations have not been good, with the result that effort levels
within the fishery have increased through time, and fish stocks have been banned. Increasing effort levels,
furthermore, have resulted in intense competition between fishers and fishing communities, with the result
that the fishery has come to be a single component in a far greater effort to gain and guarantee livelihood
requirements in the face of increasing per capita resource scarcity. Jt is therefore improbable that plans to
implement similar regulatory mechanisms in the future will succeed. However, community-based responses
to declining resource access, such as institutions that restrict access for outsiders, attempt to control water
territories, and aim at limiting the use of illegal gears off beaches, may all represent a means around which
future management alternatives can be designed. While community-based regulatory systems may not
automatically result in the sustainable exploitation of the fishery (cf Toulmin 1991; Wilson 1982), the>' Jo
provide a viable option that fisheries managers can contemplate, given the failure of state-based formal
regulations in the past, and the success of such community-based regulation in the pre-colonial period.
Needless to say, these latter successes must not be regarded as a basis from which to expect success from
the options presented above. However, given that such institutions have existed iii the past indicates that
there may be some remnant framework around which new institutions can be built. Furthermore, one of the
greatest advantages to be gained from contemplating the options suggested above is that they result in the
establishment of a dynamic management system that is both better able to monitor changes within the
fishery, and capable of rapidly responding to and learning from these changes. It is important to reiterate the
benefits to be derived from such comniunity-based management systems, and these may be summarised as
fol lows:
Placing fishing regulations into the hands of fishing communities represents a transfer of the costs
associated with the enforcement of these controls to the fishing communities (Panayotou 1982;
Johannes 1978).
Because fishing communities perceive benefits from controlling their resources, the monitoring of'
any fishing controls may be more effective if cai'ried out by fishing communities themselves.
Needless to say, given that fishing communities are located on the lake, and are aware of who is on
the beach and where their members are fishing, regulation may be far more effective than if it is left
¡ri the hands of the KFD.
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(e) Because many of the regulations proposed by alternative fisheries management theory have
previously existed in some form or another in most of the world's small-scale fisheries, their
implementation may be expected to be rapid, successful and their benefits soon realised (Panayotou
1982; Johannes 1981).
The establishment of community-based controls can provide fishing sub-clans with a basis from
which to derive incomes. These may be gained through charging outsiders who wish to fish from
community shores, taxes on fish sales, commissions charged to community members, net licenses or,
finally, from fines levied on offenders. If collection of such funds is based around a co-operative, in
which fishers also save, funds could be made available to fishers at times when catches are low. Such
funds may provide fishers with incentives to leave their gear out of the water, and reducing the
intensity with which they fish.
If community-based controls and management are based on ethnic identity, it would appear that these
have a high chance of being both effective and efficient. In this way, community leaders can be
internally monitored and regulated by sub-clan members. Utilising outsiders who are not part of any
fishing community appears to result in ethnic tensions, distrust and the failure of fishing
organisations, such as co-operatives. This locally specific way of establishing institutions may not
only serve to limit problems associated with heterogeneity, but also limit any possibility of
divergence as communities establish the kinds of rutes they feel they will benefit from, and which
they feel they are best able to monitor and implement.
The future of Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery hangs in the balance, and the failure to control effort increases,
ecological change and associated damage to existing fish stocks necessitates that some kind of regulatory
change must occur if the collapse of the fishery is to be avoided. The evidence presented in this stly
suggests that the use of formal, state-based regulations within the fishery will not prevent its collapse. As a
consequence, any future managerial change must consider the options presented in this Chapter as possible
alternative management strategies, for the failure to include fishing communities in the management process
will necessarily result in the failure of any state-based formal regulation.
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In the case of Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery, fishing regulations implemented by the Lake Victoria
Fisheries Service (LVFS) failed because they were at odds with the benefits that communities sought
to gain from maximising catches in an attempt to reap the gains that a cash-based economy offered,
The problem of homogeneity are best viewed in terms of scale. The kinds of regulations that the
LVFS sought to impose were couched in far wider political, economic and social changes. in this
sense, the LVFS regulations had an abstract quality to them that distanced them from the variable
regulatory attributes inherent at the localised, community level. At this latter level, perceptions
concerning the well-being of the entire lake focused on its inexhaustibility, a factor that was to
legitimise the notion of maxirnising catches for maximum cashreturns, and hence creating a
dichotomous perception of benefits to be gained from regulatory enforcement. The benefits the LVFS
sought to create were at odds with those desired by the fishing comiiiunities, hence forcing
divergence between the two. This divergence was further enhanced by the often brutal enforcement
of regulations by the LVFS. This divergence, that existed between the state and the fishing
communities in the colonial period, persists to this day. However, as argued in Chapter 6, the nate
of the divergence has changed. The benefits to be gained from disobeying the regulations far
outweigh those to be gained from obedience. This problem has been accentuated by increasing
resource access problems that ensure that exploitation of the fishery is defined by a series of risk
aversion strategies and coping mechanisms which seek to curtail the impact of wider economic,
political and social changes, as well as trends within the resource system itself, characterised by
dropping per capita catches and heightened levels of competition between fishers. The perceived
benefits to be gained from such fishing strategies are certain levels of income and nutritional security.
However, as per capita access to resource continue to decline, it may well be that the necessary
repeated encounters with systems that do not minimise the uncertainties of this appropriation system
and do not guarantee nutritional and income security will serve as the basis for local regulatory
institution building.
(b) In-put restrictions: in both the case of the LVFS and the current day Kenya Fisheries Department
(KFD), in-put restraints have undermined the ability of these institutions to fulfil the regulatory
mandates with which they have been charged. ¡n Chapter 5, it was argued that although the 1989
Fisheries Act does not specifically indicate its reliance on MEY and MSY models, the nature of the
rules it contains suggest that it is dependent on these models as a management framework in which co
operate. This leads to the second fundamental problem associated with the use of these models: In the
application of MEY and MSY models, data relating to effort and stock sizes are crucial. In order for
them to be continually effective, such data must be renewed on a regular basis. l'his study has found
that such information is not readily available to fisheries managers on the Kenyan sector of Lake
Victoria. Estimates of effort sizes vary considerably, depending on their source and no census of
fishers has ever been carried out. This is necessary if MEY figures are to be generated. Of equal
importance to MSY models, as well as MEY models, is information regarding fish stock sizes. The
overwhelming amount of work carried out on Lake Victoria is of biological or ecological origin, but
none of it has generated any information concerning the stock sizes of the various fish species of the
lake. In addition, this work has only provided a small amount of information concerning the various
fecundity and mortality rates of these species (see Chapter 5). Much of the biological/ecological
literature on the lake considers the mass extinction of the endemic Haploc/iromis species flock. While
there is little doubt that this is a lamentable decline, it is not clear how this information is of any
relevance to fishing communities struggling to gain or maintain good catch rates and livelihoods. Nor
does the literature on the subject relate how this decline is of any relevance to the broader
management issues concerning the lake.
(e) While some of this work has considered the possibility that the .hpIocIirornis species flock
contributed to the mixing of nutrients tip r-) . he water o.:C...... o, as well as the overall
ecological efficiency of the lake, the extent - is actuaoy is contentious, and mu'!i
discussion on the subject is conjecturai (IK.i2o.: 1)92; KaulThan roid Columba 1993; Goldschmidt
et aI. 1993). Nor is it clear that the decline of lie _c-IìroiiLc species flock has contributed to the
apparent eutrophication of the lake, particu1a ¡ì o: d:e g;t of other evidence that suggests that this
process may be occurring because of the burning of \ytatioiI '' iL lobe basin (blocky 1993).
Whatever the case, there can be little doubt thrt f . oonsiderathie coge occurring in the aquatic
environment of the lake, that fish stocks and . .....ore beio,: r2rcc: as a result, and that a
permanent oxycline appears have been estab1ish
and its management inthe future. I-low management is
not clear, and literature on the subject has not provic:1
or MEY figures exist for this fishery suggests that ti
have no targets to meet and no parameters within whir
(d) Finally, the problem of externality: The transfer of re:
away from fishing communities and into the hand:
any nexus around which community-based inst :2:. :i. initiatives o':::
centralisation enforced by the KFD has resulted io o
aligned with the perspective that it is oniy the stao
procurement system.
The above factors all represent ways which have contoibo of o the divergera of
divergence in perceived benefits - between the authorid:o; fo: re held
the fishery and any basis from which communities can
objective of this study to demonstrate how these issues 000.': to
Kenya's Lake Victoria fishery.
The second objective of the study was to show that those regulations o
context are more likely to work. In Chapter 3, the various loo ¡ regulr.lco..
the pre-colonial period were discussed. Following on from - o 9:oreticr.
it was argued that one of the primary reasons behind ¿:o ococess of
alignment that they shared with the matrix of cultural, 000c
characterise fishing communities at this time. The flSth: i: o: ;' :2
whole, at odds with community desires for social reprod
in this way served to meet community demands for
adhering to such regulation. 1-lowever, with the advent u
community-based institutions were held was altered, a10
adhering to them. In this way, community instltutiorS
However, in more recent years, as discussed in Ch
resource procurement conditions and high levels of oo
institutions which have, amongst other things, serve( e
territories and to limit access to these territories. feo
resource procurement problems, it was argued, corn:
benefits to be gained from creating such institutions.
the resources for which they are responsihk
institutions.
J
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The benefits to be gained may be viewed in terms of declining levels of uncertainty given the defene ,f
water rights; higher certainty given the proclaimed rights over fish stocks; income benefits gained from
charging outsiders for the right to fish from community beaches; and, finally, the benefits to be gained by
further institutional development, designed around existing co-operative society structures, such as
guaranteed fish markets and other attractions.
In Chapter 1, a number of criteria for 'robust' institutions were presented. The first of these concerned
clearly defined boundaries. This study has indicatcd that fishing communities will define fishing boundaries
in order to protect their fishing grounds from outsiders. The study also indicated that in at least some cases,
rules ofresidency have also been applied within communities in an attempt to regulate access to the fishery
or the community's access to fish markets. The second criteria for the 'robust' institution concerned
proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. No evidence was gathered to suggest that Kenya's
Lake Victoria fishing communities have developed institutions specifying the amount of the fish stock that
participants can procure. The third criteria referred to collective choice arrangements. It would appear that
given the community-embracing tinture of these forms of institutions that those who are affected by the
regulations are more often than not also those involved in the creation of these regulations. The fourth
criteria related to monitoring. Throughout this study, data has shown that the level of intimacy between
fishing communities and the lake is high, and that fishers are typically aware of changes that occur within it.
Indeed, fishers will even advance theories to explain why these changes have occurred. In addition, the
level of tension between fishing communities over their water territories suggests that fishers can and do
know who is in their waters, what gears are in use and, indeed, 1mw much fish is being landed. In Chapter 7,
the use of graduated sanctions - the fifth criteria - was alluded to. It presented evidence of community-based
justice systems that relied on traditional systems of justice and structures of authority. These systems did
suggest that they were graduated sanctioning systems - offenders could be caned publicly and banned from
the beach. This, in turn, does suggest that communities do have conflict resolution mechanisms on which
they are prepared to count and accept. At many beaches visited, public meetings were in progress frequently
discussing all manner of beach and fishing related problems. The final criteria for the robust institution
presented in Chapter 1, was the minimal recognition of the rights to recognise. As argued above, there is
little to suggest that, firstly, the centralised authorities who are responsible for the fishery are willing to
relinquish their legally-endorsed right to these controls, and, secondly, it would also appear that they are
prepared to use this authority to disrupt attempts by communities to create their own regulatory systems,
despite the apparently greater efficiency of the latter. This, of course, affects the extent to which
communities can ensure that their enterprises are 'nested' in broader regional and national institutions.
Kenya's Lake Victoria fishing communities, therefore, have historically displayed the ability to create
regulatory institutions. Indeed, as access to resources to fulfil income and livelihood claims, become
accentuated, both the need and desire to create and strengthen these institutions increases. This is a valuable
option which future management ilans can focus upon. Indeed, as these resource access controls bave
augmented, so too have the conditions necessary for the creation of institutions to tackle such dilemma's.
The problems that fishing communities typically face are often repetitive and occur under roughly similar
circumstances. The communities, by their very existence and the nature of the competitive and trading
relationships they have within themselves and with other communities, creates the information network on
which they can draw. And, finally, the above evidence seems also to suggest that coinniunities are both
willing and able to monitor their resource bases.
The third objective of this study was to examine the changing nature of institutions regulating the fishery
over time.
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It was argued that by understanding how these have changed may provide inforiiiation willi vhcli to design
future regulatory institutions, as well as to provide clues as to why certain sets of regulations have failed
while others have succeeded.
The data collected for and reviewed in this study uggests the folk'iviiig:
Cornrnuiìitybased regulatory systems have existed iì the p.. . \Vhile it is clear that these same
institutions caiinot be recreated for present day purposes, they can be drawn upon as a form of social
capital that may facilitate the creation and implementation offuture managerial strategies.
Community-based regulatory systems are extremely delieat lii addition, they are often dependent on
communal perceptions ofthe benefits to be derived from adhering to them. These latter perceptions
appear, in the case of Kenya's Lake Iictoria fishery, to have been couched within a conhinuiìity
framework defined by a matrix ofsocioeconoiiìic, political and cultural interactions, which ensured
thatthere was a high level ofconvergeme between the rule institutions involved within communit,
and their perceptions ofthe benefits to be gained from adhering to such rules systems. However, with
the intervention of a colonial administration, tue necessary communal matrix that upheld these
systellis charged as a direct result of enanged perceptions of benefits. This implies that regulatory
institutions and socio-economie str tures may share a symbiotic relationship, with neither able to
properly function without the other. However, under conditions of iI1creasng per capacity resource
scarcity, communities may seek to consolidate their structures, arid utilise the same rules of exclusion
and residency they practised in the past.
Why Kenya's Lake Victoria fishing coinniunitis and state-based regulations appear to diverge has
been discussed above. However, what is also clear from the data Presented in this study is that state-
based regulatory institutions have, throughout the history of the fishery, been at pains to ostracise
themselves as far as possible from the very fishing communities they are supposed to serve. There
was no evidence to suggest that either colonial or present day state institutions have ever attempted to
create some fonn of collaborative managerial framework vitli fishing communities, a factor that may
contribute to the perception held by fishing communities that the Kenya Fisheries Department (KFD)
is not representative of their interests and no benefits can be derived from adhering the fishing rules
that the latter advocates.
The problems associated with low levels of funding and staffing, as well as shortages in technical and
social knowledge appear to adversely affect the ability of state-based regulatory institutions to deliver
services to fishing communities.
The ability of local communities to create their own regulatory institutions persists. Given the wealth
of local knowledge of the lake and the fish populations within it, as well as a locelised awareness of
who is fishing where and at what time, these community institutions present managers with a viable
alternative form of regulation with which to manage this fishery. Needless to say, given its common
property status, such alternatives would only be effective if they vere applied at a lake-wide scale, so
that community institutions are not undermined by the activity of other fishing communities
elsewhere. lu order to work, furthermore, these institutions must gain legal sanction and
encouragement from the state.
The final objective of this study was to examine the impact of so-called in formal regulations' on the
activities of fishing communities. What these informal regulations represent was discussed above. The
relationships between fishing communities and informal regulations, and how the latter affect the former,
need to be understood if we are to understand why fishers perceive the need to carry out fishing in certain
ways, and also so that we may be able to uiiderstancl vihat benefits fishers p .cevc they will gain fri
fishing in certain ways.
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There is little reason to suppose that fishers have chosen to fish in these ways because of state-based formal
regulations. In addition, those community-based regulations that do exist within the fishery remain in their
infancy, and unable to gain a large measure of control in the absence of a state endorsement. As a
consequence, the fishing systems that have evolved in the fishery during the l990's appear, in large
measure, to be influenced and determined by informal regulations. As suggested in Chapter 1, common
property resources are not - or only negligibly - affected by regulations and associated rules are often
vulnerable to becoming open-access. This latter environment, it was suggested, is one in which only
informal regulations dominate exploitation patterns. Individual fishers have responded to these by
developing a series of coping mechanisms and risk aversion techniques which seek to minimise the effects
of high levels of competition and decreasing per capita access to both the fishery and other resources. These
risk aversion techniques and coping mechanisms appear to generate only sub-optimal levels of benefits to
fishing communities. However, in an open-access environment, dominated by informal regulations, fishers
have few alternative income or nutritional sources to turn to, such sub-optimal trends of overharvesting can
be expected. Furthermore, because it would appear that responses to the kinds of problems that fishers face
are undertaken ou a purely individual level, the potential problems of heterogeneity in the formation of
community-based institutions are enhanced, and fishers may often feel that they have no recourse open to
them besides the overharvest of the fish stock. It is also noticeable that many of these individually generated
decisions may not to any great degree result in a diminishment of the otherwise very uncertain common
property environment in which these fishing communities operate. If the effects of such informal
regulations are to be mitigated, then co-ordinated, and broad-based policy changes must occur which ensure
that the relationship between fishing communities and other resource pools are understood and incorpora'cd
into state-based decision making systems. In addition, every effort should be made to encourage fishing
communities to seize institution building initiatives in an attempt to help them consolidate their perceived
benefits and augment the possibility that uncertainties are avoided.
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Appendix 1: Interview schedules I
Sheet 1: Fishermen
Personal Details
Name
Age
Place of birth/home
Clan/Sub-Clan; is your sub-clan a fishing sub-clan?
Married/single; how many wives?
What do/does your wife/wives do?
How many children do you have? Do they go to school?
Did you go to school? To what level? Why did you leave?
What did you father and mother do?
What did you grandparents do?
Fanning
Do you own land?
What do you grow?
Do you sell your produce?
What did you earn from these sales last year?
Do you consider yourself more a fisherman/farmer/other?
Who tends your sharnba?
Do you ever stop fishing to tend the shamba?
Do you think fishermen are spending more time on their farms now than they used to?
What are the main problems in farming?
If you were to get 100,000/-, how would you spend it?
Do you own any livestock?
Fishing
When did you leave school? What did you do then?
Would you opt for an alternative job?
Do you have any boats? Describe them.
Do you have any nets/long-lines? Describe them.
What do the Fisheries scouts say is the minimum mesh-size for gill-nets?
How many crew do you employ? Is there a high crew turn-over?
How do you pay them?
Is there theft here?
Where do you fish?
What are the best times of the year to fish?
How much do you think you earned from fishing last year?
How does the Fisheries Department help this lake?
Sheet I Continued.
Il
34) How do you regard your relationship with the Fisheries Department'?
35) I [you vcre the Director of Fisheries, what would you do with this lake?
3G) What are the niain problems \vlth the lake?
37) I-low do \ ou ee the liturc?
33) I low long do VOLI spend on the lake per day? I-las this changed over time?
39) Is there less Ish now than when voti lirst started flshng? \Vh do you thinl this ¡s?
O) Do you catch ma ny large flsh now?
4 I) Do vo u st Il lind inbula wit h fat and/or roe?
-i2) llave you ever fished [rom other beaches? llave you ever encountered trouble doing so?
43) Do voti have a Iishinu I icense/boat reeistration/private marL?
44) I low does the co-operative help you?
15) \Vho do von sell your catch to? l-Io\\ do prices 'mv?
46) Do you have any other incomes?
47) Do your neighbours expect bí,j?
Other
48) Are there places in the lake 'here you will not fish?
49) Are there times of the year 'when you will not Fish?
50) Are there things that you fear in the lake?
SI) Are there any fish you wiH not eat?
52) Can an ajuoga he'p fishing in any way?
'JI
Sheet 2: Fish Traders
Personal
Name
Age
Place of birth/home
Marriedlsingle; Do you stil! live with youl' husband?
What does your husband do?
What clanlsub-clari aie you from? Is this a fishing sub-clan?
What clanlsub-elan is you husband from? Is this a fishing sub-clan?
How many children do you have? Do they do to school?
Did you go to school? Why did you leave?
What did your parents do?
il) What did your grandparents do?
Fish Trading
When did you leave school? What did you do then?
Where did you get the money to start this business?
Do you have any special arrangements with fishermen, other traders or customers?
What fish do you deal in?
How do you process the fish?
Where do you sell your fish?
How much do you buy your fish for? How much do you sell it for?
How much did you earn from this business last year?
What other costs do you have to cover?
Would you opt for an alternative job?
Are there more traders now than when you first started?
Do you own Laud? Do you stop trading to tend it?
Do you have a trade permit/medical certificate?
How do you see your relationship with the Fisheries Department?
What are the mai11 problems in this business?
How do you see the future of this trade?
Are there prostitute-traders here?
Sheet 3: Elderly.
1) Name
2) Age
3) Place of Birth
4) Flow long have you been on this beach?
5) How many children do you have?
6) Have they gone to school? Did You go to choûi?
7) Married? I yes, how many vives do you have?
8) What did your father/grandfather do?
9) What did your inotheiigrandniother dol
10) When and why did you coie io this beach?
11) Did you own boats/nets? 1-tow many?
12) Did all the men in the family fish and work together?
13) What other types of fishing gear did you use?
14) Did you ever use boats to fish before the wazungu came?
15) What kind of fish did you catch before the wazungu came?
16) Do you remember any of the first wazuoguthat came?
17) Did you give them names? 1f yes, why these names?
J S) Can you remember when they came?
19) What did these wazwigudo?
20) Did your father ever tell you about wazungu when you were young?
21) What were they called? What did they do?
22) Do you remember any Asians coming?
23) When you were young were there times when there was little/no fishing?
24) What did you do during harvest time?
25) When outsiders came to your village, did they have to seek permission to fish'?
26) When an outsider wanted to move into your village what were the conditions for this?
27) When you were young, did women fish too?
28) Do you remember the Fishermen's Union? Were you a member?
29) Who was in the union? Who were its leaders?
30) When you verc young, were you told that there were places one must not fish?
31) When you were young did ajuoga come to the beach a lot? if so, what for?
32) When you were young, what kinds of things did you fear in the lake?
33) Where do the spirits of those that die on the lake go?
34) Are their evil spirits in the lake?
35) Can narn stop you fishing? How can he do this?
36) What kinds of f1sh were said to be poisonous? What would happen if you ate them?
37) If land, where did you get it? Have you given your children any Land/boats/nets?
38) Before the wazungu carne, how far away was the nearest village to your own?
39) [n your society, did you distinguish between fishing, fanning and herding clans?
Initial Interview sheet for Elders. Iv
A bila
Aching
Adel
Abo
Aore
Ariap
Agoa
Agok
Ajuoga
Agulu
Alan
Allah
Arnbcga
Angwolo
Apengo
A sala
Asilo
Askari (Kis.)
Ayornbi
Bedhe
Bo
Borna
Boya
Busaa
Bwana (Kis.)
Bwandha
Literally, 'up keep' or 'livelihood'; in this study, it normally refers to a rudimentary
dwelling provided by a boat owner for his casuals.
A beach seining technique, using a mosquito beach seine, and often used for the
capture of ornena.
A fish species, probably a juvenile Barbus altianalis mdchffl
At Utajo beach, an aching method beach seine.
A river.
From the English, 'hurry up; a technique used in kindeg4 where the crew will work as
quickly as possible to complete their 'trid.
A type of k,u which does not extend on to the shore behind where it is set.
Literally, 'the back'. In a crew using lamps to fish with, one or two members are
allowed to have their own lamps, the fish from which are theirs. These are the 'agoR,
and they are charged something for the use of the net and boat, and will also
contribute to the labour needs.
A type of pottery pot, often used to store fish in.
A person, normally possessed by a spirit, but who has learned to control it so that
he/she is qualified to treat others possessed with spirits or with spirit-related illnesses.
They can also administer spirit-related medecine.
A tilapia size-range; this one is large and only just below a nya.rnazniin size; some 25
cm. TL.
Meat preserved by drying and spicing.
A mosquito beach seine.
A penis sheath used in the pre-colonial era.
A Nile perch size range. Of those perch of under a kilo, this is the largest size.
A Nile perch size range. Of those perch of under a kilo, this is the medium size.
An unknown fish species.
A watchman.
A position in a crew - he who sets the net.
A spear.
Bharig (Kis.) Marijuana.
Bib Foreseeance' - the quality of the thture or of the past, which can be seen. May also
refer to luck or destiny.
Bira Free fish.
Cow peas.
A widely used Maasai term, used to refer to a homestead.
A float (attached to a net).
Traditional Luo beer, normally considered illicit.
Either 'Mister' or 'Sir'.
A channel cut into the shore or papyrus swamp, and designed to 'fool' fish into
thinking that they are at a river mouth. Traps may be placed along it or across its
mouth.
Changaa (Kis.) A powerful, illegal alcoholic brew.
Appendix 2: Glossary of Luo, Luhya and Kiswahili terms used in this study V
All words in the left hand column are in DhoLuo unless otherwise stated. Those in Kiswahili are noted as 'Kis.',
and those in Luhya as 'Luh.'. Latin names for plant species are derived from Kokwaro (1972), while those for
fish species are derived from Graham (1929) and Witte and van Densen (1995).
VI
7I4 Tea, but may also refer to a bribe.
Chasati A anke ofindian origin, popular around the lake as a snack.
1 The sun.
s To seL; hence, 'to1rmcbikd, a sct net.
, - h ce vegeutble roduce
Ciwny The middle (ofsoinething).
Ch viri The long rains, w en tue first planting occurs (tate March - rnid-Jufy)
See omntì'.Ddgai ( (is.)
Dani A grandmother.
An enty 20 !itc 'il tin Used as a measure.Debbi(Kis.)
Dina Liteiiy, to 'prcss nowa'; iere, iefers to a beach seine type, which, once hauled in and
near g the snore, the pouch is pressed down to prevent fish from escaping out of its
moud.
Di Fron the_English. dis '. A wail, plastie dish usually used as a measure.
Another iame fof .he ½cL/iir&.Dvii
Fula Any fish of the Haoloclirornis species.
Fundí(Kis.) A s ecialist. c-s wily in mechai ics or earientry.
Fwani A fish, Barbus a firnuIis .radclif J.
Garairm udet.
Gera Simila o a bwacnil.
Ghee(Kis.) Clarified iurer.
Go:o The geuci G .eùíì for a nei.
Godo mat to 'o pe-coloniai íiskicig geai made from papyrus and used like a beach seines.
Gorogoro A LSCd 2 kg on of cookrng fat ('Cow Bo or 'Kiinbo' brands) measure, used in the sale
p 'od c.
Gwe12e A nei hboirhood wilero most nlrnbitan s share a aternal randfather.
Harambee(Kis.) A public reeting, normsfl for offic als to give out advice or information, ora fund
rriLi roeeth.
Hoka A s a11 bbsiness of selling cousurner goods such as soap, single cigarettes and so on.
Honthi Similai to bond; something mysterious, unexplained or unknown.
Wono onietuiing with is uiinown or not understood.
0 the ngLsh, local, bu normally applied to small bars, cafes and eatin. houses.
s West.
i A soowsayer or 'foreseer see 'bild.
i, A nefactor .. normally applied to permanent customers to boats.
t The nerson in a ciew wuo is rsponsible for feeding the net into the water from the
boat.
Jadil A rsou qualified or who bas he ower to exorcise thin.s and/or 'laces of evil.
Jaduon. A term of resoect ìsd to adchess niales, normally elders and other old men.
.Jajuok A kind of ìoccumany insane person, spending rnucb of his/her time running about
nude and scaring i.oie. The jajaok are said to be able to control animals, particularly
hippos arid crocodiles, and can send these to kill people. They are also said to be able
to conool lightening.
Jalanac A person qualified to appease spirits.
An applier of 'manyasl. a herbal rnedecine designed to remove evil or bad omens from
th; ,nd/o: piaces
Jama.ayasi
¡anam A person ola lake-side coni unity.
Janawi
Jandagala
Japudhiadi
Jara¡n ba
Jasasia
Kai wusi
Karla (Kis.)
Karua
Karufu
Kasesse
Katurr
Kek
Kendo
Kengere
Kiboga
Klic
Kinara
A person qualified to practise the medecine of death, using 'nawl medicines and
powers. This skill used to be confined to warriors only.
One who knows the medecine of death.
The person in a crew who helps to pull in a net, and is responsible for pulling in the
sinker side.
A person of the in-land communities; a non-fisherman; a person of a farming andlor
herdin communi
A practitioner of'sasid medecine. See 'sasid.
One who is able to bewitch others.
A herbalist.
From the English, jail', and refers to a compartment in a 'kira' into which fish are
funnelled.
A 'grabber' or 'robber'.
A trader who travels from place to place on a bicycle. In this context, most jo oringi
delivered fish from the beaches to markets.
Rain-makers.
The lun fish, Froto iterus aethio'icus.
A whirl wind.
Normally, a metal basin, but may also refer to a small 'trough'.
A type of boat, first introduced to the lake by Indian fishermen.
Bribe
A tilaia size-range.
Literally, to 'reverberate' or 'echo'. A fishing technique similar to 'ochuadd and, this
case, a long, weighted pole is used to slap the water.
Or 'kik, a stockade built across a river and into which fish traps are placed.
Literally, an oven. The user digs a shallow hole in the ground in which wood or cow
dung is placed and set alight. On a grate over the fire, fish are placed, and the whole
sealed by a sheet of corrugated iron to produce a smoked-roasted product.
A floating platform, normally made from ambach wood, made to place a pressure
lamp on in omena fishing.
A sacrificial place.
See 'keR
The border between the edge of a papyrus swamp and the water.
VII
Juteko
Jathieth
Jefa
Jom echo
Jo oringi
folalu
Kindege A fishing inethod used in the capture of'ornena where the net is arranged in a circular
fashion around the fish, and hence hauled in.
Kingo To put a spell on something.
Kipande (Kis.) An identification card.
Kltam be The wick or mantle of apressure or paraffin lamp.
Kokorro A name for a beach seine.
Ko o Any disease whose symptoms cannot be seen on the skin.
Lan'o A type of spirit in the 'nyawawa' group.
Liedo A ceremony performed on the bereaved involving the shaving of the head. lt occurs
three days after the death on men, and four days after the death on women, and
indicates that the bereaved are in mourning.
Lihudu The rainbow.
Likira A term used by both Luhya and Abasuba to refer to a 'kim'.
Loi we That which is big, unending or gigantic. Often used to refer to the open lake beyond
the Winarn Gulf: 'nain loi wo'
Liierii A type of mosquito beach seine.
Lunyu A large smoking oven for fish, built from mud around a wooden frame, and normally
utilising wood fuel.
¡via ch Fire.
Madongo Large.
Magasia A type of paddle.
Magendo (Kis.) Corru .tion.
Mandazi (Kis.) A deep-fried dough balls, often sold from road or beach-side stalls.
Manedire Medium.
Manila A heavy ply twine, normally used for the construction of beach seines
Man yasi Medecine used for cleansing; see jamanyasJ.
Mafatu (Kis.) A form of public transport, privateiy owned, and no larger than a mini-bus.
Matliar The skipper of a boat. This term probably originated from the Gujarati terni for
foreman, jamada?, and used by Indian fisheimen on the lake from the 1920's through
to the 1950's.
Matindo Small.
Mbfru Originally, a tilapia species, Oreochronils variablEs, now used as a tilapia size-range -
a medium-sized tilapia.
Mbuta The N le perch, Lates niloticus Linnaeus.
Mfuko (Kis.) Literally, 'a pocket'. In this study, it refers to a large pouch woven in to the centre of a
beach seine.
Miaha A newly married man.
Mion dho A long-line.
Miongo The keel of a boat.
Miongo wasi(Kis.) Literally, 'open shoulder'; refers to Nile perch carcasses stripped of their flesh.
Mikiyu A hardwood, probably Ofen cape( Welw.
Mikono (Luh.) An osaaYie in Luhya.
Minam The mother of the lake.
Misambwa (Luh.) The generic name for a spirit.
The Luhya name for a water spout.Misokhe(Luh.)
Mitoo See 'into'.
Ix
Moadho The swim bladder of a fish. This organ is ti11d with air, and allows a fish to float
when it is stationary. In some fish, such as the tilapia, it is a sealed organ, and the
amount ofair within it cannot be regulated. However, in the Nile perch, it is linked to
the outside ofthe fish, and the amount ofair in it can be regulated, depending on the
depth in which the fish is.
Monye At NGou, the name given to a lung fish.
Mto Or 'mitod, a food crop, ('roto/aria brevidcns var. thtermcdia
leaves(Papiionaceae); the of this plant are used as vegetables, and have a bitter taste.
Mudho The period - sorne 21 days between the point at which the moon sets and its return as
a full moon.
Mudho hala The opposite of 'mud/id, the time when the moon is full.
Muganga (Kis.) A traditional healer.
Mula A piece of cat fish, often processed (for sale).
iViumi A cat fish, Clariasmossambicus.
MvuIi(Kis.) A hard wood tree, Milicca cxc, known in Dholuo as 'olua'.
Musenaenao A traditional, Luo saw.
Mzcc(Kis.) An old man. Can also be a term of repect.
Mzungu (Kis.) A European; a white person.
Nam The lake.
Nd/i/ru A juvenile cat fish ('mumi).
N,cch rachar A large, white (sic.) tilasia.
Ngege Originally specific to one of two indigenous tilapia to Lake Victoria, OreochromLs
csculenta; now, normally a generic term for all tilapia species, but may also be used to
describe a tilapia of a certain size-range.
Nger A water current.
Ningu A fish, Labco victoriarius.
Nundu Either one of the most important of the lake spirits; or else small pox or measles,
which are said to be brought by 'nyawawä.
Nyakoi A water spout which, in Luo mythology, is a giant snake, and often seen as one of the
wives of 'nazil, the lake.
Nyama choma (Kis.) Literally 'burned meat' - meat roasted over a fire.
Nyamami A tilapia size-range, normally the largest.
Nyamrecha A person, normally a woman, responsible for cleansing the lake of evil.
j
Nyamrcrwa A guardian.
Nyang A crocodile.
Nyangidi The name of a known python, thought to have great spiritual powers.
N arnuin Daughter of the lake; a term normally applied to fish traders.
Nyar rumba A woman of an in-land farming and/or herding community.
Nyawawa Roaming groups of spirits, often said to be those of those who died in pain, and which
are said to be extremely noisy. They are responsible for bringing small pox and
measles.
Nyolworiv Literally, something that goes around. In this study, ¡t refers to a revolving credit
system often used by traders.
Nyoyo A Luo dish, comprising maize and beans.
Fish, gutted, dc-scaled, slit down the stomach and spread out to be smoked or sun-
dried. Refers to any species processed in this fashion.
Obambola
Obalul Dried fish.
Obobo f A fish, probably Gnathoncmus lungibarb/s.
Obongo bongo
Obudi
Ochonga
Ochuado
Ochun
Odeso
Odhero
Odundu
Ogono
Ohunga
0m 0go
On diek
Onera
On una
Opon
Oporo
Orega
Orín di
Orundu
Oro
Osadhe
Oseru
An agama lizard.
A tilapia size-range - one of the smallest.
The small, fresh-water shrimp, Caridina nilotica.
A fishing technique: one end of a long, large-mesh gill-net is attached to the shore and
the remainder strung out, parallel to the shore, forming an enclosure with the shore on
one side and the net on the othe. rrom a boat in the mouth of the enclosure, and beats
the water to scare fish into it.
Literally, 'to force'; also a name given to a beach seining technique using bug lines of
_gill-nets.
A type of raft, used in the colonial and p-cobonial periods to check nets set off shore.
A flat, shallow wicker-work basket or tray.
A cane-like water reed used in the building of kira and other traps: Phragniircs
inauritianus (Gramineae).
See 'Ohunga'
Unknown fish species.
A fish, probably of the Synodontis species.
Snails
A type of non-return basket trap.
Or 'oliingíi, a conical-shaped basket trap used to catch fish and may be set in a kek, or
plunged down in front of the user as s/he wades through the water.
A fish of the Synodontis species.
An eel-like fish, Caecomastacembelus frenatus.
Hook.
See 'mvuil.
A 'Kfra'.
A fish species, possibly of the Brycinus species.
AtN'Gou, the name for a fish of the Mormyrusspccies.
A small sardine-like fish indigenous to Lake Victoria: Rastrineobola argentea.
Unknown fish species.
Hyena.
A Nile perch size-range, this beinghe smallest; also known as 'onyutii.
A
Another name for the lung fish.
See 'Ondild.
Also 'opatd, a tilapia size-range, normally fairly small, some 15 cm. TL.
See 'opa
A bull frog.
Papyrus s'Namp.
The short rains, when the second planting occurs (late August - September).
Ati
ree- e, often used for timber: Treminalia brownii(Combretaceae).
apia size-range.
One haul of the beach seine.
A type of raft, similar to, although larger than, the 'odesd; the name refers to the wood
type used to make it, Aeschynomcne eiaphroxyion (Papi/ionaccae).
A small vegetable garden.
The dry season (November - late February).
A lion-return, conical fish trap.
A small basket used for scooping fish out of a net.
Os/ri
Oso
Osoga
Otea a
Sam
Sao
Sasia
Sejo
Sehoho
Se/ce se/ce
A non-return, conical fish trap, similar to, but smaller than, an osadhe.
To cleanse.
A fish, of the Brycinus species (B. jacksonii or B. sadien).
A kite, normally the black kite.
A fish, Morrnyrus kannume.
A variation on the 'seke se/cd method.
The head of a tasyrus stem.
A machete.
A cast net.
Normally, owned land, but may also be applied to 'owned' water.
'Up', 'sky' or 'lightening'. In the context of this study, it is used to refer to lightening.
Food.
A scoop-net.
The hippopotamus.
A traditional hoe of the Luo.
At Kiumba, the name for a 's/rd.
A fish, of any kind.
A smoking-roasting technique where fish are placed in wood-shavings, and the whole
set alight.
A system of labour exchange, where a group of faiiiiers come together to help one of
their colleagues, who, in return, will help all the others in the group. Also known as
the 'saga system.
See 'Reuwo'.
A type of beach seine.
A bull, or the most senior person in a community, similar to a chief.
See 'nk.
A take fly, often seen in huge, dense swarms flying across the lake.
To scoop.
A medecine which serves to disunite people.
The time fish spawn.
The power derived from being bewitched.
XI
A fishing method; a gill-net is placed in a circular fashion, and the fishermen wade
into its centre, ferretin fish out from beneath rocks.
Sendo due The start of the 'rnudhd.
Set A fishing technique similar to the 'seke se/cd.
Sewandha A hole, cut into papyrus, through which hooks are lowered to catch lung or cat fish.
Sewo A fish species, Barus docmaic.
Shamba (Kis.) A farm or a farmed plot of land.
Shambok (Afrikaans) A short whip normally made from hippo hide.
S/echo A arrangement between two people, where the one has a boat and few or no nets, a:J
the other has nets but no boat, so they team up.
Sienyo A fishing technique reserved for women. Here, a small, conical-shaped basket, open at
both ends, is plunged in front of the user as she wades through the water. Fish caught
are extracted via the hole in the top of the basket.
Sigo! A cage for keeping quail in.
Sika ayo dha A type of algae, often found floating in mats, suspended close to the bed of the lake.
Sikrinawi
Sthgo
Sire A fish, Schilbe mystus.
Soyo To fish for the lung fish with a spear, by prodding it through the papyrus swamp.
Sulcuma week] (Kis.) Kale.
Su/i A tilapia size-range.
Sui we A star
Suma A fish, Mormyrus kannume.
Taff(Luh.) A tilasia size-ran.e, this bein: the lar:est.
Tanga (Kis.) A sail.
At N'Gou, ajuvenile Nile perch.
Literally, 'to herd'. Here, it is used to refer to a fishing technique where the users form
a semicircle around set traps, and then move towards the traps, splashing and agitating
the water in front of them, thus 'herding' the fish towards the traps.
A set net.
In kin dege fishing, when used with lamps, a string of some 5-6 lamps are set on the
lake. The fishermen fish the first, the second and so on. The process from the first and
back to it is one 'triY.
A cast net.
The east.
Maize meal.
A position in a crew. Where the 'kindegd method is used in shallow water, the 'uwayo
gogcl holds the net down to the bed of the lake with his feet; also known as a 'tie
go'd.
Those of the re.ublic; the masses.
Tede
Teng'o
Uwayo gogo
Don't ask me.
To repossess.
A beach.
Plural of'mhindi.
A 'e of surit.
A mythological beast said to be the mother of all fish and extremely dangerous should
it be encountered in the lake. i
Literally, to hoe, where a hoe is used to dig (or hoe) through the papyrus swamp in I
search of lung fish.
Plural of'nizungii
When usin: 'Jdndegd in shallow water, the 'wiopara' holds the net upright.
The wind. It is also used to refer to a condition whose symptoms resemble an allergy,
such as rashes. However, some say yamo also results in boils.
A boat.
A constellation, said to fall from the sky once a year. The descent occurs in two
cohorts, the first being the male yugniin early May, followed by the female yugnitwo
weeks later. The males render the water cool, while the females make it distinctly
cold, driving fish into deeper waters. Fishing at this time is said to be poor, and those
fish caught have a milky film over their eyes.
A tila.ia size-ran:e.
XII
Trip
Tupa tupa (Kis.)
Ugwe
Unja (Kis.)
Yamo
Y/e
Yugni
Zu]
Glossary of fisheries terms used in this study:
A fish which migrats up-stream in order to spawn.
A group of people who see themselves as belonging together with interactive
relationships and who have some common, defined goal they seek to achieve
(Harris, 1992). This goal is normally the survival of the community and the
reproduction of its relations of production.
Sum of units used in fishing. Effort can be measured in terms of boats, fisher-men
or nets. In this thesis, effort refers exclusively to the number of fishermen.
The fishermen and all the gear he uses to catch fish. May include nets, fishing lines
and/or boat.
Any institutional factor which deliberately sets out to conserve a resource base by
influencin access to it.
Informal Regulation
Fisheries
Management
Maximum Economic
Yield
Maximum
Sustainable Yield
Means of Production
Regulation
Relations of
Production
Snood
Standard Length
Swim bladder
Any non institutional trend or factor which serves to affect access to a resource, and
which may not result in the conservation of the resource. May include economic,
cultural, rolitical, social, reliios or ethnic factors.
The sum of technological, knowledge and exploitation tactics which results in the
production of some good, and which may lead to the accumulation of capital.
In a fish stock, the loss from that stock due to death. Normally includes the impact
of fishing.
In a water body, a depth below which there is exists little or no oxygen in solution.
Here, rights of access are conferred on certain users without actually giving them
property rights over the resource. Thus, if fishing communities are given rights to
determine who can fish, they gain some measure of ownership ¡n this way, but no
property rights perse.
Any factor which serves to affect access to a resource
This refers to the sum of technological, social, political, economic and cultural
relationships and structure which result in the production of some good or the
exploitation of some resource.
line.
The length of a fish from it upper lip to the base of its caudal fin.
An organ in most fish species which is filled with air, and which keeps the fish
bou ant should it stop swimming.
Short pieces of twine with hooks attached, fastened at regular intervals along a long
XII
Anadromous (fish)
Community
Effort
Fishing Unit
Formal Regulation
Mortality
Oxycline
Quasi-property rights
Intitutionally based initiates aimed at either conserving a resource base or to
increase the production of a resource base.
The point at which the cost of fishing equals the value of the catch caught per
fishing unit.
The point at which mortality within a fish stock equals reproduction

